Steve claimed that we could use the Turing test to tell if we met consciousness in a dark alley. I think, by Nick's earlier assertion, that is begging the question. Nick asserted that if "Humans are conscious" mad sense as an empirical claim, it must have been the case that our definitions of "human" and "conscious" do not entail an exclusive relationship to each other. That is, just looking at the definitions, it must have been the case that other things could have been conscious and that humans could have been not-conscious.
The Turing test is to tell if the thing you are interacting with is a Human, right? But if non-human things can be conscious, then a "Yes, No" answer regarding "human" is not an answer regarding conscious. ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 email: [email protected] On Sat, Aug 16, 2014 at 1:12 PM, Steve Smith <[email protected]> wrote: > Standard Disclaimer for most: TL;DR > > Steve, > > Thanks for getting into this for real. > > Well the language *was* a bit too easy pickings there for a moment. And > I think *that* is also relevant to the conversation, even if I *was* being > teasing and flippant. The dialog in place *was* as much about language as > about consciousness. You were talking about abstractions like "cup" and > "card" which are at some level simply idiomatic. To members of a modestly > (let's say non-westernized) different culture, both "cup" and "card" would > not mean the same thing and when you met in person and showed one another > those artifacts, there might be as much surprise as recognition. I know > this may be tangential to the intended point, but I still think it cannot > be ignored? > > > > I keep starting to feel I have irresponsibly bent this thread, but then I > remind myself that, to me anyway, the question of whether ant colonies have > personalities is the same kind of question as the question of whether > computers are conscious. > > I'm not a stickler about thread-bending myself, it is certainly a > motivated tangent to the original. And don't be shy about changing the > subject-line if you feel like you are being bendy. > > Just to bend/fork/twist it in another direction... I can't help but > imagine that Ant Hill Art <http://www.anthillart.com/> is a useful > technique for trying to measure the "personality" of an ant colony (the > same way the Israelis are trying to measure the "personality" of the > Palestinians right now?). Other than being destructive testing to the > max, can we say that such artifacts (the aluminum casts of the ant-hill) > correlate with anything we might want to call "personality" of the > ant-colony collectively? I might suggest "mood" would be a more > appropriate metaphor, but still implying something familiar to > consciousness. Is it not apt to refer to an ant colony as "angry" or > "calm" or (when analyzing the nest structure) "curious" or "withdrawn" or > "aggressive"? > > How it gets answered depends on the kind of > question one takes it to be. It could be a question of fact, in which case > the answer must begin with some sort of straight-forward definition of what > would constitute a personality or a consciousness: how we would recognize a > personality or a consciousness if we met it on a dark street in the middle > of the night. > > Turing Test. Right? > > Or it could be a question of metaphysics, in which case the > answer concerns the most central, and closely held presumptions of the > answerer's thought. My sense is that you and John and Frank WANT the > question to be of the first type, but that it is, for you truly, a question > of the second type. > > I believe that the question *has* a significant component of the second > type and that the first type is the only thing that has a chance to be > measured directly. At worst, the first type of question suffers from > perceptual and semantic differences, while the second suffers from being at > some point strictly grounded in shared axioms. > > You START with the notion that at the core of every > human being is an inner, private space from which she or he speaks, and > without that presumption, all thought must stop. > > I can't quite parse this completely. I *do* think this is how we > operate, or at least this is how I subjectively feel that *I* operate and > for the sake of sanity or at least social embeddedness, I assume others > operate in a sufficiently similar manner. I'm not sure what "thought" is > if it isn't mediated by (if not entirely originating from) the neurological > (highly coupled with and informed by the vascular, the lymphatic, etc.) > system of the body. I'm not beyond granting some ground to those who want > to suggest that our individual, confined to our own body, neurological > systems are somehow coupled with those of others in overt (visual, aural, > pheremonal, etc.) ways, or even through shared mythologies (Ancient Greeks > shared the same Pantheon, the Romans, to the extent that they > > Thus, my claim about > you-all is, that you are asking for a factual answer to a metaphysical > question, and that, of course, nobody can ever provide. > > I agree. But I also think that whilst mulling over facts in the light of > metaphysical perspectives, the facts can take on some (provisional) meaning > that they did not have without that, and in complement, hanging facts all > over one's theories can help one to refine and understand their theories > more better/differently? > > My claim about > myself is that I am just treating the question as the factual question that, > and answering it in the way that factual questions are answered. "Is there > a unicorn in the room?" "Oh, you mean, a horsey sort of thing with a > narwhale horn in the middle of its forehead? No, I don't think so." So, > the template for such a conversation would be a question, "Is X conscious or > does X have a personality?", followed by an agreement on some sort of a > procedure by which consciousness or personality is to be recognized, > followed by an attempt to relate the behavior of X to those criteria. > > Ok... trying to unpack this a bit... if I understand you correctly, I > would rephrase the above to say: I intrinsically think of this as a > metaphysical question (or perhaps more aptly an epistemological one?) . I > also believe that FACTUAL things (facts about the world vs relations > between ideas) are the only ones which can be tested directly. Sometimes > the *expression* of ideas and their relations can be tested (this is what > psychologists and anthropologists do?), which amounts to determining > (experimentally and statistically) "what people believe or perceive" but > not "what they experience", if the distinction is not too subtle? > > So, I have some questions for you. First, do you accept my characterization > of the template for a factual discussion? If so, can you explain to me what > on God's green earth you think MRI images have to do with providing a > factual answer to the question of whether X is conscious or has a > personality? That's an honest question. I honestly cannot see the > relevance. > > It represents the only way *I* know of right now to measure or observe > anything about brain states of directly. In this case of humans or > possibly all animals. I don't think we can put an ant colony in an MRI and > get anything meaningful from it. I suppose we might be able to put a > single ant in one, though I'm not sure. Putting a computer or a vending > machine in one would be silly of course. > > > > Well, I can see SOME relevance, but only if I adopt the > metaphysical stance I am identifying with your position. In other words, I > think introduction of MRI "evidence" for consciousness (or personality) begs > the question of the nature of consciousness. > > This is why I asked if there were any new insights that came from such > activities. It isn't clear to me that such measurements help directly (or > it is somewhat clear that they are not). The current model, as I > understand it of what MRI's (or similar) measure and what can be correlated > with other observables and subjective inner states ( e.g. show me > flash-cards of colored shapes and maybe you can map what parts of my brain > respond to which colors and shapes, and maybe you can correlate that with > others' physiological responses to the same stimuli, but does that actually > say anything about my subjective experience of color and/or shape?). I > realize I'm talking more about "perception" than "consciousness" but I > think the two are inextricable ("Embodied Mind" arguement). > > I happen to experience modest amounts of synaesthesia, and I have never > met anyone else whose synaesthesia presents identically to my own. I > recognize the *pattern* of their descriptions of the way things get > tangled, but the specifics are always unique to me (and them?). The fact > that many people can agree that "blue and green are cool colors" and "red > and orange are hot colors" is a lovely generalization. I have learned to > nod (up and down) to such claims, yet my experience is somewhat more > complicated and unconventional. I can speak the vernacular language of > color (if someone asks me to choose a warmer or cooler color, I know what > they mean and can usually satisfy them) but the metaphors aren't as fully > apt for me. Blackbody radiation and therefore most of physics maps red to > "cool" and blue to "hot" for direct physical reasons, yet the average > individual maps blue to water and green to vegetation which are usually > cool and red and orange to flame which is usually hot. If we go to asian > cultures however, for example, we discover that Red is associated with life > and positive energy (oxygenated blood?) whilst Green is associated with > warnings and death and decay (mold and overgrowing vegetation?). Green > stop signs and lights and red traffic lights meaning *GO!*. Such things > are at least learned, if not entirely culturally defined? > > I guess what I am hypothesizing is that while neuroscientists are mucking > around measuring the brain's activity and trying to correlate it with > behaviour (including reportage of subjective experiences), that they might > trip over new ways of thinking about consciousness. I am asking if there > are new models of consciousness (metaphysical issue) which might have been > inspired or tripped over whilst running lots of people's brains through > machines, looking for "the lost keys under the streetlight". I don't > expect them to find the keys under the streetlight, but maybe while looking > there (because the light is better) they will think of other/better places > to look (or more aptly, to realize that there are no keys, or that they are > not needed?). > > > You are safe from running into me in the street in Santa Fe until October. > > Well that is a relief! Although I don't think I have *ever* run into you > on the streets of Santa Fe excepting when we were deliberately trying to > find eachother (and even then it was a crapshoot). Of course, I spend > *very* little time on the streets of Santa Fe. And not because I fear > running into you. > > I will reaffirm my desire to join the St. John's crowd on Friday AMs but > so far I seem to fail at it nearly every week of every year. But knowing > you will be there adds to my interest in doing so. > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >
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