What do they do about characteristics that don't have descriptions in T? For example, a house has the characteristic of having 3 bedrooms. That characteristic doesn't exist in theories describing 2 x 4's, PVC, drywall, nails, stucco, etc. What would they do with that? If it's emergent, then no "better" theory will eliminate it. If it's not emergent, then how can anything else be emergent but not this?
-- Russ Abbott _____________________________________________ Professor, Computer Science California State University, Los Angeles Cell phone: 310-621-3805 o Check out my blog at http://russabbott.blogspot.com/ On Mon, Oct 5, 2009 at 2:24 PM, Roger Critchlow <[email protected]> wrote: > H&O are quite methodical: "emergence: The occurrence of a characteristic * > W* in an object *w* is emergent relative to a theory *T*, a part relation > *Pt*, and a class *G* of attributes if that occurrence cannot be deduced > by means of *T* from a characterization of the *Pt*-parts of *w* with > respect to all the attributes in *G*." > > I suspect that the proper characteristics of *T* are the treated in other > parts of Hempel's book, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays > in the Philosophy of Science, so it isn't fair to assume that it's entirely > arbitrary and *ad hoc.* > > However, the purpose of the definition is to exterminate emergence, it is a > temporary state of ignorance which will be remedied by an improved theory. > That the improved theory might be entirely stated in relations between > "emergent" ontologies -- eg molecules, cells, organisms, populations, etc -- > is of no concern, they are no longer emergent if they're in the theory. > > -- rec -- > > If it's in the theory, it's in the theory! > > > On Mon, Oct 5, 2009 at 2:55 PM, Russ Abbott <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Quoting Nick, >> >> For [Hempel and Oppenheim], a characteristic of on object is emergent >> relative to a theory and relative to a particular list of part attributes >> when that characteristic cannot be deduced from the part attributes using >> that theory. So, to say that a property is emergent is only to say >> something about the state of our theory with respect to the data we have >> already gathered. >> >> That seems to mean that a characteristic is emergent or not depending on >> the theory and the part attributes considered. So based on this view any >> characteristic is emergent if one ignores all the part attributes. Is that a >> correct conclusion? Similarly no characteristic is emergent if one creates a >> theory that maps part attributes to it -- no matter how arbitrary and *ad >> hoc* that mapping may be. Neither of these seem like very attractive >> positions. They make the notion of emergence subject to all sorts of >> manipulation. >> >> Or is the point simply to define the term "emergence" in terms of this >> sort of formalism? If that's the point, i.e., to define the term "emergence" >> formally like this, then what do they do with this definition once created? >> Does this definition yield any insights, or is it just a definition? >> >> -- Russ A >> >> >> >> On Mon, Oct 5, 2009 at 1:00 PM, Nicholas Thompson < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Glen, >>> >>> My colleagues have already told you what the assignment is, so what >>> follows >>> is little more than spin. >>> >>> In our attempts to understand what is going on in this tangled >>> literature, >>> we have come up with only one way to characterize the different views of >>> emergence that seems to endure more than a week: that is the >>> epistemological vs ontological distinction. Hempel and Oppenheim fall >>> soundly on the epistemological side. For them, a characteristic of on >>> object is emergent relative to a theory and relative to a particular list >>> of part attributes when that characteristic cannot be deduced from the >>> part >>> attributes using that theory. So, to say that a property is emergent is >>> only to say something about the state of our theory with respect to the >>> data we have already gathered. >>> >>> Dennett seems to come down in the middle of our distinction. His >>> argument >>> concerns what beliefs are REALLY. His answer -- that beliefs are really >>> features of the world as seen from a point of view -- implies a position >>> on >>> the nature of emergence. Like Hemple and Oppenheim, Dennett would >>> concede >>> that seeing emergence requires one to take a point of view.... a STANCE, >>> if >>> you will. But taking that stance is like looking through binoculars ... >>> it >>> may limit your field of vision, but it also tells you something that is >>> true of the world. In fact, every stance tells you something that is >>> true >>> of the world. >>> >>> A personal note: those who tried to follow my ravings concerning Holt and >>> the New Realism this summer wont be surprized to hear me say that Dennett >>> is sounding awfully like a New Realist. >>> >>> See you Thursday at 4pm. >>> >>> Sorry for duplicate posting. >>> >>> N >>> >>> Nicholas S. Thompson >>> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, >>> Clark University ([email protected]) >>> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/<http://home.earthlink.net/%7Enickthompson/naturaldesigns/> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> > [Original Message] >>> > From: glen e. p. ropella <[email protected]> >>> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < >>> [email protected]> >>> > Date: 10/5/2009 9:38:53 AM >>> > Subject: [FRIAM] emergence seminar: what's next? >>> > >>> > >>> > What's next on the reading list? >>> > >>> > -- >>> > glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com >>> > >>> > >>> > ============================================================ >>> > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>> > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org >>> >>> >>> >>> ============================================================ >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org >>> >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org >> > >
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
