Possibly of interest..
https://journals.aps.org/prx/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevX.8.031013
On 1/3/19, 9:36 AM, "∄ uǝʃƃ" <geprope...@gmail.com> wrote:
Heh, while I appreciate the concrete example, it doesn't resolve my worry.
Why? Because my steelmanning of Nick/Eric(C)/Peirce (NEP) requires *more* than
the parallelism theorem (PT - that all parallel graphs can be simulated by
sequential graphs). If we take NEP seriously, the PT requires us to parse
"simulate". I'm going to try and fail to explain my worry. I apologize for
how badly I'll mangle it.
Nick has taken pains to explain that there's plenty of wiggle room by
claiming Peirce thought randomness was pervasive. But, if the real structure
is parallel we have 3 options:
1) The independent paths bind/obtain at the same time,
2) The paths always bind/end in the same order, or
3) The paths bind/end in a different order depending on some other factor
including randomness.
So, the reduction of that to a sequential process requires us to add that
extra meta-process, e.g. creates a 3-tuple choice mechanism and/or a (perhaps
pseudo) random appendage.
This seems like a problem for NEP's convergence to the real. I'll just
work with (3) in this post. But I can draw similar problems from (1) and (2).
Let's say with a particular process, (3) seems to be the case. Then what is it
that NEP says is "real"? Is the parallel process the real thing? Or is the
sequential process plus (perhaps pseudo) random number generator the real
thing? And regardless of which of those NEP might assert metaphysical Truth
to, can we then *use* that to infer derivative metaphysical Truths? E.g. if
NEP says the process is really parallel, then does that imply that the universe
does *not* have a monotonically increasing parameter (like the arrow of time or
the control pointer in the compiled code)? Or if the sequential+random is
real, does that imply that the universe *does* have such a parameter?
So, my steelmanning ability ends. I can't make an argument from what I
know (or don't) about NEP.
Of course, this is the problem with all metaphysical claims, for every
instance where we have to equivocate on "simulate". So if NEP is really only
saying that "nothing is real, some patterns are simply more robust than
others", then why not just say that and be done with it? Why all the fideistic
rigmarole?
On 12/31/18 2:50 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> Uh, why? For example, compilation of a recursive function to a control
flow graph.
>
>
> mdaniels@m2:~$ cat t.c
> #include <stdbool.h>
>
> int foo(bool flag) {
> if (flag) foo(false);
> else return 0;
> }
> mdaniels@m2:~$ gcc -fdump-tree-cfg -c t.c
> mdaniels@m2:~$ cat t.c.011t.cfg
>
> ;; Function foo (foo, funcdef_no=0, decl_uid=1956, cgraph_uid=0,
symbol_order=0)
>
> ;; 1 loops found
> ;;
> ;; Loop 0
> ;; header 0, latch 1
> ;; depth 0, outer -1
> ;; nodes: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
> ;; 2 succs { 3 4 }
> ;; 3 succs { 5 }
> ;; 4 succs { 6 }
> ;; 5 succs { 1 }
> ;; 6 succs { 1 }
> foo (_Bool flag)
> {
> int D.1962;
>
> <bb 2> :
> if (flag != 0)
> goto <bb 3>; [INV]
> else
> goto <bb 4>; [INV]
>
> <bb 3> :
> foo (0);
> goto <bb 5>; [INV]
>
> <bb 4> :
> D.1962 = 0;
> // predicted unlikely by early return (on trees) predictor.
> goto <bb 6>; [INV]
>
> <bb 5> :
> return;
>
> <bb 6> :
> <L3>:
> return D.1962;
>
> }
--
∄ uǝʃƃ
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============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
