And I quote:
When one proclaims oneself to be an antirepresentationalist, as proponents of radical embodied cognitive science do, there are two things one might be saying. First, one might be making a claim about the nature of cognitive systems, namely that nothing in them is a representation. For the rest o this chapter I will call this the metaphysical claim. Second, one might be claiming that our best explanation of cognitive systems will not involve representations. I will call this the epistemological claim. These are pretty clearly separate claims. It is easy to imagine, for example, that the metaphysical claim is true and that humans really are just complex dynamical systems, but they are so complex that the best way for us (with our limited intellects) to explain them is by metaphorically or instrumentally ascribing [to] them mental representation. [Chemero, A. 2011. Radical embodied cognitive science. MIT: Cambridge, MA. p67.] Given the pragmatic Maxim concerning meaning, that the meaning of a term is just those practices of investigation that the term's use would imply, how is this passage not anti-pragmatic? What other truth is there but a metaphorically or instrumentally best explanation? Chemero's overall position is that his RADICAL embodied cognitive science is the only rightful heir of the American Naturalism of which Peirce and James are the progenitors. Therefore you, many FRIAMMERS just might just see this as a internecine dustup in the anti-representationalist coven, and because you are computationalists (ergo, representationalists), ignore it. That's OK. Others may say "-ist, -ist, ist; blah, blah blah." That's ok too. But perhaps those few of you who are members of the coven may want to help me square this circle. Nick Nick Thompson thompnicks...@gmail.com <mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
.-- .- -. - / .- -.-. - .. --- -. ..--.. / -.-. --- -. .--- ..- --. .- - . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn UTC-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ archives: 5/2017 thru present https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/
