You're forgetting about certificate pinning which defeats MiTM if the certificate is issued by an unauthorized CA.
For example, here at Twitter we have certificate pinning in all of our clients to ensure SSL certificates are only signed by trusted CAs and as well as Chrome. Emerging standards like TACK and DANE will help greatly with this issue. -j On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 3:12 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > On 22-Oct-2013 16:14:00 -0400, David Miller wrote: > > > After the PRISM and other Snowden leaks, inquiring minds want to > > know: whose SSL certs are to be trusted? > > Is a self-signed cert likely to be stronger? > > Obviously, yes: any issuer in any country may be forced (by local > authorities) to issue a valid certificate for any host or domain, > so no one will be able to distinguish between original host with > updated certificate and MitM proxy operated by feds. > > > -- > Alexey V. Vissarionov aka Gremlin from Kremlin <gremlin ПРИ gremlin ТЧК ru> > GPG: 8832FE9FA791F7968AC96E4E909DAC45EF3B1FA8 @ hkp://keys.gnupg.net > > _______________________________________________ > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. > Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ >
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