I'm struggling to reconcile something she said from the presentation with what's said in the paper. In the presentation, she said (my probably flawed transcription) "The original vision was: we'd ask about concrete things. And we'd ask about abstract things. And we were expecting to see more agreement for things like cups and bowls and maybe more disagreement for abstract concepts like love and war. Instead what we found was a surprising amount of variance for both abstract and concrete concepts, though people do agree more for some concepts than others. ... even in the same context, people's concepts can vary quite a bit."
And in the paper they say something like "Thus, while our certainty might be a useful guide with regard to perceptual decisions, such as trying to locate a friend yelling for help in the middle of the woods, it may be misleading in higher-level domains, such as deciding whether to see a chiropractor versus a medical doctor." So, in the talk, the contrast is between concrete and abstract, whereas in the paper, the contrast is between perceptual versus higher-level. I worry that your contrast (physical vs. metaphysical) might well be orthogonal to both of those other contrasts. Even if by "physical", you intend something like "perceptual", your contrast with metaphysical evokes the abstract (e.g. Platonic forms or whatever). Since I don't really understand what your contrast means, my question is more about her 2: 1) concrete vs. abstract, and 2) perceptual vs. higher-level. In the talk, she says there's similar concept-mismatching variation across (1). In the paper, they say accuracy of certainty is distinct within (2) (more accurate with perceptual concepts). This is either something paradoxical and I'm missing the resolution. *Or* there's a counter intuitive result lurking. According to (1), my certainty about your concept of "cup" should be just as inaccurate as my certainty about your concept of "centroid". But according to (2), the former should be more accurate than the latter. What am I missing? On 12/30/19 1:53 PM, Roger Critchlow wrote: > The sub-fact I liked, which might be in the Daxxy paper, is that people are > very good at evaluating their certainty with respect to facts about the > physical environment, but that same feeling of certainty is all over the > place respecting the metaphysical environment. I guess we've known that for > a while. -- ☣ uǝlƃ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
