As I have often demonstrated before, I am smart enough to get us into a mess,
but not smart enough to get us out.
But.... Hempel and Oppenheim are big on the deductiive nomological account of
explanation.
So let it be the case that I am curious why the brick fell on my toe when I let
go of it
If I have a theory that says that all unsupported objects fall, and the
observations that I let go of the brick and my toe was under it, then I have an
adequate explanation for my damaged toe. Notice I didnt have to mention
gravity once.
But you know more about this than I do, dont you?
Nick
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([email protected])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
----- Original Message -----
From: Russ Abbott
To: Roger Critchlow
Cc: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group;
[email protected]; Owen Densmore; Jim Gattiker; Frank Wimberly; Chip
Garner; maryl; nthompson
Sent: 10/5/2009 3:59:15 PM
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence
seminar: what's next?
What do they do about characteristics that don't have descriptions in T? For
example, a house has the characteristic of having 3 bedrooms. That
characteristic doesn't exist in theories describing 2 x 4's, PVC, drywall,
nails, stucco, etc. What would they do with that? If it's emergent, then no
"better" theory will eliminate it. If it's not emergent, then how can anything
else be emergent but not this?
-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles
Cell phone: 310-621-3805
o Check out my blog at http://russabbott.blogspot.com/
On Mon, Oct 5, 2009 at 2:24 PM, Roger Critchlow <[email protected]> wrote:
H&O are quite methodical: "emergence: The occurrence of a characteristic W in
an object w is emergent relative to a theory T, a part relation Pt, and a class
G of attributes if that occurrence cannot be deduced by means of T from a
characterization of the Pt-parts of w with respect to all the attributes in G."
I suspect that the proper characteristics of T are the treated in other parts
of Hempel's book, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the
Philosophy of Science, so it isn't fair to assume that it's entirely arbitrary
and ad hoc.
However, the purpose of the definition is to exterminate emergence, it is a
temporary state of ignorance which will be remedied by an improved theory.
That the improved theory might be entirely stated in relations between
"emergent" ontologies -- eg molecules, cells, organisms, populations, etc -- is
of no concern, they are no longer emergent if they're in the theory.
-- rec --
If it's in the theory, it's in the theory!
On Mon, Oct 5, 2009 at 2:55 PM, Russ Abbott <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoting Nick,
For [Hempel and Oppenheim], a characteristic of on object is emergent relative
to a theory and relative to a particular list of part attributes when that
characteristic cannot be deduced from the part attributes using that theory.
So, to say that a property is emergent is only to say something about the state
of our theory with respect to the data we have already gathered.
That seems to mean that a characteristic is emergent or not depending on the
theory and the part attributes considered. So based on this view any
characteristic is emergent if one ignores all the part attributes. Is that a
correct conclusion? Similarly no characteristic is emergent if one creates a
theory that maps part attributes to it -- no matter how arbitrary and ad hoc
that mapping may be. Neither of these seem like very attractive positions.
They make the notion of emergence subject to all sorts of manipulation.
Or is the point simply to define the term "emergence" in terms of this sort of
formalism? If that's the point, i.e., to define the term "emergence" formally
like this, then what do they do with this definition once created? Does this
definition yield any insights, or is it just a definition?
-- Russ A
On Mon, Oct 5, 2009 at 1:00 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[email protected]>
wrote:
Glen,
My colleagues have already told you what the assignment is, so what follows
is little more than spin.
In our attempts to understand what is going on in this tangled literature,
we have come up with only one way to characterize the different views of
emergence that seems to endure more than a week: that is the
epistemological vs ontological distinction. Hempel and Oppenheim fall
soundly on the epistemological side. For them, a characteristic of on
object is emergent relative to a theory and relative to a particular list
of part attributes when that characteristic cannot be deduced from the part
attributes using that theory. So, to say that a property is emergent is
only to say something about the state of our theory with respect to the
data we have already gathered.
Dennett seems to come down in the middle of our distinction. His argument
concerns what beliefs are REALLY. His answer -- that beliefs are really
features of the world as seen from a point of view -- implies a position on
the nature of emergence. Like Hemple and Oppenheim, Dennett would concede
that seeing emergence requires one to take a point of view.... a STANCE, if
you will. But taking that stance is like looking through binoculars ... it
may limit your field of vision, but it also tells you something that is
true of the world. In fact, every stance tells you something that is true
of the world.
A personal note: those who tried to follow my ravings concerning Holt and
the New Realism this summer wont be surprized to hear me say that Dennett
is sounding awfully like a New Realist.
See you Thursday at 4pm.
Sorry for duplicate posting.
N
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([email protected])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
> [Original Message]
> From: glen e. p. ropella <[email protected]>
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected]>
> Date: 10/5/2009 9:38:53 AM
> Subject: [FRIAM] emergence seminar: what's next?
>
>
> What's next on the reading list?
>
> --
> glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com
>
>
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============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
