-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 A filesystem is strong I completely agree, another program running as admin that has access to it might be not.
Imagine that program can just dump NEW files everywhere (service exploitable I dunno) Now there's a way to abuse it to put a backdoor in C:\Program.exe in HP included related drivers. Or I could be mistaken, but I see every security as weak as its weakest point. On 05/21/2014 03:57 PM, Tavis Ormandy wrote: > On 21 May 2014 02:13, Project Un1c0rn <project.un1c...@yandex.com> > wrote: >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 >> >> I really don't get those kind of arguments. >> > > It's simple, if your exploit requires Administrator access, then > it's probably not a security issue. Filesystem ACLs are a > supported security boundary, being able to defeat them would be a > legitimate and important vulnerability. Inventing attacks that > require them to fail as a pre-requisite is like saying "If you can > modify /etc/passwd, then...". > > Hopefully you agree that using your Administrator access to replace > or modify system files or settings is not a security issue. > >> If there's a risk that combined with some other flaw that can be >> exploited later (dunno, dropping NEW exe in the root for eg.), >> fix the risk. > > The bug would be being able to defeat filesystem ACLs; if you have > a way of doing that without Administrator access, you have a > security bug. That doesn't need to be combined with anything else, > it's a serious vulnerability. > >> Security is not thinking, naaaah should be ok nobody can touch >> that dir ... or noooo plain text passwords are OK because my db >> is on a private network ... >> >> Damn it ... No kidding there's thousands of systems out there >> vulnerable because they think cloudflare protects them. >> >> Think for yourself ... Hackers don't take you with one single >> point of failure, they combine them. >> > > Uh, Thanks, I'll keep that in mind. > >> - --------- >> >> Project Un1c0rn http://un1c0rn.net http://unicorntufgvuhbi.onion >> >> On 05/21/2014 06:10 AM, Tavis Ormandy wrote: >>> "Stefan Kanthak" <stefan.kant...@nexgo.de> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi @ll, >>>> >>>> several programs of the current Windows 7 driver software for >>>> the "HP OfficeJet 6700" multifunction device execute a rogue >>>> program C:\Program.exe >>>> >>>> >>> >>> It sounds like a bug, but why is this a security issue? I can >>> only imagine two possible scenarios >>> >>> 1. You've somehow made the root parition FAT32, in which case >>> you're using a non-securable filesystem; Therefore not a >>> security issue. 2. You've set a bad ACL on the root directory, >>> therefore user error. >>> >>> If you believe otherwise, please post details, as that would be >>> an interesting discovery. >>> >>> Tavis. >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ Sent through >>> the Full Disclosure mailing list >>> http://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & >>> RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ >>> > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Icedove - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJTfMbUAAoJEK+8lBMTEzs6yRMP/jS+Jg1lAf2Y8hZPb3M/bmXb Y5LzhPTXP1ASoYDE7edC5al6ljmDgQ8nrWd+0Z6p+EEOnoIXkOQ9TktAXWX52ABX yILSJwifyrODAjLMUt6H8zbyOU6ZSdIbKM1UI0FBG7JBl7fMeVO3cEV8sYW7YWCc HNQZheyhkwPNvDI+mUU5QoXDq54dK5/bVbbXZideakFcJDrQj6RQ1LGS6hESXTrA lnAZB+QfwTDrVGGaffXAscEIaCSTbU3ZaBZl9sEtoA8wkCjT7FQGj8W4YoFhHq/w 884Z+/20RBm/CmV33vswDrGZZMsKXdt/qyx39viGeR0/hnLgovG1AgUILiaKx1I5 pUy+FIfIieHxv5FzTshBg7LI9EoDOQrUU+qF/qyXV3a0o7w8C/GufHqfHwWiPhFm 9irscbgMZlyyoyomh69j+9KecCR4SrDdhDNxBccRXGL7BTchoG6fdE5cmBt1PoNw LlTumzXl/FH/ZT5rfm7/SnrlJvpAv1M6yLM+O4DPyQDPyngepYUc94k8uXwBeec5 hAwMoEPll0F4m2XfyflV7/0x3kYFgWhBA6PBbGRh8n09/cw69S+I/09eCDhsCOKo MlM+ONMq53WfrUiLKOLu1U0QmUSSLoFD8CnFlcCxrsrugdwwuzCp3KaEFIo9j8z9 AOq6iIyeYrh8FLY/0B1k =myN8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list http://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
