In case anyone cares, the argument ends like this: I am forced into the extreme, but unassailable, position that I have consciousness as I conceptualize it but that I can't demonstrate that anyone or anything else has it. Nick's conclusion, I think, is that certain entities have an illusion that they have consciousness (behavior) but cannot explain what it is. But I may be wrong about the latter.
Frank Sent from my Verizon 4G LTE Phone (505) 670--9918 On Aug 24, 2014 11:46 AM, "Frank Wimberly" <[email protected]> wrote: > If you say you are not conscious, I defer to your superior knowledge of > the subject (you). > > Frank > > P.s. Nick and I have been through this argument before. > > Sent from my Verizon 4G LTE Phone > (505) 670--9918 > On Aug 24, 2014 11:43 AM, "Nick Thompson" <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> So, now we move to the next step of the argument: >> >> >> >> On what basis do any of you confidently assert that I am conscious when I >> say I am not? >> >> >> >> Nick >> >> >> >> Nicholas S. Thompson >> >> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology >> >> Clark University >> >> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ >> >> >> >> *From:* Friam [mailto:[email protected]] *On Behalf Of *Frank >> Wimberly >> *Sent:* Sunday, August 24, 2014 1:06 PM >> *To:* 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' >> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by >> environment >> >> >> >> But you are nonetheless correct. All this reminds me of the old joke: A >> skeptic asks God, “How do I know that I exist?” God replies, “And who is >> asking?” >> >> >> >> Frank >> >> >> >> >> >> Frank C. Wimberly >> >> 140 Calle Ojo Feliz >> >> Santa Fe, NM 87505 >> >> >> >> [email protected] [email protected] >> >> Phone: (505) 995-8715 Cell: (505) 670-9918 >> >> >> >> *From:* Friam [mailto:[email protected] >> <[email protected]>] *On Behalf Of *Steve Smith >> *Sent:* Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:41 AM >> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group >> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by >> environment >> >> >> >> >> >> Rebuttal by shame! If you have to ask you can't afford it. >> >> <grin> you saw right through me! >> >> >> >> -- rec -- >> >> >> >> On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 10:29 AM, Steve Smith <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> Hey, wait a minute, guys! You have lost me. What is this "consciousness" >> of which you speak. I am not sure I have one and I need you to describe >> it >> to me in a way that I can recognize it. >> >> No you don't... and if you don't know that, then you are not a truly >> conscious being, but rather a clever simulacrum of one. >> >> >> >> >> N >> >> Nicholas S. Thompson >> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology >> Clark University >> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Friam [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of John Kennison >> Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 11:50 AM >> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group >> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by >> environment >> >> Eric, >> >> As I understand it, Dennett's position and Chalmers' are not only >> incompatible, their difference is more extreme than one simply being the >> denial of the other. >> Dennett says that a zombie is simply impossible. If we tried to create a >> computer that could think like a human, it would be conscious --perhaps >> even >> if it just did a good job of analyzing things the way humans did --even >> without loving pets, etc. (I say perhaps, because I'm not sure what >> Dennett >> actually means.) >> Chalmers says (I think) that even if we created a physically object that >> was >> identical to a human, it wouldn't necessarily be conscious --which I find >> too extreme. When I said I favored Chalmers, I meant that it seems >> plausible >> that consciousness might not simply emerge if a system behaves in a >> sufficiently sophisticated way. --the way the system is constructed could >> make a difference. But these are only top of my head guesses. >> >> --John >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: Friam [[email protected]] on behalf of Eric Charles >> [[email protected]] >> Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:04 AM >> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group >> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by >> environment >> >> John, >> So, in a "snapshot" I think "A conscious system and a non conscious one >> could be physically identical", however, I think it would be disingenuous >> to >> say that we could not tell them apart through interaction over time. This >> issue is not whether or not it is easy, but merely whether it is possible. >> >> I guess the question boils down to how you respond to challenges about >> philosophical zombies. These discussions normally begin with someone >> asserting "You can imagine things that behave exactly like you and I in >> all >> ways, but not conscious." The presenter then goes on to lay out a series >> of >> riddles these creatures lead to. However, I am not sure I buy the >> premise. I >> would assert that you CANNOT imagine such creatures. Can you really >> imagine >> a creature that acts exactly like you without consciousness? Perhaps you >> can >> imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog (if you >> have a dog) without feeling the love that you feel. But can you imagine a >> creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog with being aware of >> your dog?!? >> >> It seems like the type of claim we allow people to get away with at the >> start of a philosophical discussion, because it is a pretty normal seeming >> premise, and we all like to play such games... but if we really stopped to >> consider the premise, we would not let it pass. >> >> (Obviously, this need not be read as a question to you, it is a challenge >> to >> Chalmers and others who hold those views.) >> >> Eric >> >> >> >> ----------- >> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >> Lab Manager >> Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst >> Hall >> Room 203A >> 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. >> Washington, DC 20016 >> phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 >> email: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> >> >> >> On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 1:16 PM, John Kennison >> <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> Thanks Nick, >> >> I found a few statements I would revise in what I wrote. >> Perhaps, I should have said that my argument seems valid rather correct. >> I was careless in describing Chalmers' view (He said something like: A >> conscious system and a non conscious one could be physically identical). >> And I was being presumptuous in describing Dennett as giving a great tour >> of the issues --I don't know that much about the issues. >> --John >> ________________________________________ >> From: Friam [[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>] >> on >> behalf of Nick Thompson >> [[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>] >> Sent: Friday, August 22, 2014 12:37 PM >> To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' >> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony >> 'personalities' shaped by environment >> >> John, >> >> Thanks for this. But now I have to read Dennett again. I am afraid my >> copy >> is in a box in Santa Fe, so may have to come over and borrow yours for a >> few >> days. But I am in somebody else's vacation cabin in NH for the moment, so >> it will be a while. >> >> The following is from my shaky memory. Please don't flame me, anybody; >> just put your arm around my shoulders and lead me from error. >> >> There appears to be a divide amongst philosophers of science concerning >> how >> much to be a rationalist. Thomas Kuhn is the classic IRRATIONALIST An >> awful >> lot of the philosophy of science that we were all taught in graduate >> school >> is irrationalist in this sense. Even Popper, who stressed the logic of >> deduction in his philosophy ("falsification") was irrationalist in his >> account of where good scientific ideas come from ("bold conjectures"). >> The >> hallmark of an irrationalist is a tendency to put logic words in ironic >> quotes, such as "proof" or "inference" or "truth" , or to use persuasion >> words ("intuition pumps") that avoid invoking logical relations. So, >> Dennett's failure to organize the book in the manner you suggest is part >> and >> parcel of his irrationalism, as is, by the way, your observation that an >> argument can be effective without being clear. >> >> I want to pull back a bit my distinction between metaphysical and factual. >> I guess I REALLY think the distinction is relative to a particular >> argument. >> In any argument, there are the facts we argue from and the facts we argue >> about. There is a sense in which metaphysics consists in the facts we >> ALWAYS argue from. I hope I haven't shot my own high horse out from under >> me, here. >> >> Nick >> >> Nicholas S. Thompson >> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University >> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Friam >> [mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>] On >> Behalf Of John Kennison >> Sent: Friday, August 22, 2014 8:35 AM >> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group >> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by >> environment >> >> Nick: >> I find your distinction between metaphysical questions and factual >> questions >> helpful because it clarifies the vague feeling I expressed about making >> "some sort of error" when I said that consciousness is "having an inner >> subjective life". I no longer feel it is an error but I should categorize >> it >> as a metaphysical position rather than a scientific fact. (I prefer the >> term >> ``scientific fact`` to your term ``fact``.) It still seems like a good >> argument ("I know consciousness exists because I experience it") even >> though >> this cannot be a scientific argument. >> >> Eric, Steve, et al: >> Thanks for your very interesting comments. I would like to add some >> further >> comments about Dennett. I both enjoyed and was frustrated by his book >> "Consciousness Explained". I recommend it highly but with the following >> caveats: >> >> (1) I wish the book were organized differently. I think it should have >> started with "The Challenge" (section 5 of chapter 2, p.39-42). I >> paraphrase >> this challenge as: >> First, Dennett says he wants to explain Consciousness in >> scientific terms, without invoking anything beyond contemporary science. I >> take this to mean that he wants to show that we can analyze and explain >> human behavior entirely in scientific, materialistic terms without >> appealing >> to any 'mysterious' forces. (Therefore, to focus on the behavior rather >> than the motives, of conscious people, Dennett starts by telling >> speculative >> stories about the phenomenology of consciousness.) >> Secondly, he doesn't want to be like behaviorists who >> "pretend >> they don't have the experiences we know darn well they share they share >> with >> us. If I [Dennett] wish to deny the existence of some controversial >> feature >> of consciousness, the burden falls on me to that it is somehow illusory." >> (p.40 of the book). >> Thirdly he wants to do an honest job of explaining the >> empirical evidence. >> This challenge intrigued me. The first and second goals seem almost >> contradictory. I wondered how he could possibly pull it off. >> >> (2) As far as I remember, Dennett never summarizes how he met this >> challenge. (I read this book over 15 years ago and I might have forgotten >> the summary. At any rate, as I go over the book now, I can't find the >> kind >> of summary I would like to see.) So here is my summary of how Dennett did: >> (a) After having read the book, I feel there is no theoretical barrier to >> explaining all of the behavior of apparently conscious beings in purely >> materialistic terms. >> (b) My memory is that Dennett explains the feeling of being conscious in >> terms of the strong AI hypothesis, which says that any system that carries >> out a sufficiently complex task will automatically be conscious. I am not >> certain if I believe this, but it or something like it seems necessary if >> we >> take the first two goals seriously. Dennett apparently believes that the >> emergence of consciousness depends only on the behavior exhibited. By >> contrast, Chalmers argues that a conscious systems and a non-conscious >> system could exhibit the same type of behavior. I don't see any reason to >> favor either position, but I prefer Chalmers. >> >> (3) On Dennett's style: This is what I find both frustrating and >> intriguing. >> He seems to discuss various ideas without fully arranging them into an >> argument, as I would tend to do. Dennett relies on this tendency of the >> reader to complete the argument. So Dennett spends less time on >> argumentation and more on telling stories. Sometimes it works, sometimes >> it >> doesn't. As mentioned above, I came away with a strong feeling about the >> first part of the challenge. I also had a strong feeling that our >> consciousness often fools us into thinking it is in control when it >> isn't. I >> liked Dennett's presentation of the Pandemonium model of language (based >> on >> work of Selfridge, Dawkins and others) and I feel it explains a lot of >> things that would otherwise be murky. On the other hand, I was >> dissatisfied >> with the chapter on "Qualia Disqualified". I even found myself agreeing >> with >> his students (and others) that he hasn't really explained consciousness >> --but I think he gave us a great tour of the issues. (If I had written >> the >> book, and arranged it more logically, the thread of the arguments might >> have >> been clearer, but it would have been a much less effective book.) >> >> --John >> ________________________________________ >> From: Friam [[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>] >> on >> behalf of Eric Smith [[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>] >> Sent: Saturday, August 16, 2014 12:31 PM >> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group >> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' >> shaped by environment >> >> Hi Steve, >> >> I am neither knowledgeable, nor do I have time to report even my own >> experiences, without making a mess of things. But perhaps I can give some >> titles of things people have pointed out to me. >> >> There seem to be several schools of approach (meaning, groups of people >> who >> criticize each other a lot). I't hard even to know how to break them down >> into clusters, because there are several axes of variation. >> >> There is a school who are mechanistic, and who think of themselves as >> mechanistic. >> >> At one end within that school, one has Dan Dennett. Much of what he says >> seems to me like a lot of effort to beat the dead horse of mysticism, and >> I >> have no patience for that, because I find it tedious and uninteresting. >> Beyond that, it is not clear to me how much he has contributed in real >> ideas. One that seems okay, if I understand it from informal >> conversations >> that have involved him, is that it involves a kind of recursive >> self-reference of thought. Meaning, that thought is a process for >> handling >> responses to events (or, in a very broad use of the noun, "things"), and >> part of what consciousness does is render the state of thought as a >> "thing" >> in its own right, having the same symbolic kind of representation as the >> mind gives to other "things", so that thought can then process a >> representation formed about its own state. This seems like part of the >> common lore, expressed already in this thread, and not novel. Dennett >> seems >> to want to associate this ability specifical ly with language, and seems >> almost to want to treat it as an _application_ of linguistic faculty. I >> don't think that is a well-motivated position, but I am glad Dennett does >> it >> because it makes an important point. Language, in having syntax, can >> manipulate words within the syntactic system, much as it uses words to >> manipulate ideas within semantic systems. That is hard to understand in >> language, and making us aware of the fact that it is hard, even though it >> has been before our eyes for centuries, seems helpful in expressing part >> of >> what makes assigning clear meaning to statements about consciousness hard. >> >> On another extreme from Dennett but still materialist, we have Giuglio >> Tononi and his "Phi" measure. Basically, Tononi adopts information theory >> as a language, and within that language introduces a concrete notion of >> what >> it means for an information system to be irreducible, in a way that I >> think >> is analogous to the notion of irreducibility of representations of groups, >> in the theory of representations. The details are different because >> information theory is a different structure from algebra, but the basic >> notion of something's not being splittable into factors is the same. I am >> now a couple of years out of date wrt Tononi's publications, but I think >> it >> is fair to say that Tononi asserts that having a very large irreducible >> component of information is the _essence_ of consciousness, and that all >> the >> other things like self-reference (which I would argue are also essential, >> even if irreducibility is too) are merely other phenomena of mind but not >> the thing that distinguishe s conscious states. The Tononi development >> has >> the virtue of being an actual idea that is formalized and thus >> unambiguously >> exchangeable among people. It may also have a kernel of something >> important. Many people who work in consciousness seem to think it does. >> For my taste, it is too non-embodied to likely be a very comprehensive >> part >> of the right answer. I think both the embodied dimensions of the things >> that contribute to conscious states, and some kind of recursion, are >> primitives that are essential. Tononi has a large book about this, and I >> think several shorter papers that are on the arXiv. >> >> Somewhere in here is Christof Koch, who is also considered one of the >> important contributors, but I don't know what his ideas are. I include >> him >> because if you are asking who the thought leaders at the moment seem to >> be, >> my understanding is that he is one of them. >> >> There is also Max Tegmark, who has a recent paper "Consciousness as a >> state >> of matter", available from the arxiv. This (which I have read) seems to >> me >> to be a smart mathematician's discussion of a generally nice point, which >> adds nothing of substance to where we are stuck. Tegmark is making an >> argument with which I agree, that most-everything we see in nature that is >> robust is a "state of matter", understood as modern physics uses the term. >> Hence, the distinctive and characteristic nature of consciousness too. >> But >> the only thing about consciousness in what Tegmark builds is what he gets >> from Tononi. The rest of it is more about the theory of measurement in >> quantum mechanics, than it is anything that distinguishes consciousness >> from >> other patterns of order to which we have given names and phenomenologies. >> >> Now, if I understand it at a distant second hand, Chalmers has a criticism >> of all of these kinds of positions, notwithstanding their technical >> differences, which is that he would claim they fail to recognize what he >> calls "the hard problem". I do not know exactly how Chalmers uses >> language, >> and I cannot speak for him, but to try to use my own language to express >> what I think he says, I would say he asserts that these mere >> characterizations of mechanism are not "accounting for" what we mean when >> we >> report "the experience of" this or that. Here, the word "qualia" is often >> introduced, to refer to the antecedent of such reports. >> >> I think Dennett thinks of (and perhaps calls) Chalmers the worst sort of >> Cartesian dualist, whereas Chalmers would say that Dennett is claiming >> that >> consciousness "doesn't really exist", or something morally equivalent. I >> believe both of them think of the axis on which they hold opposite ends as >> different and bigger than any of the axes that separate the technical >> people >> from one another. Chalmers seems (for good or ill) to attract people who >> do want to be dualists or mystics (or mysterians), so without putting in a >> lot of time with original material, it is hard to get a clear picture of >> him >> through the people who claim to render him. >> >> Ih the middle of all this, helping us sort it all out, is John Searl, who >> has a short little book "The problem of consciousness". Searl is at his >> best when using pellucid common language to explain why everyone else is >> being silly. He is much less impressive when asked to introduce an actual >> new idea that moves the discussion forward. However, in saying that, I do >> not mean to diminish the value (or the enjoyment) of his criticisms. He >> has >> some language in there about various kinds of dualists, which I find >> mystifying, because it all exists within such self-referential circles of >> language that I wouldn't know how to link it to anything in the rest of >> the >> world. But, if you want to know about dualists, this is a good place to >> find them categorized. >> >> I find reporting on a lot of this like I think I would feel if sent to the >> middle east to report on exactly why it is necessary for some factions to >> fight other factions. There seems to be a long way between being humans, >> and so exercising the individual and social behaviors that constitute >> bringing ourself to share or coordinate various internal states that we >> refer to with names for awareness or states of mind or whatever, and >> finding >> a language that, in symbolic form, makes a faithful representation of what >> it is that distinctively allows us to be what we are and do what we do. >> Each of these guys seems to bring attention to the absence of such >> language >> in one or another way. What I can't understand is why they think there is >> anything more than "a hard problem" of inventing a valid language to >> faithfully reflect the structure of a natural phenomenon, and their main >> difference is in how much each thinks he has captured and the others have >> not. But I think they would argu e there is more to their positions than >> that. >> >> Of course, I have no expert knowledge, and haven't put that much time even >> into reading their literatures as an outsider and tourist. So it is to be >> expected that a lot of it will pass over me. >> >> Several of these guys have either TED talks, or lectures that stream on >> the >> web, which are shorter than reading their papers, but even more >> unsatisfying. >> >> Oops. Too much text. >> >> All best, >> >> Eric >> >> >> >> >> >> On Aug 16, 2014, at 11:04 AM, Steve Smith wrote: >> >> Gentlemen, >> >> I am also interested in both the nature of consciousness and the >> nature of >> >> knowledge regarding what appear to be entirely subjective phenonomena >> (arising from the fact of consciousness?). >> >> The last time I attended a Cognitive Neuroscience conference (6 years >> >> ago?) I was impressed with how far things had come with regard to >> correlating brain imaging and *reported* subjective experiences. I >> realize that sometimes more data and even higher quality data doesn't >> necessarily improve a model qualitatively, but I have been hoping that >> there >> would be some conceptual breakthroughs from this work. >> >> Unfortunately, as the popular media and the population in general >> (which >> >> is chicken, which is egg?) have taken a stronger interest in science (or >> has >> come to fetishize the artifacts of science?) there is a lot more "noise" >> to >> sort through to find signal. The number of articles or even entire >> issues >> of magazines and the number of books on the topic has risen dramatically >> in >> the past 10 years or so, but I rarely see what looks like new insight into >> the nature of consciousness. >> >> I'm hoping someone here with more direct experience or more patience >> with >> >> the literature (BTW, the "hard literature" on the topic is generally too >> opaque for me, so I'm lost in a middle-ground limbo between the popular >> accounts and the actual work-product of scientists) knows of new insights >> or >> new twists on the old models to share. >> >> Does anyone have a short list of recent publications which reframe the >> >> question in a new way? >> >> - Steve >> >> Hi Nick, >> >> One of the problems in discussing consciousness is that it seems very >> >> hard to break it down into simpler concepts. There are what might be >> called >> "high-level" words such as "inner life", "awareness", "apprehension", >> which >> suggest consciousness but only to someone who already ha a sense of what >> consciousness is. Whereas low level words, which refer to things that can >> be readily measured do not seem adequate to get at the real meaning of >> consciousness. So we are left with metaphors. When I use words such as >> "access" and "inner life" they suggest a container but they are not >> necessarily used to denote an actual container but to describe a situation >> which has some of the properties of a container. >> >> However, there does seem to be a real container that describes the >> information I have access to. I get raw information from my body. >> This is not to say that my consciousness is located in my body, but >> that what I know about the outside world starts with how my body >> senses the outside world. These senses are then processed or >> contemplated somehow and this results in what I think I know about >> the world. There is no way that "I can see exactly what you see" >> because what you see comes from your body and what I see comes from >> my body. If we literally mean "see" then what you see is what enters >> your eyes and what I see is what enters my eyes. You might tell me >> about what you see, but that is not the same as seeing what you see >> because what you have seen has been processed by you then >> reformulated in terms of speech, which is then processed by me. Even >> if we witnessed the same event, we would have slightly different >> viewpoints, and our eyes are different, and, in any case, we w >> >> ou! >> >> ld start interpreting the incoming rays of light as soon as they >> started >> >> to enter our respective eyes. >> >> You also gave examples in which I might infer what you saw. This >> seems to >> >> presuppose I have a theory of what Nick is all about or some means of >> making >> inferences. (I don't have a well-articulated theory of Nick, but I do >> arrive >> at conclusions about what to make of you. I'm not certain how I do this, >> but >> I am certain that I do it all the time, quite effortlessly and almost >> automatically.) At any rate this drawing of inferences does not seem to be >> seeing exactly what you see, but a way (not necessarily very accurate) of >> getting a rough approximation of what you saw. >> >> --John >> >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe >> at St. John's College to unsubscribe >> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe >> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe >> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe >> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe >> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe >> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> >> >> >> >> ============================================================ >> >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >
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