Maybe, but I'm literally on my way to visit Glen in Portland. Actually... to visit daughter and grandson and much more but hoping to see him on the trip! I'll take a closer look in the next few days and see if there is anything I can add.
- Steve On 8/22/19 7:25 PM, Nick Thompson wrote: > Hi, Glen, > > This is one of those moments when Steve Smith may be able to rescue my > ability to participate further in this conversation by making a translation. > Steve? Can you help here? > > By the way, I am still puzzled by how one makes inferences or explanations > without categories and/or principles? Can you give me an example from > everyday life? > > So, the way into my basement requires passing through a low doorway. Every > year, in the first week we come here, I go down there and ram my head on the > top of the door. Ok, so the next time I go down, as soon as I enter the > passageway leading to the door, I feel uneasy ...."This is like the time I > bumped my head" ... and, unless I am demented by haste, I duck my head. > Simple as this example is, still it involves (on my account, anyway), the > application of a principle to a category. > > Which suggests to me that when you seem to talk about rule-less thinking > (unruly thinking?), you actually talking about choosing among different sorts > of rules and categories, how we decide amongst them, when we decide to give > up on one and employ another. > > Perhaps this is a way of asking the same question: As you understand > "deontological" thought, how is it different from plain-old logical thought? > > Nick > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology > Clark University > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > -----Original Message----- > From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of u?l? ? > Sent: Thursday, August 22, 2019 1:49 PM > To: friam@redfish.com > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] abduction and casuistry > > Maybe to give context to my hand-wavey colloquial nonsense below, I *really* > like Gabbay and Woods' [†] formulation of an "abductive schema": > >> Let Δ=(A_1,…,A_n) be a *database* of some kind. It could be a theory or an >> inventory of beliefs, for example. Let ⊢ be a *yielding relation*, or, in >> the widest possible sense, a consequence relation. Let Τ be a given wff >> (well-formulated formula) representing, e.g., a fact, a true proposition, >> known state of affairs, etc. And let A_(n+j), j=1,…,k be wffs. Then >> <Δ,⊢,Τ,A_(n+j)> is an abductive resolution if and only if the following >> conditions hold. >> >> 1. Δ⋃{A_(n+j)} ⊢ Τ >> 2. Δ⋃{A_(n+j)} is a consistent set >> 3. Δ ⊬ Τ >> 4. {A_(n+j)} ⊬ Τ >> >> The generality of this schema allows for variable interpretations of ⊢. In >> standard AI approaches to abduction there is a tendency to treat ⊢ as a >> classical deductive consequence. But, as we have seen, this is >> unrealistically restrictive. > (Emphasis is theirs, at least in the draft copy I have.) They go on to assert: > >> ⊢ can be treated as a relation which gives with respect to Τ *whatever* >> property the investigator (the abducer) is interested in Τ's having, and >> which is not delivered by Δ alone or by {A_(n+j)} alone. > In my colloquial description, Δ is the collection of old dots there at the > start of the process and Τ is the new dot. It's open whether or not the set > of wffs (A) are also dots or part of the connections drawn between them, > depending on how you feel about *dot composition* (e.g. subsets of dots that > are all very close together, so we just draw them as one big dot or somesuch) > and scale/resolution. Rule (2) is *clearly* a rule for how the dots can be > connected. In general, consistency is also an ambiguous concept. > > As always, I'm probably wrong about whatever it is Gabbay and Woods are > saying. Any errors are mine. But maybe their words above can give some > context for how I feel about "reasoning from particulars". > > [†] https://www.powells.com/book/-9780444517913 > > > > On 8/22/19 8:26 AM, glen∈ℂ wrote: >> First, did you miss Dave's contribution? It was more on-topic than mine! >> >> On Rigor: Yes, there's quite a bit of what you say I can agree with. But >> only if I modify *my* understanding of "rigor". I think rigor is any >> methodical, systematic behavior to which one adheres to strictly. It is the >> fidelity, the strict adherence that defines "rigor", not the underlying >> structure of the method or system. And in that sense, one can be rigorously >> anti-method. Rigorously pro-method means adhering to that method and never >> making exceptions. Rigorously anti-method means *never* following a method >> and paying (infinite) attention to all exceptions, i.e. treating everything >> as a single instance particular, an exception. I grant that "methodical >> anti-method" is a paradox... but only that, not a contradiction. >> >> On monism vs. monotheism: The simple answer is "no". I'm not confusing the >> two. By reducing every-stuff to one-stuff, *and* talking about types of >> inference like ab-, in-, and de-duction, you are being (at least in my view) >> axiomatic, with a formal system based on 1 ur-element. Everything else in >> the formal system has to be derived from that ur-element via rules. To boot, >> your attempt to classify casuistry and abduction (same or different is >> irrelevant, it's the classification effort that matters) argues for some >> sort of formalization of them. A/The formalization of abduction is an active >> research topic. My use of the word "deontological" was intended to refer to >> this rule-based, axiomatic way of thinking. I'm sorry if that lead to a red >> herring off into moral philosophy land. >> >> On inferring from particulars: While it's true that induction builds a >> predicate around a particular, it is a "closed" set. (Scare quotes because >> "closed" can mean so much.) Abduction doesn't build predicates and any >> explanation it does build is "open" in some sense. So, I would agree with >> you that one can't really *argue* from a particular using abduction. I tend >> to think of it more like brain storming, in a kindasorta Popperian, open >> way. Any proto-hypothesis can be brought to bear on the abductive target. >> And the best we can do is play around with the abductive target to see if it >> might kindasorta *fit* into that open set of proto-hypotheses. Once you land >> on a set of proto-hypotheses that's small enough to be feasibly formulated >> into testable hypotheses, then you reason by induction over those hypotheses. >> >> In some ways, this would be very like what I, in my ignorance, think >> casuistry is. I'd argue that an experimentalist's focus on putting data >> taking in 1st priority and hypothesis formulation in 2nd priority falls in >> the same camp. So, I agree that casuistry looks a lot like abduction. But I >> don't think that that criminologist was doing either of them. >> >> On ontology vs. rules *and* reasoning from particulars: The proto-hypotheses >> I mention above do not have to take the form of "rules to apply" to the >> abductive target. Think of the game "connect the dots", where the dots are >> particulars and they are/can be interpolated and/or extrapolated by an >> infinite number of lines between them. On the one hand, more dots can make >> it more difficult to find a pattern that includes the *new* dot, but perhaps >> only when you're already pre-biased with a set of lines that connect the old >> dots. On the other hand, if you're rule-free when you look at the old set of >> dots *and* rule-free when you look at them with the new dot included, you're >> open to any set of connecting lines. >> >> Of course, in science, we do have an ur-rule ... that *all* the dots must be >> connected. So, that constrains the set of lines that connect the dots. And >> the more dots, the fewer ways there are to connect them. But practicality >> demands that we doubt at least some dots. So, we're allowed to throw out the >> weakest dots if that allows us to form more interesting connective patterns. >> >> So, in this scenario, the proto-hypotheses are really just collections of >> old dots in which the new dot must sit. We're not reasoning from *one* >> particular to testable hypotheses. We're reasoning from the addition of that >> particular to collections of other particulars. > -- > ☣ uǝlƃ > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove > ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
