On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 11:32:21PM -0700, Paul Vixie wrote:
[...]
really bruce? on a scale of doesn't-matter-at-all to
worst-thing-you-could-have-previously-imagined, a read only exploit is
even worse than that?
With all due respect to your ego Paul, I think you might under-estimate the
long term effects: private keys get stolen, this allows people to play
man-in-the-middle, people (the masses) will renew their certificates but
might re-use their generated private keys because the don't know exactly
what they are doing, etc.
As the EFF's traces back into 2013 might tell us, some bad guys exploited
this for some time now. If this is the case, we might soon arrive at the
conclusion that we need to exchange all certificates which had been created
in the last two years.
While I hope it tends to your interpretation, I fear a bit that it might be
Bruces in the long run.
--jc
--
A great many of today's security technologies are "secure" only because
no-one has ever bothered attacking them. -- Peter Gutmann
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