On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 6:16:29 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: > > > > On 7/21/2019 4:06 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 4:39:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> >> >> On 7/21/2019 12:30 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:18:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> >>> I didn't say there was. I said *youse-self* sees Moscow and >>>> Washington. "Youse-self" is second person *plural*. >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>> >>> Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept >>> frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's >>> clear and meaningful. >>> >>> >>> But does it have a clear answer? >>> >>> The MWI has it's own problems with probability. It's straightforward if >>> there are just two possibility and so the world splits into two (and we >>> implicitly assume they are equi-probable). But what if there are two >>> possibilities and one is twice as likely as the other? Does the world >>> split into three, two of which are the same? If two worlds are the same, >>> can they really be two. Aren't they just one? And what if there are two >>> possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand >>> chance. Does the world then split into 1001 worlds? And what if the >>> probability of one event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds. >>> But if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens infinitely >>> many times and there is no natural measure of probability. >>> >>> Brent >>> >> >> >> >> Sean Carroll is the multiple-worlds dude. He would have an answer. >> >> >> >> http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/ >> >> >> "The potential for *multiple worlds* is always there in the quantum >> state, whether you like it or not. The next question would be, do >> multiple-world superpositions of the form written [above] ever actually >> come into being? And the answer again is: *yes, automatically*, without >> any additional assumptions." >> >> >> But then the question is how many worlds (the 1/pi problem) and how does >> probability come into it? Do we have to just assign probabilities to >> branches (using the Born rule as an axiom instead of deriving it)? And >> what about continuous processes like detecting the decay in Schroedinger's >> cat box? Is a continuum of worlds produced corresponding to the different >> times the decay might occur? >> >> Brent >> > > > Tegmark could be on the mark by taking the position that infinities of all > types should be removed from physics. > > So there would be no "continuum of worlds". The way I think about it > (without getting into the formality of computable analysis) is to just > think of the worlds being generated as in a quantum Monte Carlo program: > There will be lots of worlds randomly made, but not an actual infinity of > them. > > > That would just be equivalent to weighting them with the Born Rule. If > you're going to have worlds generated per a MC program with weightings > (probabilities) then why not just have world generated per the Born MC > program. > > Brent > > > > (God plays Monte Carlo.) > > @philipthrift > >
Maybe it ends up being basically the same Monte Carlo programming. Monte Carlo sampling from the quantum state space https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.7805 https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.7806 @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3bec5f99-4727-4eb6-9f29-8682caebdb58%40googlegroups.com.
