Leibniz tried to reconcile determinism and free will. He used the metaphor of 
"windowless individuals": we can not see the personality of another person - 
unless we experience how a person acts and reacts, i.e. if we do not know the 
personal history, there is no window where we can observe the character of 
someone. In this sense the hard problem of consciousness appears to be a 
problem but is in fact a solution of another problem: the combination of 
determinism and free will. The actions of a person are determined, but it is 
normally unknown to others by what influences. Because of this lack of 
knowledge the actions seem to be undetermined, although they are not.Is this an 
interesting idea or just nonsense? What do you think? -J. 
-------- Original message --------From: Jochen Fromm <j...@cas-group.net> Date: 
2/27/21  22:29  (GMT+01:00) To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee 
Group <friam@redfish.com> Subject: [FRIAM] Subjective experience & free will I 
am reading a book about Leibniz and started to wonder if the hard problem of 
consciousness could be the reason why we have the illusion of free will and can 
not predict how others will act. From the outside a person seems to have free 
will in principle. From the inside everybody feels something different and is 
controlled by emotions based on subjective experience, which is unknown to 
others, because the individual is not transparent and the history is not 
known.Once we investigate the life of a person, for example by a detective as 
part of a criminal investigation, or as movie viewers in a cinema, we start to 
understand why a person acts they way it does. The more we step into the 
footsteps of a person, the better we understand the feelings, goals and 
motives.Could it be that the same thing which  prevents us from understanding 
the subjective experiences of others also creates the illusion of free will?-J.
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