On 12.07.2016 12:59, Daniel Kalchev wrote: > The standard HTTPS implementation is already sufficiently broken, with the > door wide open by the concept of “multiple CAs”. The protocol design is > flawed, as any CA can issue certificate for any site. Applications are > required to trust that certificates, as long as they trust the CA that issued > them. > > It is trivial to play MTIM with this protocol and in fact, there are > commercially available “solutions” for “securing one’s corporate network” > that doe exactly that. Some believe this is with the knowledge and approval > of the corporation, but who is to say what the black box actually does and > whose interests it serves? > > There is of course an update to the protocol, DANE, that just shuts this door > off. But… it faces heavy resistance, as it’s acceptance would mean the end of > the lucrative CA business and the ability to intercept “secure” HTTPS > communication. Those relying on the HPPTS flaws will never let it become wide > spread. > > In summary — anyone can sniff HTTPS traffic. No need for any cipher backdoors > here. Nor any need for GOST to be involved.
You forget to mention that CA must already be in the trusted root list to allow it happens.
signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
