"Absent a "true" description at its root, a theory becomes a Jenga tower of speculation"
Ah, I see you've been to an American Psychological Association conference! That aside... ;- ) .... thank you for this excellent critique! I will endeavor to do it justice in reply when I get to a real computer. Best, Eric On Tue, Dec 24, 2019, 7:26 AM Prof David West <profw...@fastmail.fm> wrote: > Lacking the wit tore- weave the argument that has unraveled into several > threads and posts; an attempt to begin afresh from one of the points of > origin - the Introduction to a book by Nick and Eric. > > First a common ascription: " A description is understood as a simple > statement of a fact, whereas an explanation is an interpretation. A > description simply says what happened, whereas an explanation says why it > happened." > > Followed by an argument that description and explanation are pretty close > to the same thing: all descriptions explain; all explanations describe, > and both are in some sense, interpretations. > > Then a discussion that leads right back to the same distinction: > "Descriptions are explanations that the speaker and audience take to be > true for the purpose of seeking further explanations. Conversely, > explanations are descriptions that the speaker and audience hold to be > unverified under the present circumstances." > > There is, however, a (in my mind) subtle error here, in that the assertion > just quoted uses the word "true" as if it was the same thing as "assumed > for the purposes of argument" — the conclusion of the argument about > differences — which it is not. Similarly, "unverified" is not the same as > "contested absent further information;." > > I presume that this error? was intentional, as they need descriptions and, > later, models to have this "truthiness" quality. > > The discussion of explanations as models with 'basic" and "surplus" > implications (surplus being divided into "intended" and "unintended") > parallels and, except for vocabulary, duplicates McCormac's discussion of > the evolution of metaphor from epiphor to either "lexical term" or "dead > metaphor." [Unlike Glen, I have no difficulty with metaphor as a kind of > philosopher's stone for sense-making in science.] > > The discussion of levels of explanations is where the need for "truthy" > descriptions comes back into play. Somewhere in our hierarchy of models is > the need for a "true" purely descriptive model. Even within any given model > there is a need to accept the "Basic Meaning" as being "true" and purely > descriptive, so we can go about researching and verifying (or not) the > intended "surplus meanings." > > Although it is evident how and why they need "truth" in order to proceed > with their discussion and argument, I am unwilling to grant it. For me, > both explanations and descriptions are "interpretations" with no > qualitative differentiation. > > Their goal is to be "scientific" and so "truthy" models must remain and > become fundamental to the evaluation of explanations. Evaluation is taken > to be a two step process, with each step having three aspects. > > Specify the explanation: > 1. find the foundational (root of the theory) "true" description. > 2. expose the model - i.e. the metaphor. > 3. expose the intended surplus implications such that research can begin > to verify/disprove them. > Evaluate the explanation > 1. discard the explanation if there are no surplus implications exposed > for investigation. > 2. confirm the basic implications > 3. prove some number of the intended surplus implications to be "true." > > Nice and tidy - except it does not / cannot work this way. Just like the > "scientific method" in general, this construct can serve, at best, as an > after the fact rationalization of a course of investigation. > > Absent a "true" description at its root, a theory becomes a Jenga tower of > speculation. > > "Confirmation" of basic implications is too often a "political" exercise — > so too any "proving" of surplus implications as "true" — witness the > Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Physics. (Or, in the case of 'proving" > things, the fact that string theory and many other quantum theories > generate no testable intentional surplus implications.) > > It is far too easy to move inconvenient (i.e. unprovable) "intended > surplus implications to the "unintended' category — witness Artificial > Intelligence and the mind-is-computer-is-mind model/metaphor. > > The "unintended" surplus implications might, more often than not, be more > important than the "intended" ones — witness epigenetics. > > Reliance on models, even structured models like those proposed, eliminates > "context" because all models are, if not abstractions, simplifications; > focusing only on what is deemed 'relevant." > > This last point makes me want to read the rest of Eric's and Nick's book, > because I suspect I would find agreement with the last point of my > argument. I surmise this from the all to brief mention that: "we will find > that the problem Darwin’s theory does suffer from is that it is wrong. > Yes…Wrong! Darwinian Theory is wrong in a much more limited sense – > empirical evidence shows that a comprehensive explanation for adaptation > will require the inclusion of other explanatory principles, to complement > the explanatory power of natural selection. " > > Which brings me to a concluding question: can 'broken-wing' behavior > convey an evolutionary advantage to the Killdeer absent a mechanism the > maintains the gullibility of the Fox? It would seem to me that Foxes whose > behavior ignored the Killdeer feint would be better fed (eggs and > nestlings) than those that were fooled and therefore obtain an evolutionary > advantage that would, eventually make the Killdeer seek an alternative > strategy. > > An off-hand BTW — I much prefer postmodern methods of deconstruction as a > methodology; not to find "Truth" which does not exist, IMO, but simply to > keep the investigation lively and honest. > > davew > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC <http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/FRIAM-COMIC> > http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
