i would appeal to the history of right and left turning and its consequences in 
the life of the organism.  

Russ, 

At some point we might want to appeal to the neural events that accompanied 
these events to answer the question, how does the nervous system mediate the 
interaction between the organim and it's environment.  Something like that. 

Eric will do better when he has time but he has classes to teach and children 
raise. 

Nick 

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, 
Clark University ([email protected])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
http://www.cusf.org [City University of Santa Fe]




----- Original Message ----- 
From: Russ Abbott 
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Sent: 5/2/2010 5:35:17 PM 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Behaviorism [was Beat poet]


Eric, Can you provide an example of an acceptable behaviorist answer to your 
question about why a person turned left instead of right. By example, I'm 
looking for something more concrete than "the explanation for the choice must 
reference conditions in our protagonists past that built him into the type of 
person who would turn left under the current conditions." What might such an 
explanation look like?


-- Russ Abbott
______________________________________

 Professor, Computer Science
 California State University, Los Angeles

 cell:  310-621-3805
 blog: http://russabbott.blogspot.com/
 vita:  http://sites.google.com/site/russabbott/
______________________________________




On Sun, May 2, 2010 at 4:03 PM, ERIC P. CHARLES <[email protected]> wrote:

Robert,
You accuse Nick of talking about "the brain", when he was talking about "the 
mind". 

The most basic tenant of behaviorism is that all questions about the mind are 
ultimately a question about behavior. Thus, while some behaviorists deny the 
existence of mental things, that is not a necessary part of behaviorism. On the 
other hand, the behaviorist must deny that the mind is made up any special 
substance, and they must deny that the mental things are somehow inside the 
person (hence the comparison with soul, auras, etc.). If the behaviorist does 
not deny tout court that mental things happen, what is he to do? One option is 
to claim that mental things are behavioral things, analyzed at some higher 
level of analysis, just as biological things are chemical things analyzed at 
some higher level of analysis. So, to answer your question: There IS a brain, 
and the brain does all sorts of things, but it does not do mental things. 
Mental things happen, but they do not happen "in the brain". As Skinner would 
put it, the question is: What DOES go on in the skull, and what is an 
intelligible way to talk about it? The obvious answer is that the only things 
going on in the skull are physiological. 

For example, if one asks why someone chose to go left instead of right at a 
stop sign, one might get an answer in terms of the brain: "He turned left 
because his frontal cortex activated in such and such a way." However, that is 
no answer at all, because the firing of those neurons is a component part of 
the turning left! Ultimately, the explanation for the choice must reference 
conditions in our protagonists past that built him into the type of person who 
would turn left under the current conditions. In doing so, our explanation will 
necessarily give the conditions that lead to a person whose brain activates in 
such and such a way under the conditions in question. 

Put another way: To say that he chose to turn left because a part of his brain 
chose to turn left misses the point. It anthromorphizes your innards in a weird 
way, suggests homunculi, and introduces all sorts of other ugly problems. 
Further, it takes the quite tractable problem of understanding the origins of 
behavior and transforms it into the still intractable problem of understanding 
the origins of organization in the nervous system. Neuroscience is a great 
field of study, and it is thriving. Thus, people hold out hope that one day we 
will know enough about nerve growth, etc., that the origin of neuronal 
organization will become tractable. One day they will, but when that day comes 
it will not tell us much about behavior that we didn't already know, hence they 
won't tell us much about the mind we didn't already know. 

Or at least, so sayith some behaviorists,

Eric



On Sun, May 2, 2010 05:09 PM, "Robert J. Cordingley" <[email protected]> 
wrote:

Nick
Let me try this on(e)... it's because the brain is the physical structure 
within which our thinking processes occur and collectively those processes we 
call the 'mind'.  I don't see a way to say the same thing or anything remotely 
parallel, about soul, aura, the Great Unknown and such.  Is there an argument 
to say that the brain, or the thinking processes don't exist in the same way we 
can argue that the others don't (or might not)?
Thanks
Robert

On 5/2/10 12:52 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote: 
</snipped> 

How is banging on about mind any different from banging on about soul, or aura, 
or the Great Unknown? 

Nick

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