Frank, it was definitely a panic attack, but with a strange sense of observing myself having one. I have had similar experiences where I was aware that my body was going into shock, but somehow remaining independent and being able to "manage" the process with meditation and breathing techniques.
This is definitely a provocation for the consciousness deniers — I not only feel conscious, but simultaneously meta-conscious. *:)* davew On Tue, Dec 28, 2021, at 5:37 PM, Frank Wimberly wrote: > Dave, > > Would you call the anxiety you experienced a "panic attack"? I've had a > couple each of which was stimulated by a dream in which I was going to be > trapped inside of something (claustrophobia). In each case it took > medication to dissipate the intense anxiety. Also, I think I had a milder > attack when I first smoked marijuana in 1966. Given my background it's > tempting to understand the intense ones as unconscious memories of birth. > > --- > Frank C. Wimberly > 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, > Santa Fe, NM 87505 > > 505 670-9918 > Santa Fe, NM > > On Tue, Dec 28, 2021, 4:38 PM Prof David West <profw...@fastmail.fm> wrote: >> An experiential (400 mike trip): >> >> In the beginning there was Nothing — the Singularity. Then a quite >> literally impossible differentiation occurred; setting of a chain reaction >> of differentiation and hence Something(s). >> >> This experience parallels the Taoist dictum that from One came Two, from Two >> Four, and from Four Everything. Of course I was aware of Taoism before I had >> the experience, so maybe what I "observed" was merely a visualization of a >> concept encountered decades ago. >> >> BTW, this was the closest I ever felt at mental risk. Part of the experience >> was observing two "flawless diamond necklaces" then descending into an >> infinite recursion of differentiation: e.g. one necklace had an imperfect >> diamond, the diamond had a near invisible flaw, a single atom in the lattice >> was misaligned, a quantum string was vibrating incorrectly, ... . It was >> actually anxiety inducing as I watched my mind tripping out. >> >> davew >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 28, 2021, at 12:50 PM, glen wrote: >> > It's OK. I fixed your larding format. >> > >> > Just like with your challenge to what "possible" means, we have to also >> > challenge the use of "random". You can't say "experience is random" >> > without some kind of _set_ or _space_ of experiences from which to >> > choose. E.g. it makes sense to say things like "There exist a black >> > ball and a white ball. Choose one at random." It does not make sense to >> > say "There exists nothing. Choose an experience at random." >> > >> > So we need some sense of a set of experiences from which to choose. We >> > can conflate concepts like "choice", "select", and "random" together, I >> > think. But we have to talk seriously about what *exists* ... the set of >> > things from which the selection selects. This is where Lewis has an >> > advantage. Anything that could exist, does exist. We don't have to >> > worry about construction of nothing to something, from a little bit of >> > stuff to a lot of stuff, etc. It's all already out there. >> > >> > But to toss in a little more grist just to help skip over all this to >> > get to the question: >> > >> > Then we have to talk about what you're calling repetitions or >> > regularities ... "laws", rules to which the extant things adhere (or >> > would/will adhere if we ever got around to >> > measuring/perceiving/experiencing them). As I've ranted, there are 2 >> > features we probably want: consistency and completeness. Any 2 things >> > from the set of extant things shouldn't contradict each other. And the >> > set of extant things has to be complete. I.e. we can't dream up stuff >> > that is NOT in the set. >> > >> > This is where counterfactuals play a role. When we talk about different >> > things within a world versus different worlds, we're talking about >> > contradictions/inconsistencies. But counterfactuals come in 2 senses, >> > the (broader?) linguistic one (future [plu]perfect?) and the >> > (specific?) logical one. >> > >> > I think we could derive a way of *counting* worlds based on the way we >> > *count* things within a world. >> > >> > Without that minutiae out of the way, back to the question: Regardless >> > of whether the choice of things from a world, or the choices of a world >> > is *random* or not, when we talk about regularities/patters over >> > collections of worlds, is that probabilistic? Or is it a clear case of >> > sizes/measures of those collections? My guess at the answer is that >> > every particular world will always be distinguishable (observability) >> > from every other particular world. There are no equivalence classes >> > unless we gloss/abstract some predicate/selector/choice. But maybe >> > there *are* some inevitable equivalence classes ... like >> > complementarity in quantum mechanics, where something is always >> > unobservable, unreachable, behind the ontological wall. If that's the >> > case, then our choice/selection methods must be probabilistic, a >> > partial versus total ordering/sizing. >> > >> > Please remember that I don't *believe* any of this, personally. I'm >> > simply building a defensible answer to the question "Why is there >> > something, rather than nothing?" >> > >> > On 12/28/21 11:10, thompnicks...@gmail.com wrote: >> >> On 12/28/21 09:30, glen wrote: >> >>> >> >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Best_of_all_possible_worlds >> >>> >> >>> We see something like this in evolutionary justifications of various >> >>> phenotypic traits, the most egregious being evolutionary psychology, but >> >>> including Nick's hyena penis and the ontological status of epiphenomena. >> >>> Yes, I'm posting this in part because of EricC's kindasorta Voltaire-ish >> >>> response to what might seem like my Leibnizian defense of bureaucracy. >> >>> But I'm also hoping y'all could help with the question I ask later. >> >>> >> >>> Of course, I'm more on Spinoza's (or Lewis') side, here, something >> >>> closer to a commitment to the existence of all possible worlds. I'm in a >> >>> running argument at our pub salon about the metaphysical question "Why >> >>> is there something, rather than nothing?" My personal answer to that >> >>> question, unsatisfying to the philosopher who asked it, is that this is >> >>> either a nonsense question *or* it relies fundamentally on the ambiguity >> >>> in the concepts of "something" and "nothing". Every denial of the other >> >>> proposed answers (mostly cosmological) involves moving the goal posts or >> >>> invoking persnickety metaphysical assumptions that weren't laid out when >> >>> the question was asked. ... it's just a lot of hemming and hawing by >> >>> those who want to remain committed to their own romantic nonsense. >> >>> >> >> Ok, I don’t know whether my nonsense is romantic, but here it is. >> >> Experience is essentially random. So, to answer the question, there is >> >> mostly nothing. Indeed, experience seems often to repeat itself, but all >> >> random processes repeat themselves, and so are still nothing. Every once >> >> in a while, however, such repetitions are so persistent as to beyond our >> >> capacity to shrug them off as random, and these experiences are >> >> somethings. >> >> >> >>> But a better answer might be something like: Because the size of the set >> >>> of possible worlds where there is something is *so much larger* than the >> >>> size of the set of worlds where there is nothing. And one might even >> >>> argue that all the possible worlds where there is nothing are >> >>> degenerate, resulting in only 1 possible world with nothing. [⛧] >> >>> >> >>> I don't think this is a probabilistic argument. But I'm too ignorant to >> >>> be confident in that. Can any of you argue one way or the other? Is this >> >>> argument from size swamping probabilistic, combinatorial? Or can I take >> >>> a Lewisian stance and assert that all the possible worlds do, already, >> >>> exist and this is just a numbers thing? >> >> OOOOOPS! My always-slippery grasp on the word “possible” has failed. >> >> What do we mean, in this context, by “possible”? >> > >> > -- >> > glen >> > Theorem 3. 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