må. den 22. 02. 2016 klokka 03.58 (+0100) skreiv Ralf Mardorf: > On Sun, 21 Feb 2016 21:22:02 +0100, Stig Roar Wangberg wrote: > >I only encrypt to people I trust IF the message requires it. > > Here we face another issue. If you don't always encrypt messages, then > a judge could assume that the encrypted email are related to a crime. > In some countries, IIRC e.g. Great Britain, people can be forced by law > to decrypt data, if they don't do it, they get arrested. In Germany we > have a strong data protection, AFAIK you can't be forced to decrypt > data. Btw. by accident I lost some unimportant keys, so I can't decrypt > some unimportant data, but this could become an issue in countries, > that are allowed to force you, to decrypt data. However, some nations > even use torture. "IF the message requires it" is a strange statement. > Actually all mail, perhaps excepted of postcards, are liable to > inviolability of the mail. If you like to turn the spotlight on you, > then encrypt just a few messages, so police and others know at least > dates, when you might be involved in crimes or whatsoever they are > interested in. IOW by decrypting messages that "require" decryption and > at the same time not encrypting other messages, you already provide > useful data to those who are interested in it. The content of the > message might be unimportant to them, the only information they need > is, that at a given date you corresponded by encrypted emails. Now you > could argue, that in addition you're using anonymous mailing, mixminion > or similar. Since TOR was mentioned I'll quote from the FAQs: > > "So I'm totally anonymous if I use Tor? > No. > [snip]" > > "What attacks remain against onion routing? > As mentioned above, it is possible for an observer who can view both > you and either the destination website or your Tor exit node to > correlate timings of your traffic as it enters the Tor network and also > as it exits. Tor does not defend against such a threat model. > > [snip] > > Furthermore, since Tor reuses circuits for multiple TCP connections, it > is possible to associate non anonymous and anonymous traffic at a given > exit node, so be careful about what applications you run concurrently > over Tor. Perhaps even run separate Tor clients for these applications." > - https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en > > IOW e.g. even if you run Ardour, a digital audio workstation that phones > home and it phones home, while you are using TOR browser, a lot of the > security provided by TOR could be null and void. > > Regards, > Ralf
But I DO agree with the facts you are presenting. Thank you, Ralf. Best regards, Stig _______________________________________________ evolution-list mailing list evolution-list@gnome.org To change your list options or unsubscribe, visit ... https://mail.gnome.org/mailman/listinfo/evolution-list
