On Wednesday, August 14, 2019 at 5:06:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Aug 2019, at 11:49, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>>
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, August 12, 2019 at 4:17:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 12 Aug 2019, at 00:16, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, August 11, 2019 at 1:07:02 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 9 Aug 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *The Right Stuff*
>>> Ned Markosian
>>> https://markosiandotnet.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/right-stuff.pdf
>>> from https://markosian.net/online-papers/
>>>
>>> *Things are also known as “objects” and “entities,” and stuff is also
>>> known as*
>>> *“matter” and “material.”*
>>>
>>> *This paper argues for including stuff in one’s ontology. The
>>> distinction*
>>> *between things and stuff is first clarified, and then three different
>>> ontologies*
>>> *of the physical universe are spelled out: a pure thing ontology, a pure
>>> stuff*
>>> *ontology, and a mixed ontology of both things and stuff. (The paper
>>> defends*
>>> *the latter.) Eleven different reasons for including stuff (in addition
>>> to things)*
>>> *in one’s ontology are given (seven of which the author endorses and
>>> four of*
>>> *which would be sensible reasons for philosophers with certain
>>> metaphysical*
>>> *positions that the author does not happen to hold). Then five
>>> objections to*
>>> *positing stuff are considered and rejected.*
>>>
>>>
>>> Honest and clear defence of stuff!. I appreciate his distinction between
>>> things and stuff.
>>>
>>> So with mechanism, we can say: many things no stuff!
>>> (Many things like numbers, machines, persons, physical objects,
>>> physical experiences, etc.),
>>>
>>>
>>> Feel free to defend any of the eleven reason he gave. Up to now (I read
>>> slowly) I am not convinced.
>>>
>>> I am more sure that 2+2=4 than of the existence of plumb, .. not
>>> mentioning the existence of a plumber !
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>> I don't know about a plumb, but of a plum, I am more sure of any of my
>> experiences of eating a plum than 2+2=4.
>>
>>
>> But the experience of eating a plum is not a proof that the plum is made
>> of matter. I dreamed a lot eating things, for example. A first person
>> experience never proves anything, except the existence of that experience
>> for the one who remember it.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 2+2=4 is a heuristic of mathematical language. Useful for us, but not
>> "real" like a plum-eating experience.
>>
>>
>> With mechanism, we do have an explanation of where such experience come
>> from.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Language bewilders us, and thus we talk and write and think of things,
>> but it's the plum stuff that matters.
>>
>>
>>
>> Then mechanism is false. Maybe, but the evidences side with mechanism,
>> not with materialism. Yes, language bewllders us in making us believe in
>> stuff, but if digital mechanism is correct, all the argument you might find
>> for better are find by your counterpart in arithmetic, and here we know
>> that they are invalid, but that shows that your intuition is not well
>> sustained, or that mechanism is false (and the “you” in arithmetic becomes
>> p-zombies.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> This is the whole panpsychism (here the Galen Stawson, Philip Goff, Hedda
> Hassel Mørch, ... materialist panpsychist kind, not the idealist version
> of maybe a few) enterprise.
>
> Either:
>
> Mechanism is true.
>
> or
>
> Panpsychism is true.
>
>
>
> Why?
>
> It seems to me that if Mechanism is false, *many* different sorts of
> non-mechanist theory can be true, including pure arithmetical one, or set
> theoretical one.
>
> With Non-Mechanism, weak materialism *might* become consistent, but that
> does not (yet) make it necessarily true.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
Basically, you replace mechanism with an experiential mechanism (
*e-mechanism*), where
*Φ+Ψ:* *both numbers (information) and [real!] qualia (experience)
are processed*.
Now matter (in the panpsychist view) supplies *Φ+Ψ* but maybe there's an
alternative.
It comes down to what real *Ψ *is.
A recent paper from Hedda Hassel Mørch here:
https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCTPP.pdf
A real *Ψ* vs an illusory or simulated *Ψ *is the key issue.
@philipthrift
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