I wrote this article a few years ago about Intel's vPro. When it was published, I was called by the lead architect on the technology. He spent over 20 minutes trying to convince me that what I had written was not accurate, that no such abilities existed inside vPro, and that it would only be used for business uses.
http://www.tgdaily.com/hardware-opinion/39455-big-brother-potentially-exists-right-now-in-our-pcs-compliments-of-intels-vpr Best regards, Rick C. Hodgin --- On Thu, 6/28/12, [email protected] <[email protected]> wrote: > From: [email protected] <[email protected]> > Subject: [Freedombox-discuss] Backdoor in military chips may also be in > Freedombox > To: [email protected] > Date: Thursday, June 28, 2012, 11:57 AM > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > US military chips have a preinstalled backdoor. "This > backdoor has > a key, which we were able to extract. If you use this key, > you can > disable the chip or reprogram it at will, even if locked by > the > user with their own key. This particular chip is prevalent > in many > systems, from weapons [and] nuclear power plants to public > transport. In other words, this backdoor access could be > turned > into an advanced Stuxnet weapon to attack potentially > millions of > systems," Skorobogatov said in the research paper. . . > . > California-based Actel inserted the backdoor, not as a > malicious > activity but rather as a built-in debugging interface.. . . > and is > a common debugging practice.. . .Whether you call this a > security > feature to prevent others from hacking the chip through JTAG > or a > secret backdoor available only to the manufacturer, is open > to > interpretation," Graham said" > http://www.techspot.com/news/48817-china-not-responsible-for-us- > military-chip-backdoor.html > > Regardless whether physical access is necessary to exploit > the > debugger, do not underestimate the effectiveness of a > debugger > functioning as backdoor. Government, hackers and abusers can > break > into offices, homes, cars and wherever else a PC or small > FreeddomBox may be at. Furthermore, I doubt physical access > is > really required. > > Please ask Marvell and ARM if there is a debugger. If so, > please > ask them to remove it. > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Charset: UTF8 > Note: This signature can be verified at https://www.hushtools.com/verify > Version: Hush 3.0 > > wsBcBAEBAgAGBQJP7H7rAAoJEMry4TZLOfxmYHcH/2RBEpd+S+N7D/edOadg2G2+w6r/ > zYzHUd/zlAMiO6o/Z2F2lOcIavB7q0X9sVvUojxFGqLVRHxWXcNiiyyW9Wag53zRByZ3 > 4Gc5DpBZCts/PcVLxi23USCN5MpgLDFkQ6/aNoE9pLzm4XnGlYxYupHhBqtgwBwZvnDX > xZ6rtmFFNsXCaUI4ObnaAYNHQ/08iWeJE96U8YdEJI5b/wEW+oa2J9VRgBUYxblUmCHX > AZTz5mVCuxdKjFlCVYns7Dq8ICwUheVz4fMvF2Wdu+X87rv1xvh07+YhfearlDMNv2NH > wzraVV2iUfCCJJDkthp0Vgyq4NfMAkBEx0ZL+sHVswc= > =Vd0v > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > > _______________________________________________ > Freedombox-discuss mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss > _______________________________________________ Freedombox-discuss mailing list [email protected] http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss
