Jon,

 

I wrote this immediately but forgot to send it. 

 

I have to say, the idea of a squandered metaphor really grabbed me.  I may have 
squandered some metaphors, in my own time.  A metaphor is definitely something 
that can be used prematurely or other than for its highest and best use.   

 

I am not sure what monads and monism have to do with each other, other than 
that they share a linguistic root.  Honest.  I have trouble seeing the 
connection.  

 

As I understand it, “monism” is a philosophical position that asserts that 
there is only one kind of stuff.  There are materialist monists, idealist 
monists, and neutral monists.  My “experience monism” (which I attribute to 
Peirce) is meant to be a form of neutral monism.  It makes no claim, takes no 
interest in, any claim that “experience” is either “in the mind” or “of the 
world”.  Experience just is.  Experiences represent only other experiences.  

 

I don’t have much of a grip on MonADism.  As I understand monads, they are 
irreduceable “atoms” of existence.  They have no innards.   Now I suppose [he 
said, thinking aloud] that I might believe that everything that is consists of 
irreduceable particles of unchanging properties … and that would be a monist 
monadism.  

 

I am still tantalized by the thought that “you-guys” know something that arises 
from the depth of your practice that could be put into words for a person like 
me.  I have written a little on metaphors in science, published less.  But what 
I have learned suggests that the more specific and the less handwavey a 
metaphor is, the more “juice” it has.  In that connection, I was sorry we 
didn’t pursue further John Balwit’s example of Goedel, Escher, and Bach, as a 
book that points into the heart of computation by describing three different 
practices that are peripheral to it and inviting the reader to get a feel for 
what they have in common.   

 

I hope some folks follow up on your suggestion. 

 

Nick 

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Jon Zingale [mailto:jonzing...@gmail.com] 
Sent: Thursday, January 10, 2019 9:49 AM
To: Nick Thompson <nickthomp...@earthlink.net>
Subject: Re: Motives - Was Abduction

 

Marcus,

 

There is almost something ironic about mentioning

monads in a discussion which continues to skirt

relationships between monist and dualist perspectives.

Unlike Leibniz's notion of monad (classic monism),

the 'functional programming' notion of monad is

necessarily steeped in dualism (thanks category theory).

While it is amusing that these categorical structures

have found a home in the tool sets of functional

programmers (thanks Moggi), it is the case that they

are often misrepresented in the poetry of armchair

philosophers across the internet:

 

Q: How is a monad like Vegas?

A: What happens in a monad stays in a monad.

 

In an effort to avoid a continuous stream of squandered

metaphors and endless meandering I wish to see this

metaphor spelled out further. In your example, what

would the multiplication for the monad be? If it is fair

to say that this is a monad, in what sense are the units

and multiplication natural? Lastly, what are the categories

(objects and morphisms)?

 

As far as characterizing subjectivity and degrees of

failure, would it perhaps be more fair to suggest a

comonadic model?

 

Jonathan Zingale

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