Glen and Eric, In my role as the Fool Who Rushes In, let me just say that according to an experience monist, past experience, present experience, and future experience are all on the same footing. We come to know them as different because they prove out in different ways. This should fit nicely with your constructivism, Glen, although you may see it as too much of a good thing. We can have expectations about the past, just as well as we can have expectations of the future, and those expectations can prove out or not in subsequent experience.
Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of ?glen? Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 8:37 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam@redfish.com> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] probability vs. statistics (was Re: Model of induction) Excellent! My opponent will be very happy when I make that concession. It's interesting that, for this argument, I've adopted the Platonic perspective despite being a constructivist myself. And it's interesting that my current position (that the math world is extant and static) seems to rely a bit on viewing probability theory as a special subset of math overall. But that perspective seems to encourage me to think about the ontological/metaphysical aspects. Perhaps it's only because I'm not a mathematician. Thanks! On 12/13/2016 05:00 AM, Eric Charles wrote: > I don't have an answer per se, but I have some relevant information: > > Back in the early days of statistics, one could become a pariah in the > eyes of the field if it became suspected one had surreptitiously used Bayes' > Theorem in a proof. This was because the early statisticians believed > future events were probable. They really, deeply believed it. They > were defining a new world view, to be contrasted with the > deterministic world view. If you smoked, there was a probability that > in the future you might get cancer; it was not certain, nothing was > predetermined. In such a context, any talk of backwards-probability is > nonsensical. After you have lung cancer, there is not "a probability" > that you smoked. Either you did or you did not; it already happened! > Thus, at least for the early statisticians, people like Fisher, time > was inherent to claims about probability. > > Now, it is worth noting that one can wager on past events of any kind, > given someone willing to take the bet. And in such a context, Bayes' > Theorem can be mighty useful. The Theorem is thus quite popular these > days, but that is a different matter. Whatever the results of such > equations are > --- between 1 and 0, having certain properties, etc. --- so long as > the results refer to past events, Fisher and many others would have > insisted that the result is not "a probability" that said event occurred. > > Also, from what I can tell, as mathematicians became more prevalent in > statistics, as opposed to the grand tradition of > scientist-philosophers who happened to be highly proficient in > mathematics, such ontological/metaphysical points seem to have become much > less important. -- ␦glen? ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
