On 06/25/2012 15:53, RW wrote: > On Mon, 25 Jun 2012 14:59:05 -0700 > Doug Barton wrote: > >>>> Having a copy of the host key allows you to do one thing and one >>>> thing only: impersonate the server. It does not allow you to >>>> eavesdrop on an already-established connection. >>> >>> It enables you to eavesdrop on new connections, >> >> Can you describe the mechanism used to do this? > > Through a MITM attack if nothing else
Sorry, I wasn't clear. Please describe, in precise, reproducible terms, how one would accomplish this. Or, link to known script-kiddie resources ... whatever. My point being, I'm pretty confident that what you're asserting isn't true. But if I'm wrong, I'd like to learn why. >>> and eavesdroppers >>> are often in a position to force reconnection on old ones. >> >> If you can get on the network link between the client and the host, >> yes, you can force an existing connection to drop. But that doesn't >> require the host's secret key. > > I didn't say it did, I was referring to the statement: "It does not > allow you to eavesdrop on an already-established connection." So, correct, but irrelevant. >>>> If the server is set up to require key-based user authentication, >>>> an attacker would also have to obtain the user's key to mount an >>>> effective man-in-the-middle attack. >>> >>> If an attacker is only interested in a specific client, it may not >>> be any harder to break the second public key, than the first one. >> >> Well that's just plain nonsense. The moon "may" be made of green >> cheese. > > It depends on the nature of the attack, but the possibility that two > arbitrary keys are of similar strength under a specific attack is not > on a par with the moon being made of cheese. Again, correct, but irrelevant. Doug -- This .signature sanitized for your protection _______________________________________________ freebsd-security@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-security To unsubscribe, send any mail to "freebsd-security-unsubscr...@freebsd.org"