On Thu, May 16, 2013 at 5:41 PM, Kirils Solovjovs <[email protected]> wrote: > You may have read about this in another list. > http://lists.randombit.net/pipermail/cryptography/2013-May/004224.html > http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001430.html > > > I'd like to give out some observations and point out some not so obvious > risks (as if Microsoft Skypying™ on your conversations is not enough). > > Requests always come from the same IP 65.52.100.214. > They have referrer and user agent set to a dash "-". > They are always HEAD requests which immediately follow 302 redirects. > They access both http and https links despite some speculations saying that > they do it one way or the other. > This is a relatively new phenomena that by my accounts is happening since > the end of April 2013. ... > Back to the point. Now that it's clear that [at least] links from users' > private chats somehow magically end up at Redmond, it's obviously a privacy > issue of having some usernames/password/sessions/whatever embedded in the > URL. There could be legal concerns here too (if a prosecutor takes interest if folks besides the Swartz's of the world).
I can't wait to see the first CFAA violation brought against interception services like these. Consider: the owner of the remote server surely did not authorize the interception service to access the site with a user's username and password. That's a clear violation of exceeding one's authority under the CFAA since the interception service had no authority from the server's owners. Jeff _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
