On 09/12/2019 22:25, Andreas Rheinhardt wrote:
While CBS itself uses size_t for sizes, it relies on other APIs that use
int for their sizes; in particular, AVBuffer uses int for their size
parameters and so does GetBitContext with their number of bits. While
CBS aims to be a safe API, the checks it employed were not sufficient to
prevent overflows: E.g. if the size of a unit was > UINT_MAX / 8, 8 *
said size may be truncated to a positive integer before being passed to
init_get_bits() in which case its return value would not indicate an
error.

These checks have been improved to really capture these kinds of errors;
furthermore, although the sizes are still size_t, they are now de-facto
restricted to 0..INT_MAX - AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinha...@gmail.com>
---
The check in cbs_insert_unit() can currently not be triggered, because
av_malloc_array makes sure that it doesn't allocate more than INT_MAX;
so the allocation will fail long before we get even close to INT_MAX.

av1 and H.26x have not been changed, because their split functions
already check the size (in case of H.264 and H.265 this happens in
ff_h2645_packet_split()).

It would btw be possible to open the GetBitContext generically. The
read_unit function would then get the already opened GetBitContext
as a parameter.

  libavcodec/cbs.c       | 6 ++++++
  libavcodec/cbs_jpeg.c  | 2 +-
  libavcodec/cbs_mpeg2.c | 2 +-
  libavcodec/cbs_vp9.c   | 2 +-
  4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/libavcodec/cbs.c b/libavcodec/cbs.c
index 0badb192d9..805049404b 100644
--- a/libavcodec/cbs.c
+++ b/libavcodec/cbs.c
@@ -206,6 +206,9 @@ static int cbs_fill_fragment_data(CodedBitstreamContext 
*ctx,
  {
      av_assert0(!frag->data && !frag->data_ref);
+ if (size > INT_MAX - AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE)
+        return AVERROR(ERANGE);

For this and the following patch I wonder if it would be nicer to pick a sensible upper bounds for fragments (something like 2^30B total in at most 2^20 units?), name them (CBS_MAX_DATA_SIZE, CBS_MAX_UNITS?) and then use those in all checks?

No real case should get anywhere near these bounds, and indeed anything which 
even gets close was likely crafted by a malicious adversary specifically to do 
so.

+
      frag->data_ref =
          av_buffer_alloc(size + AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
      if (!frag->data_ref)
@@ -693,6 +696,9 @@ static int cbs_insert_unit(CodedBitstreamContext *ctx,
              memmove(units + position + 1, units + position,
                      (frag->nb_units - position) * sizeof(*units));
      } else {
+        if (frag->nb_units == INT_MAX)
+            return AVERROR(ERANGE);
+
          units = av_malloc_array(frag->nb_units + 1, sizeof(*units));
          if (!units)
              return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
diff --git a/libavcodec/cbs_jpeg.c b/libavcodec/cbs_jpeg.c
index b189cbd9b7..2bb6c8d18c 100644
--- a/libavcodec/cbs_jpeg.c
+++ b/libavcodec/cbs_jpeg.c
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ static int cbs_jpeg_read_unit(CodedBitstreamContext *ctx,
      GetBitContext gbc;
      int err;
- err = init_get_bits(&gbc, unit->data, 8 * unit->data_size);
+    err = init_get_bits8(&gbc, unit->data, unit->data_size);
      if (err < 0)
          return err;
diff --git a/libavcodec/cbs_mpeg2.c b/libavcodec/cbs_mpeg2.c
index 13d871cc89..255f033734 100644
--- a/libavcodec/cbs_mpeg2.c
+++ b/libavcodec/cbs_mpeg2.c
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ static int cbs_mpeg2_read_unit(CodedBitstreamContext *ctx,
      GetBitContext gbc;
      int err;
- err = init_get_bits(&gbc, unit->data, 8 * unit->data_size);
+    err = init_get_bits8(&gbc, unit->data, unit->data_size);
      if (err < 0)
          return err;
diff --git a/libavcodec/cbs_vp9.c b/libavcodec/cbs_vp9.c
index 42e4dcf5ac..f6cfaa3b36 100644
--- a/libavcodec/cbs_vp9.c
+++ b/libavcodec/cbs_vp9.c
@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ static int cbs_vp9_read_unit(CodedBitstreamContext *ctx,
      GetBitContext gbc;
      int err, pos;
- err = init_get_bits(&gbc, unit->data, 8 * unit->data_size);
+    err = init_get_bits8(&gbc, unit->data, unit->data_size);
      if (err < 0)
          return err;

There are more of these init_get_bits(..., 8 * something) hanging around.  
Perhaps change all of them as one patch, even if there isn't any danger of 
overflow?

Thanks,

- Mark
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