> I also believe that it would be beneficial to implement regular rewriting > of randomly picked lock sector(s) at random times during a user specified > interval (up to x rewrites within n seconds) in order to further obscure > the write pattern and provide additional protection for lock sectors. > ALeine
I agree. I would also add random reads (or specially designed, combined random reads and writes) to make traffic analysis and differential attacks a real PITA for the hacker (although this idea may not be very effective against a highly motivated and determined attacker, such as some government, for instance). Every data storage device has to be "hot", initially at least. Moreover, it is much better to keep the disk attached until the last minute before the attacker will get access to it, because this offers the user protection: deleting keys from a "cold" disk is not possible. Therefore, it is important for GBDE to protect "hot" disks as much as possible (including protection methods against "cleaning lady" copy & differential attacks, for SAN environments & other traffic analysis attacks, etc). BTW, PHK, why did you choose the scheme of encrypting offsets of lock sectors with part of key material and storing them somewhere, instead of just using part of the key material itself to determine the offsets? Timestamp: 0x422BE3D9 [SorAlx] http://cydem.org.ua/ ridin' VN1500-B2 _______________________________________________ freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-hackers To unsubscribe, send any mail to "[EMAIL PROTECTED]"
