On November 2, 2015 5:29:29 AM GMT+01:00, Ralf Quint <freedos...@gmail.com> wrote:
>The downside of that approach however is that it this opens up the >possibility to create a matching hash on "inappropriate" passwords (too > >short, easy to look up/guess) and hence get access... And that's why we use cryptographically secure hash functions. This prevents the malicious attacker from creating a collision on purpose, and with a random collision at p = 1/2**128 you can practically ignore that possibility. It is more probable that the comparison function gets a zap from some cosmic ray and tells you a one for a zero. _______________________________________________ fpc-pascal maillist - fpc-pascal@lists.freepascal.org http://lists.freepascal.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fpc-pascal
