I would say that Peirce is concerned with determining what is true in this actual world. That water decomposes into hydrogen and oxygen in a certain ratio under certain experimental conditions, is the type of thing we will (presumably) continue to agree about until the end times, i.e., it is "true". (That ratio isn't exactly 2 hydrogen for every 1 oxygen, but it is reasonably close.)
Can we imagine a world in which water decomposes in some other fashion? I'm not sure exactly what that discussion is. Would we say something like: Sure, but then it wouldn't be "water" Or would we say something like: Yes, that could definitely be a possible world, but their "water" wouldn't be exactly the same as our water. At any rate.... The Philosophical Zombie Problem is the type of thing that is faux deep, and I thought it deserved to be ridiculed, and I think it makes as much sense when talking about couches as when talking about people. So... I was mostly just trying to make that point. (Ditto with the "Stomach in Jar" entry mocking the "Brian in a Vat" thought experiment.) There might be a conversation something like it that would have a bit of depth, but instead it is almost entirely linguistic trickery masquerading as deep thoughts. ----------- <[email protected]> On Sat, Nov 20, 2021 at 9:39 PM Jon Zingale <[email protected]> wrote: > "As an experience-monist, I believe either that all worlds are possible > or no worlds are possible. Also, as an experience-monist (but not as a > behaviorist) I am allowed to experience the world in a variety of ways, > as present, as past, as future, as fantasy, as dreams, and, as possible, > or impossible." > > I gather that you mean something like, "Any experience is possible", but > I am not sure that this coincides with the usage of "possible worlds" as > it occurs in EricC's Wikipedia reference, *possible worlds* in the sense > of Kripke. In Kripke, "possible worlds" logic is used as a kind of foil > for speaking about a priori and a posteriori truths. Kripke distinguishes > between those propositions which are necessarily true (in that they are > true for every possible world) and those propositions which are possibly > true (in that they are true for at least one possible world). As far as > I can reason at present, your ontological commitments are to "Peircean > Truth" wherein propositions are only "true" if they are true for every > possible world, i.e., necessary truth. Those propositions which are > unstable, or vary across "worlds", I imagine for Peirce, are nothing at > all. How poorly do I understand your position relative to this context? > > .-- .- -. - / .- -.-. - .. --- -. ..--.. / -.-. --- -. .--- ..- --. .- - . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn UTC-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: > 5/2017 thru present https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >
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