"Andrey A. Chernov" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > The basic OPIE/S-KEY idea under that was that normally only one-time > password is allowed, i.e. user is not allowed to type plaintext passwords > at all because connection treated as totally insecured one. > > But for very special cases configured by sysadmin, like working in the > same machine or trusted subnet, OPIE/S-KEY additionally allows plaintext > password too, depending on its own configuration.
That's what PAM is for. If fixed (not necessary plaintext!) passwords are allowed, the admin will mark pam_opie as "sufficient" and place pam_unix below it; if they're not, he'll just remove pam_unix. The current system, BTW, leaves the policy in the hands of the user, as she can create or remove ~/.opie_always at will. A security policy which is based on letting the user decide what is sufficient authentication and what is not is not a proper security policy. > > In any case, if I understand what you're trying to do, it can be done > > by [...] > It sounds good, I'll run a test case and inform you about results. Actually, that idea won't work, because PAM will ignore PAM_AUTH_ERR from a "sufficient" module. A "requisite" helper module, placed after pam_opie, which fails if ~/.opie_always exists would do the trick, if one really wanted this. DES -- Dag-Erling Smorgrav - [EMAIL PROTECTED] To Unsubscribe: send mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with "unsubscribe freebsd-current" in the body of the message
