You should read my erstwhile boss's book. It goes beyond tennis players: https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/minds-arrows
Frank Wimberly Phone (505) 670-9918 On Sep 22, 2017 7:51 AM, "Roger Critchlow" <r...@elf.org> wrote: > Simulation, hmm. As I read a cover article in Nature several years ago, a > study of tennis players established that their nervous systems implemented > a Bayesian model of where the tennis ball was going in order to prepare for > the possible return actions that might be necessary. This reminds me of > the mythical martial artist who is quietly waiting for the adversary to > commit to one branch of the ensemble of possible attacks. So when the > actor believes in a probabilistic network of possible futures, updates > those expectations according to each iota of evidence as it is received, > and acts accordingly, is that belief or skepticism? > > -- rec -- > > > On Fri, Sep 22, 2017 at 9:32 AM, Marcus Daniels <mar...@snoutfarm.com> > wrote: > >> Eric writes: >> >> >> "But at least one of the reasons to have a mind is to simulate many more >> actions than one can take. I guess I would say that concepts like belief >> refer to very materially instantiated patterns in those contexts of >> simulation. But again, that is a topic that has been raised and jousted >> over in hundreds of FRIAM pages by now, so I am not adding anything new to >> it here." >> >> >> More than fifteen years ago, one of my colleagues roped me into teaching >> a complexity summer school where we were tasked to teach agent based >> modelling. Absolutely dreading this task, I instead wrote a quick >> simulation of such jousting -- the projection of personality down to a >> lower dimensional space. At that time, the tradition was a 2-d >> representation with time iteration, not a 1-d with time iteration. I >> think a model of this forum should at least have two dimensions, as the >> jousters will often be on oblique angles and miss one another, >> intentionally or not. In any case, this was _my_ idea and don't steal it! >> I will dig up the Java code to prove it! >> >> >> Marcus >> ------------------------------ >> *From:* Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> on behalf of Eric Smith < >> desm...@santafe.edu> >> *Sent:* Friday, September 22, 2017 4:14:01 AM >> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group >> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia >> >> Thanks Nick, >> >> Yes, I understand the distinctions below. I am glad I opened with “Some >> how I imagine that…”, giving me enough wiggle room to have been wrong in >> the imagination to almost any degree. Small larding below, because I too >> have been under the gun to do something I don’t want to do, but there will >> be hell to pay for my stalling now. >> >> > As a behaviorist, I have to concede that it is possible to act >> tentatively. When I am meeting a dog for the first time, I extend the back >> of my hand into the danger zone near its muzzle, rather than putting out my >> hand confidently and stroking its neck, head, or flank. This allows the >> dog a chance to smell my hand and me a chance to gauge its intentions. Am >> I acting in doubt. I guess it depends on what the proposition is. If the >> proposition is that I am safe to reach out and pet the dog, I definitely >> doubt that. If the proposition is that no dog is safe to touch on the >> first meeting, then my tentative behavior affirms that belief. >> > >> > Peirce defined belief as that upon which we act and doubt as the >> absence of belief. It follows logically that anything we act on affirms >> some belief and, therefore, at the moment of action, extinguishes all >> contrary beliefs. If you follow me here, I may appear to win the argument, >> but only on sophistic points. >> >> I think I understand the alliance between the position you represent as >> Peirce’s, and behaviorism. With a lot of effort to stay in the discipline, >> and not slip back into reflecting my own intuitions, I could perhaps even >> mimic the kinds of arguments that this alliance makes. >> >> As you probably already know, I am comfortable enough working with even >> sometimes vaguely-understood terms that this position bothers me as >> bleaching language. If there were never a value-difference between what >> one was (or could have been) seen to do, and what was afterwards >> characterized as one’s beliefs at the time, then it is questionable whether >> there is any reason to have two words in the language. I imagine (again) >> that the adamant behaviorists would like to see the word “belief” expunged, >> though perhaps there is room in their lexicon to have to words that always >> take (as a matter of logic, or of construction) the same values, but which >> are allowed to carry different names because they are interfaces of those >> selfsame values to contexts or environments of different kinds. To me it >> seems more plausible that mental-state terms such as “belief” exist in the >> informal lexicon, as distinct from taken-action, not only because whatever >> our inner life is makes it appealing for us to use such terms, but also >> because there is an empirical, inter-subjectively available structure in >> tentativeness that the notion of beliefs as something with an independent >> existence from realized actions does a good job capturing. So not only are >> we inclined to use the word, but nature and discourse reinforce us to some >> extent in doing so. But at the same time as you probably know this is my >> preferred assumption, I read you as having energetically argued that it is >> invalid, against any number of opponents, so we let that stand. >> >> > Allow me to go for a KO. >> >> but that requires so little…. >> >> > When you are interacting with humans, how exactly DO you decide what >> they believe? >> >> If this were the only frame for such a question, would it not say that >> there is no referent for Ontology apart from a mirror of Epistemology? The >> important thing here being the extreme corner into which it tries to push >> the argument: we are not talking about all angles from which there might be >> grounds to use such a word, but that the question of the _existence_ of a >> referent for it is to be nothing more than a reflection of the >> epistemological means to assign _values_ to particular instances. I can >> think of cases where this was the right thing to do (getting rid of >> Newtonian time), but also cases where it amounts to insisting that the most >> restricted forms of evidence are the only ones to be admitted, and that >> much larger bodies of pattern that are not thoroughly analyzed are to be >> dismissed out of hand (historical linguistics in the old Germanic practice >> from before the age of probabilistic reasoning), which I think I can show >> were wrong. >> >> Perhaps because there is so much that I not only don’t know, but am >> poorly suited to being able to “get”, it is congenial to me to think that >> deciding what values something has, or even what something “is” as the >> referent for a word, can be very hard even if the value and the referent >> exist. More things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in my >> philosophy, etc. >> >> > What are the practices you would engage in to test the belief of >> somebody. Can you imagine a test of some belief that would allow you to >> infer that I believe something even though my actions are inconsistent with >> that belief? Would that be rational on your part, or just evidence of your >> Christian good nature? Or your belief in a non-material mind? >> >> Not non-material. But at least one of the reasons to have a mind is to >> simulate many more actions than one can take. I guess I would say that >> concepts like belief refer to very materially instantiated patterns in >> those contexts of simulation. But again, that is a topic that has been >> raised and jousted over in hundreds of FRIAM pages by now, so I am not >> adding anything new to it here. >> >> Moriturus te saluto, >> >> Eric >> >> >> > >> > All the best, >> > >> > Nick >> > >> > Nicholas S. Thompson >> > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology >> > Clark University >> > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ >> > >> > >> > -----Original Message----- >> > From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com >> <friam-boun...@redfish.com>] On Behalf Of Eric Smith >> > Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 4:44 PM >> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < >> friam@redfish.com> >> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia >> > >> > Somehow I imagine that Nick means to say there are costly signals in >> this game — that motor action is thicker than conversation or reflection. >> > >> > If I am walking across a snowfield that I know to be filled with >> crevasses, and I know I can’t tell which snow holds weight and which >> doesn’t, my movement is really different than it is putting my feet on the >> floor beside the bed in the morning. >> > >> > To take a different example that is counterfactual but easier to use in >> invoking the real physiological paralysis, if Thank God Ledge on halfdome >> were not actually a solid ledge, but a fragile bridge, or if there had been >> a rockfall that left part of it missing and I were blindfolded, or if I >> were a prisoner of pirates blindfolded and made to walk the plank, my steps >> would land differently than they do when I get out of bed in the morning. >> > >> > There I didn’t say what anyone else would do in any circumstance, but >> did claim that my own motions have different regimes that are viscerally >> _very_ distinct. I’m not sure I can think about whether I would fight for >> air when being drowned. It might be atavistic and beyond anything I >> normally refer to as “thought”. I certainly have had people claim to me >> that that is the case. >> > >> > Those distinctions may occupy a different plane than the distinction >> between reasonableness and dogmatism all in the world of conversation and >> the social exchange. >> > >> > But I should not speak for others. Only for myself as a spectator. >> > >> > Eric >> > >> > >> > >> > >> >> On Sep 21, 2017, at 4:32 PM, gⅼеɳ ☣ <geprope...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> No regrets or apology are needed. And even if we are about to "argue >> about words" ... I forget what famous dead white guy said that ... it's >> still useful to me. >> >> >> >> You say: "if one acts in the assurance that some fact is the case, one >> cannot be said to really doubt it" The answer is clarified by reading >> Marcus' post. If you act with assurance, then you're not open to changing >> your mind. So, you've simply moved the goal posts or passed the buck. >> >> >> >> I *never* act with assurance, as far as I can tell. Every thing I do >> seems plagued with doubt. I can force myself out of this state with some >> activities. Running more than 3 miles does it. Math sometimes does it. >> Beer does it. Etc. But for almost every other action, I do doubt it. So, >> I don't think we're having the discussion James and Peirce might have. I >> think we're talking about two different types of people, those with a >> tendency to believe their own beliefs and those who tend to disbelieve >> their own beliefs. >> >> >> >> Maybe it's because people who act with assurance are just smarter than >> people like me? I don't know. It's important in this modern world, what >> with our affirmation bubbles, fake news, and whatnot. What is it that >> makes people prefer to associate with people whose beliefs they share? >> What makes some people prefer the company of people different from them? >> Etc. >> >> >> >> >> >> On 09/21/2017 01:20 PM, Nick Thompson wrote: >> >>> I am afraid this discussion is about to dissolve into a quibble about >> the meaning of the words "doubt" and "belief", but let's take it one more >> round. In my use of the words ... and I think Peirce's ... one can >> entertain a doubt without "really" having one. Knowledge of perception >> tells us that every perceived "fact" is an inference subject to doubt and >> yet, if one acts in the assurance that some fact is the case, one cannot be >> said to really doubt it, can one? It follows, then, that to the extent >> that we act on our perceptions, we act without doubt on expectations that >> are doubtable. >> >>> >> >>> Eric Charles may be able to help me with this: there is some debate >> between William James and Peirce about whether the man, being chased by >> the bear who pauses at the edge of the chasm, and then leaps across it, >> doubted at the moment of leaping that he could make the jump. I think >> James says Yes and Peirce says No. If that is the argument we are having, >> then I am satisfied we have wrung everything we can out of it. >> >>> >> >>> Anyway. I regret being cranky, but I can't seem to stop. Is that >> another example of what we are talking about here? >> >> >> >> -- >> >> ☣ gⅼеɳ >> >> >> >> ============================================================ >> >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe >> >> at St. John's College to unsubscribe >> >> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >> > >> > >> > ============================================================ >> > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe >> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >> > >> > >> > ============================================================ >> > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >> > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >
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