Politically charged question to follow. Unlike my usual wont, I am not trying to be provocative. I pick a difficult example for my question in the hope that it will generate enough heat to produce light with the hope that the light will illuminate clarity.
Pierce said: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." The Donald is our object. 1- Can we enumerate the "effects with conceivably practical bearings" we expect our object to have? 2- Must the enumeration include both "positive" and "negative" effects? 2a- does the answer to #2 depend on the definition of "our?" If 'our' is defined inclusively the answer to #2 would seem to be yes, but if 'our' is exclusive or restricted to only those with pro or anti perspectives/convictions, maybe not. 3- Must the effects we conceive have some threshold measure of a quality we might call 'truthiness', 'likelihood', 'believe-ability', reality'? [T becoming a dictator is a conceivable effect, but, I for one, see no possibility of that effectuating.] 4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object? 5- If we have myriad enumerations does that mean "we" cannot possess a conception of the object, merely multiple conceptions of caricatures of the object? I'm working on a paper with an epistemological focus and that brought me to Pierce and prompted the above questions. Another question for the evolutionists who are also pragmatists: why pragmatism over "naturalized epistemology?" davew ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
