On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 7:35 AM, Jeff Law <l...@redhat.com> wrote:
> This patch introduces the stack clash protection options
>
> Changes since V2:
>
> Adds two new params. The first controls the size of the guard area.
> This controls the threshold for when a function prologue requires
> probes. The second controls the probing interval -- ie, once probes are
> needed, how often do we emit them. These are really meant more for
> developers to experiment with than users. Regardless I did go ahead and
> document them./PARAM
>
> It also adds some sanity checking WRT combining stack clash protection
> with -fstack-check.
diff --git a/gcc/params.c b/gcc/params.c
index fab0ffa..8afe4c4 100644
--- a/gcc/params.c
+++ b/gcc/params.c
@@ -209,6 +209,11 @@ set_param_value (const char *name, int value,
error ("maximum value of parameter %qs is %u",
compiler_params[i].option,
compiler_params[i].max_value);
+ else if ((strcmp (name, "stack-clash-protection-guard-size") == 0
+ || strcmp (name, "stack-clash-protection-probe-interval") == 0)
+ && exact_log2 (value) == -1)
+ error ("value of parameter %qs must be a power of 2",
+ compiler_params[i].option);
else
set_param_value_internal ((compiler_param) i, value,
params, params_set, true);
I don't like this. Either use them as if they were power-of-two
(floor_log2/ceil_log2 as appropriate) or simply make them take
the logarithm instead (like -mincoming-stack-boundary and friends).
Both -fstack-clash-protection and -fstack-check cannot be turned
off per function. This means they would need merging in lto-wrapper.
The alternative is to mark them with 'Optimization' and allow per-function
specification (like we do for -fstack-protector).
Otherwise ok.
Richard.
> Jeff
>
>
> * common.opt (-fstack-clash-protection): New option.
> * flag-types.h (enum stack_check_type): Note difference between
> -fstack-check= and -fstack-clash-protection.
> * params.h (set_param_value): Verify stack-clash-protection
> params are powers of two.
> * params.def (PARAM_STACK_CLASH_PROTECTION_GUARD_SIZE): New PARAM.
> (PARAM_STACK_CLASH_PROTECTION_PROBE_INTERVAL): Likewise.
> * toplev.c (process_options): Issue warnings/errors for cases
> not handled with -fstack-clash-protection.
>
>
>
> * doc/invoke.texi (-fstack-clash-protection): Document new option.
> (-fstack-check): Note additional problem with -fstack-check=generic.
> Note that -fstack-check is primarily for Ada and refer users
> to -fstack-clash-protection for stack-clash-protection.
> Document new params for stack clash protection.
>
>
>
>
> * toplev.c (process_options): Handle -fstack-clash-protection.
>
> testsuite/
>
> * gcc.dg/stack-check-2.c: New test.
> * lib/target-supports.exp
> (check_effective_target_supports_stack_clash_protection): New
> function.
> (check_effective_target_frame_pointer_for_non_leaf): Likewise.
> (check_effective_target_caller_implicit_probes): Likewise.
>
>
>
> diff --git a/gcc/common.opt b/gcc/common.opt
> index e81165c..cfaf2bc 100644
> --- a/gcc/common.opt
> +++ b/gcc/common.opt
> @@ -2306,6 +2306,11 @@ fstack-check
> Common Alias(fstack-check=, specific, no)
> Insert stack checking code into the program. Same as -fstack-check=specific.
>
> +fstack-clash-protection
> +Common Report Var(flag_stack_clash_protection)
> +Insert code to probe each page of stack space as it is allocated to protect
> +from stack-clash style attacks
> +
> fstack-limit
> Common Var(common_deferred_options) Defer
>
> diff --git a/gcc/doc/invoke.texi b/gcc/doc/invoke.texi
> index 3e5cee8..8095dc2 100644
> --- a/gcc/doc/invoke.texi
> +++ b/gcc/doc/invoke.texi
> @@ -10128,6 +10128,20 @@ compilation without. The value for compilation with
> profile feedback
> needs to be more conservative (higher) in order to make tracer
> effective.
>
> +@item stack-clash-protection-guard-size
> +The size (in bytes) of the stack guard. Acceptable values are powers of 2
> +between 4096 and 134217728 and defaults to 4096. Higher values may reduce
> the
> +number of explicit probes, but a value larger than the operating system
> +provided guard will leave code vulnerable to stack clash style attacks.
> +
> +@item stack-clash-protection-probe-interval
> +Stack clash protection involves probing stack space as it is allocated. This
> +param controls the maximum distance (in bytes) between probes into the stack.
> +Acceptable values are powers of 2 between 4096 and 65536 and defaults to
> +4096. Higher values may reduce the number of explicit probes, but a value
> +larger than the operating system provided guard will leave code vulnerable to
> +stack clash style attacks.
> +
> @item max-cse-path-length
>
> The maximum number of basic blocks on path that CSE considers.
> @@ -11333,7 +11347,8 @@ target support in the compiler but comes with the
> following drawbacks:
> @enumerate
> @item
> Modified allocation strategy for large objects: they are always
> -allocated dynamically if their size exceeds a fixed threshold.
> +allocated dynamically if their size exceeds a fixed threshold. Note this
> +may change the semantics of some code.
>
> @item
> Fixed limit on the size of the static frame of functions: when it is
> @@ -11348,6 +11363,25 @@ generic implementation, code performance is hampered.
> Note that old-style stack checking is also the fallback method for
> @samp{specific} if no target support has been added in the compiler.
>
> +@samp{-fstack-check=} is designed for Ada's needs to detect infinite
> recursion
> +and stack overflows. @samp{specific} is an excellent choice when compiling
> +Ada code. It is not generally sufficient to protect against stack-clash
> +attacks. To protect against those you want @samp{-fstack-clash-protection}.
> +
> +@item -fstack-clash-protection
> +@opindex fstack-clash-protection
> +Generate code to prevent stack clash style attacks. When this option is
> +enabled, the compiler will only allocate one page of stack space at a time
> +and each page is accessed immediately after allocation. Thus, it prevents
> +allocations from jumping over any stack guard page provided by the
> +operating system.
> +
> +Most targets do not fully support stack clash protection. However, on
> +those targets @option{-fstack-clash-protection} will protect dynamic stack
> +allocations. @option{-fstack-clash-protection} may also provide limited
> +protection for static stack allocations if the target supports
> +@option{-fstack-check=specific}.
> +
> @item -fstack-limit-register=@var{reg}
> @itemx -fstack-limit-symbol=@var{sym}
> @itemx -fno-stack-limit
> diff --git a/gcc/flag-types.h b/gcc/flag-types.h
> index 5faade5..8874cba 100644
> --- a/gcc/flag-types.h
> +++ b/gcc/flag-types.h
> @@ -166,7 +166,14 @@ enum permitted_flt_eval_methods
> PERMITTED_FLT_EVAL_METHODS_C11
> };
>
> -/* Type of stack check. */
> +/* Type of stack check.
> +
> + Stack checking is designed to detect infinite recursion for Ada
> + programs. Furthermore stack checking tries to ensure that scenario
> + that enough stack space is left to run a signal handler.
> +
> + -fstack-check= does not prevent stack-clash style attacks. For that
> + you want -fstack-clash-protection. */
> enum stack_check_type
> {
> /* Do not check the stack. */
> diff --git a/gcc/params.c b/gcc/params.c
> index fab0ffa..8afe4c4 100644
> --- a/gcc/params.c
> +++ b/gcc/params.c
> @@ -209,6 +209,11 @@ set_param_value (const char *name, int value,
> error ("maximum value of parameter %qs is %u",
> compiler_params[i].option,
> compiler_params[i].max_value);
> + else if ((strcmp (name, "stack-clash-protection-guard-size") == 0
> + || strcmp (name, "stack-clash-protection-probe-interval") == 0)
> + && exact_log2 (value) == -1)
> + error ("value of parameter %qs must be a power of 2",
> + compiler_params[i].option);
> else
> set_param_value_internal ((compiler_param) i, value,
> params, params_set, true);
> diff --git a/gcc/params.def b/gcc/params.def
> index 6b07518..2270031 100644
> --- a/gcc/params.def
> +++ b/gcc/params.def
> @@ -213,6 +213,16 @@ DEFPARAM(PARAM_STACK_FRAME_GROWTH,
> "Maximal stack frame growth due to inlining (in percent).",
> 1000, 0, 0)
>
> +DEFPARAM(PARAM_STACK_CLASH_PROTECTION_GUARD_SIZE,
> + "stack-clash-protection-guard-size",
> + "Minimum size (in bytes) of the stack guard, must be a power of 2 >=
> 4096.",
> + 4096, 4096, 134217728)
> +
> +DEFPARAM(PARAM_STACK_CLASH_PROTECTION_PROBE_INTERVAL,
> + "stack-clash-protection-probe-interval",
> + "Interval (in bytes) in which to probe the stack.",
> + 4096, 1024, 65536)
> +
> /* The GCSE optimization will be disabled if it would require
> significantly more memory than this value. */
> DEFPARAM(PARAM_MAX_GCSE_MEMORY,
> diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/stack-check-2.c
> b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/stack-check-2.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..196c4bb
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/stack-check-2.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
> +/* The goal here is to ensure that we never consider a call to a noreturn
> + function as a potential tail call.
> +
> + Right now GCC discovers potential tail calls by looking at the
> + predecessors of the exit block. A call to a non-return function
> + has no successors and thus can never match that first filter.
> +
> + But that could change one day and we want to catch it. The problem
> + is the compiler could potentially optimize a tail call to a nonreturn
> + function, even if the caller has a frame. That breaks the assumption
> + that calls probe *sp when saving the return address that some targets
> + depend on to elide stack probes. */
> +
> +/* { dg-do compile } */
> +/* { dg-options "-O2 -fstack-clash-protection -fdump-tree-tailc
> -fdump-tree-optimized" } */
> +/* { dg-require-effective-target supports_stack_clash_protection } */
> +
> +extern void foo (void) __attribute__ ((__noreturn__));
> +
> +
> +void
> +test_direct_1 (void)
> +{
> + foo ();
> +}
> +
> +void
> +test_direct_2 (void)
> +{
> + return foo ();
> +}
> +
> +void (*indirect)(void)__attribute__ ((noreturn));
> +
> +
> +void
> +test_indirect_1 ()
> +{
> + (*indirect)();
> +}
> +
> +void
> +test_indirect_2 (void)
> +{
> + return (*indirect)();;
> +}
> +
> +
> +typedef void (*pvfn)() __attribute__ ((noreturn));
> +
> +void (*indirect_casted)(void);
> +
> +void
> +test_indirect_casted_1 ()
> +{
> + (*(pvfn)indirect_casted)();
> +}
> +
> +void
> +test_indirect_casted_2 (void)
> +{
> + return (*(pvfn)indirect_casted)();
> +}
> +/* { dg-final { scan-tree-dump-not "tail call" "tailc" } } */
> +/* { dg-final { scan-tree-dump-not "tail call" "optimized" } } */
> +
> diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/lib/target-supports.exp
> b/gcc/testsuite/lib/target-supports.exp
> index fe5e777..25c3c80 100644
> --- a/gcc/testsuite/lib/target-supports.exp
> +++ b/gcc/testsuite/lib/target-supports.exp
> @@ -8468,3 +8468,78 @@ proc check_effective_target_arm_coproc4_ok { } {
> return [check_cached_effective_target arm_coproc4_ok \
> check_effective_target_arm_coproc4_ok_nocache]
> }
> +
> +# Return 1 if the target has support for stack probing designed
> +# to avoid stack-clash style attacks.
> +#
> +# This is used to restrict the stack-clash mitigation tests to
> +# just those targets that have been explicitly supported.
> +#
> +# In addition to the prologue work on those targets, each target's
> +# properties should be described in the functions below so that
> +# tests do not become a mess of unreadable target conditions.
> +#
> +proc check_effective_target_supports_stack_clash_protection { } {
> + if { [istarget aarch*-*-*] || [istarget x86_64-*-*]
> + || [istarget i?86-*-*] || [istarget s390*-*-*]
> + || [istarget powerpc*-*-*] || [istarget rs6000*-*-*] } {
> + return 1
> + }
> + return 0
> +}
> +
> +# Return 1 if the target creates a frame pointer for non-leaf functions
> +# Note we ignore cases where we apply tail call optimization here.
> +proc check_effective_target_frame_pointer_for_non_leaf { } {
> + if { [istarget aarch*-*-*] } {
> + return 1
> + }
> + return 0
> +}
> +
> +# Return 1 if the target's calling sequence or its ABI
> +# create implicit stack probes at or prior to function entry.
> +proc check_effective_target_caller_implicit_probes { } {
> +
> + # On x86/x86_64 the call instruction itself pushes the return
> + # address onto the stack. That is an implicit probe of *sp.
> + if { [istarget x86_64-*-*] || [istarget i?86-*-*] } {
> + return 1
> + }
> +
> + # On PPC, the ABI mandates that the address of the outer
> + # frame be stored at *sp. Thus each allocation of stack
> + # space is itself an implicit probe of *sp.
> + if { [istarget powerpc*-*-*] || [istarget rs6000*-*-*] } {
> + return 1
> + }
> +
> + # s390's ABI has a register save area allocated by the
> + # caller for use by the callee. The mere existence does
> + # not constitute a probe by the caller, but when the slots
> + # used by the callee those stores are implicit probes.
> + if { [istarget s390*-*-*] } {
> + return 1
> + }
> +
> + # Not strictly true on aarch64, but we have agreed that we will
> + # consider any function that pushes SP more than 3kbytes into
> + # the guard page as broken. This essentially means that we can
> + # consider the aarch64 as having a caller implicit probe at
> + # *(sp + 1k).
> + if { [istarget aarch64*-*-*] } {
> + return 1;
> + }
> +
> + return 0
> +}
> +
> +# Targets that potentially realign the stack pointer often cause residual
> +# stack allocations and make it difficult to elimination loops or residual
> +# allocations for dynamic stack allocations
> +proc check_effective_target_callee_realigns_stack { } {
> + if { [istarget x86_64-*-*] || [istarget i?86-*-*] } {
> + return 1
> + }
> + return 0
> +}
> diff --git a/gcc/toplev.c b/gcc/toplev.c
> index e6c69a4..24a00df 100644
> --- a/gcc/toplev.c
> +++ b/gcc/toplev.c
> @@ -1591,6 +1591,26 @@ process_options (void)
> flag_associative_math = 0;
> }
>
> + /* -fstack-clash-protection is not currently supported on targets
> + where the stack grows up. */
> + if (flag_stack_clash_protection && !STACK_GROWS_DOWNWARD)
> + {
> + warning_at (UNKNOWN_LOCATION, 0,
> + "-fstack-clash_protection is not supproted on targets "
> + "where the stack grows from lower to higher addresses");
> + flag_stack_clash_protection = 0;
> + }
> +
> + /* We can not support -fstack-check= and -fstack-clash-protection at
> + the same time. */
> + if (flag_stack_check != NO_STACK_CHECK && flag_stack_clash_protection)
> + {
> + warning_at (UNKNOWN_LOCATION, 0,
> + "-fstack-check= and -fstack-clash_protection are mutually "
> + "exclusive. Disabling -fstack-check=");
> + flag_stack_check = NO_STACK_CHECK;
> + }
> +
> /* With -fcx-limited-range, we do cheap and quick complex arithmetic. */
> if (flag_cx_limited_range)
> flag_complex_method = 0;
>
