Re: randomdev entropy gathering is really weak

[Poul-Henning Kamp]

In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Kri
s Kennaway writes:
>On Sat, 22 Jul 2000, Jeroen C. van Gelderen wrote:
>
>> I agree that you need long RSA keys ... but the real 
>> discussion isn't really about key length but rather about 
>> the overall complexity of attacking the key:
>
>Okay, using RSA keys wasn't the best example to pick, but Yarrow also
>seems easy to misuse in other cases: for example if you want to generate
>multiple 256-bit symmetric keys (or other random data) at the same time,

Kris,

Obviously, if you need more randomness than a stock FreeBSD system
can provide you with, you add hardware to give you more randomness.

In other words, and more bluntly:  Please shut up now, will you ?

--
Poul-Henning Kamp       | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
[EMAIL PROTECTED]         | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD coreteam member | BSD since 4.3-tahoe    
Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.


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