Mikhail Gorelkin wrote: > >>Glen<< > > 1) >>But, one has to realize that the latter me is just as > "real" as the former me.<< > > Probably, from a point of view of an > authentic self, a degree of such "real-ness" is not very significant > - zero probability - and may be ignored almost completely. I think it > is "real" because this authentic self exists behind it.
Perhaps. But there is a consensus reality argument that our conception of self (and hence our whole behavioral repertoire) is a function of our inner selves. The argument basically relies on the idea that our inner self co-emerges ontogenically right along with our physical self. And to change either one at any stage in ontogenesis is to change the other in deep and fundamental ways. There's also an extension of that argument that says a person's identity is as much a function of their peers as it is of their self. I'm not saying that these are rock solid arguments. But, to claim that the inner self's "real-ness" is insignificant is a denial of those arguments and, to defend the claim properly, you'd have to find some important fault with those arguments. > 2) >>But I > have to punctuate this argument again with the fact that the > constructed reality, those thoughts inside someone's brain, are just > as real as the a priori reality<< Yes, but it's very limited and low > reality. We try to think about something, but our Selves know it as > it is. This difference is what matters. I agree that the difference is what matters. But I disagree that our constructed inner self is "very limited". In fact, I'd say that the plasticity of our inner self is much greater in some ways than that of our physical selves precisely because it sits on a (perhaps imperfect) logical layer of abstraction above the physical self. In other words, our inner self can contemplate obviously fictitious things like unicorns and human-traversable wormholes without immediately being shot down by reality. Our physical selves are "trapped" within the tight, immediate constraints of physical reality. But to go back to the main point, those obviously fictitious constructions we imagine are still _real_ in that they have a perceptible (sometimes immense) impact on the physical world. (Just take a look at all the glittery unicorns on pastel colored notebooks in the school supplies section of your local box store. ;-) > 3) >>> Those things like Gödel's result and Lie groups are just as real >>> as apples, chairs, and the grand canyon.<< apples,... are a > result of our perception (interpretation) of reality. They are > symbols, constructs like Lie groups. But constructs may be also > phantoms (illusions) - without a correlation (a kind of an > "isomorphism") with something in reality (or bigger reality) and > don't "work" in our practical life. They eventually will disappear. I agree with the gist of what you're saying. The fictitious constructs of no use to the physical self will die off. However, we can't be too draconian about the word "use". For example glittery, rainbow-colored unicorns serve no apparent purpose (except to young people and wind-bags trying to build straw-men ;-), yet they continue unabated. The reverse logic is that all these constructs, fictitious or not, that currently exist _must_ be serving some purpose to the physical selves of those who hold them. > 4) >>Feynman said better: What I cannot create, I do not > understand.<< In his Nobel lesson, Feynman said that nobody > understands quantum mechanic :-) The key word here is "create" and > people mostly misuse it. I think that this phrase should sound like > this: what I cannot make, I do not understand (algorithmical > understanding). Yes, I agree that the inverse phrase is correct as > well... The ability to *make* is an attribute of our rational mind. > If one person can make something like a chair, than another one can > steal his plan (algorithm, understanding), copy it and sell on the > market with a price of *commodity*. But a rational mind cannot > *create*. Such ability is an attribute of our Genius. We read poetry > for only two reasons: to get a glimpse of its original author - this > authentic self, and to enjoy his *creation* - art. We cannot sell to > a museum our makes but arts. And the Boston Symphony Orchestra will > not perform even a technically sophisticated make... Creation of a > genius is mysterious for a rational mind of the "author" as for > others. It's why "authors" usually withdraw their interpretations and > comments or make (invent) them after all. --Mikhail Hmmm. [grin] You _almost_ convince me! But, I don't hold this Cartesian Partition so strongly. I believe the activity in the brain is real activity and can create (by itself) just as mysteriously as the interplay between hands and brain can create. In fact, it's not clear to me that the brain, by itself, can _make_ anything in your sense. It is not regular enough. Perhaps the more autonomic parts of the brain can act so regular. But, the higher functions seem more artistic than methodological. Whether or not such brain activity is "rational" or not is, I think, a red herring. Rationality is probably a convenient fiction. Going back to the original point, I maintain that both the act of creation and the act of making occur within what I call sensory-motor interactions, not somehow "beyond" or behind them. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
