On Thu, Sep 06, 2012 at 11:01:57PM +0100, RW wrote: > Reusing a secure entropy file is only a problem if the complete history > of yarrow, from boot until some significant output, is exactly the same > as on a previous boot.
Not sure I agree. It's not the only problem. It's the worst problem; in the situation you describe, you'll end up with identical output from /dev/random. > Once something changes you get a completely > different sequence of yarrow cipher-keys; a counter or writing out > a new entropy file will both do this, but OTOH so will any difference in > harvested entropy such a sub-nanosecond difference in timing. You're correct. Are you arguing that we shouldn't recycle /entropy after it's used? If so, why are you okay with making life easier for active attackers? _______________________________________________ [email protected] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-rc To unsubscribe, send any mail to "[email protected]"
