On Monday, July 29, 2019 at 8:00:31 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 29 Jul 2019, at 13:18, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected] 
> <javascript:>> wrote:
>
> On Monday, July 29, 2019 at 5:47:16 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 29 Jul 2019, at 03:03, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected]> 
>> wrote:
>>
>> On Sunday, July 28, 2019 at 5:22:39 PM UTC-5, [email protected] wrote:
>>>
>>> I am suspecting that someone who works with Hilbert space, might see 
>>> themselves as Hugh Everett friendly? Throw in Bryce DeWitt and John A. 
>>> Wheeler too. 
>>>
>>>
>> I am fairly agnostic about quantum interpretations. They are auxiliary 
>> postulates or physical axioms that appear to have no falsifiable content. 
>>
>>
>>
>> Everett does not talk about interpretation, but about a new formulation, 
>> or new theory. That new theory which is the old Copenhagen one, but with 
>> the postulate collapse deleted.
>>
>> I agree, this are different theories, before suggesting different type of 
>> interpretation (differing along the lines dividing monism (Everett) and 
>> dualist (Copenhagen).
>>
>> Everett ides is the idea that a physicist obey to quantum mechanics too. 
>> Eventually this lead to a “relative state interpretation” of the same kind 
>> of the “relative computational state” in arithmetic.
>>
>> With mechanism, quantum mechanics is how the digital number reality looks 
>> from inside,by machines which are supported by infinitely many computations 
>> (which are relatively executed in virtue of pure number theoretical 
>> relations (indeed the so called sigma_1).
>>
>> Everett eliminates the wave collapse postulate, but with mechanism, the 
>> wave itself is eliminated, and must be recovered through the geometry and 
>> topology associated with the material/observable modes of the universal 
>> machine (those given by Theaetetus and variants applied to Gödel’s 
>> beweisbar (provability) postulate. That gives already the quantum logics 
>> needed where they were expected). Quantum mechanics becomes a “theorem” in 
>> the universal machine's theory of consciousness and matter.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>
> MWI is a quantum interpretation because it makes an ontological statement 
> on the nature of the wave function. 
>
>
> I use “MWI” as a synonym as “no assumption of collapse”. Then the theory 
> is neutral on the nature of the wave. It can still become purely 
> epistemological, as it is necessarily the case if we assume digital 
> mechanism. There are still “many-histories”, but this are expected to be 
> the same as the computations, which exists in arithmetic.
>
>
>
>
> Quantum mechanics by itself makes no inference on the existential nature 
> of ψ. 
>
>
> If Quantum Mechanics means the Copenhagen theory, then there is strong 
> inference on the existential nature of Psi. There is a physical wave of 
> some sort, and the human observation reduces it physically. It is a dualist 
> theory, assuming that the ave describes some reality (testable by 
> experiment) and that the observation acts on that reality, but is not part 
> of that reality.
>
>
>
>
> The MWI is ψ-ontological, 
>
>
> Not necessarily, as mechanism illustrates. In that case there is nothing 
> but the natural numbers in the ontology, and the wave is purely 
> epistemological, it describes the map of the consistent extension of the 
> observer/universal-machine (in arithmetic).
>
>
>
> which means it requires the wave function to be ontic or real. By way of 
> contrast the Bohr interpretation is ψ-epistemic, which is to say the ψ is 
> just an epistemological entity used to compute experimental outcomes; it 
> has no reality.
>
>
> I guess you mean “no physical reality”, but with Mechanism, there is no 
> physical reality at all, except a special  sharable epistemological 
> reality, that we can call “physical”, but is pure first person (plural) 
> histories.
>
> Here, we mix two difficulties, which is that 1) with mechanism, all 
> physical terms get a new interpretation in terms of natural numbers (and 
> set of natural numbers), 2) that even in the materialist (and thus non 
> mechanist) frame, there is no unanimity of how to interpret the wave and 
> the measurement operations.
>
> With Mechanism, both Copenhagen and Everett admits purely epistemological 
> interpretations.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
The MWI is a specific interpretation, and it maintains an existence of the 
wave function. We local observers are only able to witness a pieces of it. 
This is in place of collapse. Either way one is left with an unsettled 
sense of how the collapse or this splitting is realized. With Bohr's 
Copenhagen interpretation the wave function is a device to calculate 
outcomes and then does this collapse, which really just means revealing a 
result. MWI splits the world, it continues to have a constancy. Bohr's CI 
is epistemic and MWI is ontic.

LC
 

>
>
>
> LC
>
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