Nick, Would you explain further your notion that belief is that on which we act. Does this imply for you that a lack of action implies a lack of belief? For example, I believe that the earth is round, but I don't act on that belief. Does that mean I do't really have that belief? How does this work in your framework?
Also, you say that true propositions are those on which the human species as a community of inquiry will ultimately (in the infinite future) converge. That bothers me in a number of ways. - This is such a remote definition that it hardly seems worth bothering with in the first place. There is no operational test to determine whether something is the truth under this definition. As you say, this is really just a definition, but it's not even a definition of one concept in terms of others. It simply labels "the propositions on which ... " as the truth. But giving a label to a set of things doesn't add anything new. It just adds a label. So why bother? And especially why other when the term "the truth" has some meaning to most people. Why say that we should forget about that meaning and use the term as a label for some set of things -- if that set even exists (see below). - One doesn't know that it will ever refer to anything. We won't converge on anything in the infinite future since there is no end to the infinite future and hence no convergence. - If you are using converge as in mathematics as in the convergence of an infinite series (where there is convergence to infinity), then, as in mathematics, one may be able to determine at this moment what the series (or truth) will converge to. But that's probably not what you (or Peirce) have in mind. But if you reject that, then as in the previous point, there is no convergence since one never reaches infinity. So there is no such set. - Some series don't ever converge. How do we know that the truth in your sense is not one of those? The community of inquiry may split with one part of it converging (assuming there is convergence) on one truth and another part of it converging on another truth. Then what? - Most importantly, why bother attempting to define what you mean by the truth at all? If you had such a definition, what would you do with it? What good would it be? *-- Russ Abbott* *_____________________________________________* *** Professor, Computer Science* * California State University, Los Angeles* * Google voice: 747-*999-5105 Google+: https://plus.google.com/114865618166480775623/ * vita: *http://sites.google.com/site/russabbott/ *_____________________________________________* On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 5:17 PM, Nicholas Thompson < nickthomp...@earthlink.net> wrote: > Thanks, Eric.**** > > ** ** > > I am sure Bayes and and Peirce would have got on famously. Unfortunately, > this can only be surmise for me, because despite attempts by many kind > people to explain Bayes to me, nothing has ever stuck. I am ever hopeful, > but afraid I am demonstrably not worth further investment by others. **** > > ** ** > > In connection with your other comments below, there are passages in Pierce > that are eerily reminiscent of Schroedinger’s what is life and like things > that Kaufmann wrote. From his MAN’S GLASSY ESSENCE, I give you …**** > > ** ** > > * Protoplasm, when quiescent, is broadly speaking, solid; but when it is > disturbed in an appropriate way, or sometimes even spontaneously without > external disturbance, it becomes, broadly speaking liquid. A moner in this > state is seen under the microscope to have streams within its matter. … > Long-continued or frequently repeated liquefaction of the protoplasm > results in an obstinate retention of the solid state, which we call > fatigue.”* > > ** ** > > He relates this fatigue to the formation of habits. After a few pages, he > reveals where he is headed: **** > > ** ** > > *“But what is to be said of the property of feeling? If consciousness > belongs to all protoplasm, by what mechanical constitution is this to be > accounted for. The slime is nothing but a chemical compound. There is no > inherent impossibility in its being formed synthetically in the laboratory, > out of its chemical elements: and if it were so made, it would present all > the characters of natural protoplasm. No doubt, then, it would feel. To > hesitate to admit this would be puerile and ultra-puerile. “ * > > * * > > Have to fix dinner. **** > > ** ** > > Nick **** > > ** ** > > *From:* friam-boun...@redfish.com [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On > Behalf Of *Eric Smith > *Sent:* Thursday, March 29, 2012 3:36 PM > *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Clarifying Induction Threads**** > > ** ** > > Thanks greatly Nick,**** > > ** ** > > It is very helpful to me to see these premises laid out in a systematic > way, since I am nowhere near having the resources of either time or brain > to try to read this material myself. **** > > ** ** > > As you say, it fits well as a description of the events that make up a > problem-solver's practical day. **** > > ** ** > > I think it leaves me with more unsatisfied questions perhaps than I had > before, or maybe just a larger urge to try to formalize. I think of > Vygotsky (Thought and Language) and "family relations" as precursor to > predicates, when I read your description of abduction. I think of Bayesian > inference when I read your description of his notions of validity in weak > form, as an alternative to Popper. Each of these seems to be an attempt by > one or another worker to get at rules that could be used to build a machine > -- of which we knew all the internal parts -- that would commit these acts. > Then we could study the overlap and differences with our own choices, and > perhaps update our categories.**** > > ** ** > > Interesting, always interesting,**** > > ** ** > > Eric**** > > ** ** > > ** ** > > ** ** > > On Mar 29, 2012, at 12:29 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:**** > > > > **** > > Dear Eric Smith (and other patient people),**** > > **** > > I have been trying to get the chance to lay this out for three days, and > have just not had the time. I am enthralled at the moment by the > scientific philosophy of Charles Saunders Peirce because, weird as it is, > it seems to capture a lot of what I think about a lot of things. It also, > it stands at the root of many of our institutions. You can access this > connection through Menand's, *The Metaphysical Club.* Many of the > foundational beliefs we hold about education and science and even > jurisprudence are partly due to Peirce.**** > > **** > > I am not sure Peirce thought he needed (1) below, but I need it to get > him started, so I will attribute it to him.**** > > **** > > (1) Humans are a knowledge-gathering species by nature. Darwinism tells us > that humans have survived both as communities and as a species because > their cognitive processes have brought their beliefs into concert with the > world. (Peirce is a bit of a group Selectionist.) A belief is that on > which I act. There are no latent beliefs in Peirce. Doubt is an > incapacity to act. **** > > **** > > (2) True propositions and the best methods for discovering them are those > on which the human species, as a community of inquiry, will converge > ULTIMATELY. By ultimately, I mean the infinite future. Note that this is > a* **definition *of "true." There is no other truth in Peirce, no > correspondence theory, except possibly that inferred by me in (1 ) . The > current views of contemporary communities of inquiry may be our best shot > at the truth, but they are NOT true, by definition, unless they happen to > be that on which the human community of inquiry will ultimately converge. > Peirce was a chemist, a mathematician and an expert in measurement. There > was no doubt in his mind that the best methods for producing enduring > convergence of opinion were what we think of as Scientific methods -- > experiments and mathematical analysis .**** > > **** > > (3) The real world consists of all that is true. **** > > **** > > (4) Our knowledge of the world is through a stream of logical inferences. > All human beings are informal scientists by nature. All human belief is > arrived at, whether consciously or unconsciously, whether by scientist or > by layman, whether by infant or mature adult, by the application of forms > of inference and by experiments and observations whether formal or > informal. **** > > **** > > (5) Contrary to what many of us were taught in graduate school, there are > three forms of valid inference. Communities of inquiry (principally > “Sciences” to Peirce) use all three forms of inference, to produce networks > of inference. **** > > **** > > **** > > (6) Deductive inferences such as *"A. All Swans are White; B. this bird > is a swan; C. This bird is white."* are categorically true. However, > those who taught us in Graduate School that only deductive inferences are > valid, failed to tell us how we come by either the Major (A) or the Minor > (B) premise of such inferences. Popper, who influenced many of the > scientists in my generation, used to tell us that they were "bold > conjectures." Big lot of help THAT is! One of the great strengths of > Peirce’s work is that he gives an account of the origin of “bold > conjectures”. **** > > **** > > (7) Peirce honors two additional forms of valid logical inference, which > he calls forms of "probable" inference. . A probable inference is one > whose strength improves with the multiplication of concordant cases. > Probably inference can supply the major (A) and minor (B) premises of > deductive inferences from empirical observations. Much of scientists’ daily > work consists in improving the strength of our probable inferences. **** > > **** > > (8) The first of these types is induction. *“C. This bird is white; B. > This bird is a swan; A. All Swans are White.”* It generates the major > premise of the deductive inference above (A), but needs other inferences to > supply C. and B. With a single case, an inductive inference is valid, but > extremely weak. With the discovery of larger and larger numbers of swans > that are white, the strength (probability) of the inference approaches > 1.00. **** > > **** > > (9) The second of these types of probable inference is “abduction”. *“C. > This bird is white; A. All Swans are White; B. This bird is a swan.”* > Abductions can generate the minor premise of the deductive inference above > (B) but need other inferences to supply A and C. An abductive inference > based on the discovery of a single concordant property between swans and > the bird at hand is valid but extremely weak. As more concordant properties > are discovered, our certainty that the bird is a swan approaches 1.00. *** > * > > **** > > (10) The beliefs in the self and in an inner private world are all arrived > at in this manner. They are the result of inferences (“signs, Peirce would > say”) arising from our experience with the world. The self’s view of the > self is no more privileged an inference than the other’s view of the self. > In fact, on Peirce’s account, the former is probably based upon the latter > by abductive inference.**** > > **** > > (11) On the account of Many Wise Persons, all the above is based upon > Peirce’s theory of signs. I confess I don’t really understand that theory, > and tried very hard to get to this point without invoking it. Your > skepticism should be heightened by this admission. **** > > **** > > I will send this off to some people who know Peirce better than I in the > hope that they will correct me. I will send along any corrections I > receive.**** > > **** > > Nick**** > > **** > > FN#1. Yes, I know that all swans are not white. I know my ornithology, my > childhood literature and my chaotic economics as well as the next guy. *** > * > > **** > > FN#2. Some readers may struggle with the idea that calling a bird “white” > is itself an inference. But, think about how you would go about deciding > the color of something. You would observe it over time, you would observe > it in various lights, etc., and then DECIDE that it was white. Whether > that process is conscious or unconscious, systematic or unsystematic, is > irrelevant to Peirce. It is still an inference. **** > > **** > > **** > > -----Original Message----- > From: friam-boun...@redfish.com [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On > Behalf Of Eric Smith > Sent: Wednesday, March 28, 2012 5:10 PM > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Clarifying Induction Threads**** > > **** > > Thank you Lee and Glen both,**** > > **** > > Yes, I could not disagree. **** > > **** > > There is an interesting question, Glen, on which I don't have a dog in the > fight either way. Is the worry about induction only (or even mostly) about > the origin of conjectures, or is it (equally much, or even mostly) about > the source of confidence in conjectures? The issue of what we would like > to regard as truth values seems to me to suggest at least large weight on > the latter. I think, "truth" descending from a common root of "trust" and > so forth. **** > > **** > > I look forward to Lee's particular refutation, because I was wondering > whether I would argue against the same point myself, say for flipping coins > where there are only two possibilities, and trying to decide whether it is > better to expect that the next one will be the same as previous ones, or > not. But even there, I might niggle with something on algorithm complexity > and description length, and argue that it is "harder" to expect a violation > of a long string of repeats, than it is for a short string.**** > > **** > > But, I look forward to listening to Lee's refutation.**** > > **** > > All best,**** > > **** > > Eric**** > > **** > > **** > > On Mar 28, 2012, at 4:06 PM, lrudo...@meganet.net wrote:**** > > **** > > > Eric Smith: **** > > >** ** > > >> every child knows there can be no discussion of induction that is not** > ** > > >> predicated on the availability of infinities.**** > > >** ** > > > Not so (independent of what every child knows)! I have to rush off**** > > > but will try to get back to this later.**** > > >** ** > > > ============================================================**** > > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe** > ** > > > at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at**** > > > http://www.friam.org**** > > **** > > **** > > ============================================================**** > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv**** > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, > unsubscribe, maps athttp://www.friam.org**** > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org**** > > ** ** > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org >
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