In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Richard Coleman writes: >For instance, the NIST specification for AES and CCM mode (NIST Special >Publication 800-38C) specifically states that you must limit the number >of invocations of the block cipher (specifically AES) to 2^61. Now, I >realize that is an upper bound. But even after removing several orders >of magnitude, that leaves a huge amount of material you can encrypt with >a single key. > >Just throwing out a data point.
This would be much more interesting if you qouted the number they will say ten and twenty years from now. -- Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20 [EMAIL PROTECTED] | TCP/IP since RFC 956 FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence. _______________________________________________ freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-hackers To unsubscribe, send any mail to "[EMAIL PROTECTED]"
