Hi Karl,
Le 17/10/2017 à 04:24, Karl Denninger a écrit :
> Please understand that if you can get an AP to hand you a zero'd key
> (with an intentionally "weak" client) THEN THAT PERSON JUST BECAME
> ABLE TO ATTACH TO YOUR NETWORK AS AN AUTHORIZED USER.
As per my understanding, this attack only allows to join the network in
the case of Wireless Gigabit GCMP (WiGig) which is currently uncommon.
Common implementations such as WPA2 CCMP and legacy WPA TKIP only allow
the attacker to intercept and manipulate transmitted data. No way has
been found yet for the attacker to forge handshake messages, join a
network or otherwise determine network's password.
Moreover, traffic interception either requires the traffic to be in
clear form or communication security to be poorly implemented. I
personally hope this will again raise the interest toward a fully
encrypted Internet and clear communication becoming the exception
instead of the norm. Clear-text transmission of user's data is a plague
which should be removed.
> Incidentally, has anyone yet figured out if this vector works on a
> network configured for machine certificates instead of a PSK? I'm not
> certain from what I've looked at yet, and that is bothering me a LOT
> for what should be obvious reasons.
Yes, as the author states in the attacks details[1] this attack also
affect enterprise WiFi networks, and both client and server must be
patched for the fix to work so any unpatched device (BYOD...) will
remain a vulnerable point in the corporate infrastructure.
[1]: https://www.krackattacks.com/#details
--
WhiteWinterWolf
https://www.whitewinterwolf.com
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