On Tue, Apr 09, 2013 at 10:35:30AM +0200, Andre Oppermann wrote:
> On 09.04.2013 10:16, Peter Holm wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 08, 2013 at 02:13:40PM +0200, Andre Oppermann wrote:
> >> On 05.04.2013 13:09, Matt Miller wrote:
> >>> Hey Rick,
> >>>
> >>> I believe Juan and I have root caused this crash recently. The t_state =
> >>> 0x1, TCPS_LISTEN, in the link provided at the time of the assertion.
> >>>
> >>> In tcp_input(), if we're in TCPS_LISTEN, SO_ACCEPTCONN should be set on
> >>> the
> >>> socket and we should never enter tcp_do_segment() for this state. I think
> >>> if you look in your corefile, you'll see the socket *doesn't* have this
> >>> flag set in your case.
> >>>
> >>> 1043 /*
> >>> 1044 * When the socket is accepting connections (the INPCB is in
> >>> LISTEN
> >>> 1045 * state) we look into the SYN cache if this is a new
> >>> connection
> >>> 1046 * attempt or the completion of a previous one. Because
> >>> listen
> >>> 1047 * sockets are never in TCPS_ESTABLISHED, the V_tcbinfo lock
> >>> will be
> >>> 1048 * held in this case.
> >>> 1049 */
> >>> 1050 if (so->so_options & SO_ACCEPTCONN) {
> >>> 1051 struct in_conninfo inc;
> >>> 1052
> >>> 1053 KASSERT(tp->t_state == TCPS_LISTEN, ("%s: so
> >>> accepting
> >>> but "
> >>> 1054 "tp not listening", __func__));
> >>> ...
> >>> 1356 syncache_add(&inc, &to, th, inp, &so, m, NULL, NULL);
> >>> 1357 /*
> >>> 1358 * Entry added to syncache and mbuf consumed.
> >>> 1359 * Everything already unlocked by syncache_add().
> >>> 1360 */
> >>> 1361 INP_INFO_UNLOCK_ASSERT(&V_tcbinfo);
> >>> 1362 return;
> >>> 1363 }
> >>> ...
> >>> 1384 /*
> >>> 1385 * Segment belongs to a connection in SYN_SENT, ESTABLISHED
> >>> or
> >>> later
> >>> 1386 * state. tcp_do_segment() always consumes the mbuf chain,
> >>> unlocks
> >>> 1387 * the inpcb, and unlocks pcbinfo.
> >>> 1388 */
> >>> 1389 tcp_do_segment(m, th, so, tp, drop_hdrlen, tlen, iptos,
> >>> ti_locked);
> >>>
> >>> I think this has to do with this patch in soclose() where SO_ACCEPTCONN is
> >>> being turned off in soclose(). I suspect if you look at the other threads
> >>> in your corefile, you'll see one at this point in soclose() operating on
> >>> the same socket as the one in the tcp_do_segment() thread.
> >>>
> >>> http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=243627
> >>>
> >>> 817 /*
> >>> 818 * Prevent new additions to the accept queues due
> >>> 819 * to ACCEPT_LOCK races while we are draining them.
> >>> 820 */
> >>> 821 so->so_options &= ~SO_ACCEPTCONN;
> >>> 822 while ((sp = TAILQ_FIRST(&so->so_incomp)) != NULL)
> >>> {
> >>> 823 TAILQ_REMOVE(&so->so_incomp, sp, so_list);
> >>> 824 so->so_incqlen--;
> >>> 825 sp->so_qstate &= ~SQ_INCOMP;
> >>> 826 sp->so_head = NULL;
> >>> 827 ACCEPT_UNLOCK();
> >>> 828 soabort(sp);
> >>> 829 ACCEPT_LOCK();
> >>> 830 }
> >>>
> >>> Juan had evaluated this code path and it seemed safe to just drop the
> >>> packet in this case:
> >>>
> >>> + /*
> >>> + * In closing down the socket, the SO_ACCEPTCONN flag is removed to
> >>> + * prevent new connections from being established. This means that
> >>> + * any frames in that were in the midst of being processed could
> >>> + * make it here. Need to just drop the frame.
> >>> + */
> >>> + if (TCPS_LISTEN == tp->t_state) {
> >>> + TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_rcvwhileclosing);
> >>> + goto drop;
> >>> + }
> >>> KASSERT(tp->t_state > TCPS_LISTEN, ("%s: TCPS_LISTEN",
> >>> __func__));
> >>>
> >>> Or, if there's someone more familiar with the locking in these paths, they
> >>> may be able to come up with a way to restructure the locks and logic to
> >>> close this window.
> >>
> >> Matt, Juan,
> >>
> >> excellent analysis. I don't see a better approach to handle this
> >> under the current ACCEPT_LOCK model.
> >>
> >> Compared to your patch I'd like to handle this race earlier before
> >> we hit tcp_do_segment().
> >>
> >> Could you please review the attached patch which handles it right
> >> after the SO_ACCEPTCONN / syncache check?
> >>
> >> --
> >> Andre
> >>
> >> Index: netinet/tcp_input.c
> >> ===================================================================
> >> --- netinet/tcp_input.c (revision 249253)
> >> +++ netinet/tcp_input.c (working copy)
> >> @@ -1351,6 +1351,16 @@
> >> */
> >> INP_INFO_UNLOCK_ASSERT(&V_tcbinfo);
> >> return;
> >> + } else if (tp->t_state == TCPS_LISTEN) {
> >> + /*
> >> + * When a listen socket is torn down the SO_ACCEPTCONN
> >> + * flag is removed first while connections are drained
> >> + * from the accept queue in a unlock/lock cycle of the
> >> + * ACCEPT_LOCK, opening a race condition allowing a SYN
> >> + * attempt go through unhandled.
> >> + */
> >> + TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_rcvdwhileclosing);
> >> + goto drop;
> >> }
> >>
> >> #ifdef TCP_SIGNATURE
> >
> > I was able to reproduce the original "panic: tcp_do_segment:
> > TCPS_LISTEN" with ease; see
> > http://people.freebsd.org/~pho/stress/log/tcp.txt.
> >
> > With your patch (minus the TCPSTAT_INC) I got this "panic: Lock (rw)
> > tcp locked @ netinet/tcp_input.c:1432."
> >
> > http://people.freebsd.org/~pho/stress/log/tcp2.txt
>
> Please replace the 'goto drop' with 'goto dropunlock' to fix the panic.
>
Yes, this seems to take care of the two problems reported. Tested for
5 hours without any repeats.
- Peter
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