On Thu, Aug 8, 2019 at 3:50 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < [email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 8/8/2019 11:59 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Thu, Aug 8, 2019 at 1:24 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On 8/8/2019 3:56 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, August 7, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 8/7/2019 8:47 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Aug 7, 2019 at 4:59 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 8/7/2019 2:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Aug 7, 2019 at 2:23 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 8/7/2019 8:30 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>> > This is made most clear in the case of a quantum computer. Where >>>>> the >>>>> > quantum computer can be viewed as one WORLD (def 1) that contains >>>>> many >>>>> > little worlds (def 2), where each computational trace constitutes >>>>> its >>>>> > own little world, causally isolated from the rest. >>>>> >>>>> Except those computational traces DO NOT constitute little worlds. >>>>> They >>>>> are not causally isolated. The whole function of the computer depends >>>>> on them interacting, i.e. interfering coherently. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> It depends on the algorithm. >>>> >>>> If, as in my neural net example, interference is not used, the many >>>> computations are causally isolated, and will remain so (FAPP) once I read >>>> the output bits. >>>> >>>> You seem to want it both ways. "Yes they are many worlds, but they're >>>> not entirely or always completely causally isolated, so they're not really >>>> separate worlds." >>>> >>>> >>>> You're the one who introduced worlds and little worlds. My point is >>>> just that doing computations with lots of qubits doesn't imply there are >>>> separate worlds in which the computations happen; in fact it requires the >>>> contrary if the computation is to come to a single conclusion. >>>> >>> >>> No disagreement with that, but my point all along is that "many >>> somethings" associated with the qubits in the quantum computer, can lead to >>> many minds which can have many experiences, when the quantum computer >>> executes computational traces which create conscious states. Do you >>> disagree with this? >>> >>> >>> No. As far as I know minds are classical like processes in brains. >>> >> >> Quantum logic gates are Turing complete. This means quantum computers can >> emulate any classical computation. So in certain algorithms, the >> components of the superposition are traces of distinct classical >> computations. >> >> >> >>> That's why you are never really "of two minds". Superpositions >>> corresponding to neurons firing and not-firing decohere far too quickly. >>> See Tegmark's paper. >>> >>> >> >> I'm aware of it. It's about decoherence times of biological neurons to >> disprove the Penrose idea that brains exploit quantum mechanics to somehow >> overcome incompleteness. >> >> The point of using a quantum computer in my example is that decoherence >> doesn't happen until after the computational traces have all been realized. >> >> If I understand your position correctly, you believe the distinct >> computational traces exist but that they're not consciousness, because you >> postulate decoherence at each step of the computation is necessary? >> >> Would this not make Wigner's friend into a zombie (or any AI or brain >> emulation performed on a quantum computer)? Does my clarification of the >> Turing completeness of Quantum logic gates do anything to amend your >> opinion? >> >> >> I think that thought must be essentially classical. Otherwise, according >> to MWI, we would not be aware of the classical world, but only of the state >> vector. It's the same reason Bohr insisted on a classical world for >> science to be possible. There must be definite sharable results. So I >> think this applies within a single brain as well as between Wigner and his >> friends. The interesting question is why are we aware of the projection or >> decoherence onto certain bases and not others, and could consciousness be >> realized differently? >> > > I agree human consciousness is the result of an effectively classical > computation. > > This is why I insist that the quantum computer, (whose components > represent many individual classical computations), can instantiate a > multitude of individual brains, each potentially having a unique experience. > > Quantum computers can emulate any classical computation. If a brain > emulated on a quantum computer answers "no" when asked the question "are > you conscious?" while the same brain emulated on a Pentium III processor > answers "yes" when asked the same question, then you have a violation of > the Church-Turing thesis. This is a program that can determine something > about its underlying hardware (whether its a classical or quantum > computer). If instead, you hold that both emulations answer "yes", then > you have a violation of the anti-zombie principle > <https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/kYAuNJX2ecH2uFqZ9/the-generalized-anti-zombie-principle>. > Either consequence is distasteful to me. > > > If the quantum computer didn't decohere to a quasi-classcial mixture it > would answer "Yes and no." (to every question). > I am assuming in this example that the brain emulation is deterministic (no superpositions need be used as inputs). Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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