> On 6 Jul 2019, at 13:32, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Saturday, July 6, 2019 at 1:42:20 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 6 Jul 2019, at 05:57, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, July 5, 2019 at 9:27:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 4 Jul 2019, at 10:57, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, July 4, 2019 at 3:31:27 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> > On 3 Jul 2019, at 19:54, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> > <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> > You may be able to access your subjective time, but does it provide a >>> > measure...and if so what is it? >>> >>> >>> >>> We get three candidates for the logic of the measure one, given by the >>> logic of the intensional variant of G ([]p): >>> >>> []p & p >>> []p & <>t >>> []p & <>t & p >>> >>> With “[]” = Gödel’s beweisbar, and p is any sigma_1 arithmetical sentences >>> (it models the Universal dovetailing). >>> >>> If that logic verifies some technical condition (described by Von Neuman in >>> some papers), the logic should provides the entire probability calculus, as >>> it has to do if Mechanism is correct. >>> >>> G and G* splits both []p & <>t and []p & <>t & p. So we get 5 logics, but >>> normally, only the starred logic should provides the measure, because it >>> depends on the true structure made by the 1p experiences, and not the >>> experienced experiences. Our future depends non locally of all our existing >>> “preparation” or “reconstitution” that exists in the (sigma_1) arithmetic >>> (the universal dovetailer). >>> >>> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> If that above is a correct experientiality logic, then what would be a >>> 'machine' -- defined in terms of physics (or chemistry or biology) -- to >>> execute it? >>> >>> We know one 'machine' exists: our brain. But what machine is that? >> >> >> >> That’s a very good question, but not an easy one, especially if you are not >> familiar with the “universal dovetailer argument” and our >> self-multiplication in arithmetic. >> >> The brain exist phenomenologically, and it is not a machine, even if it is >> something which supports computation. In fact it is the same for a computer. >> >> You could say that a brain or a computer is a digital machine (supporting >> our computation), but that it is itself supported by an infinity of >> computations. Intuitively (accepting classical quantum physics momentarily) >> a piece of matter is a map of all the realities you will access if you >> attempt to figure out some aspect of those sub-level computations. You can >> imagine that there is one computation for each possible position (and >> momentum) of each electron in that piece of matter, and the electron itself >> is a complicated invariant of some possible field. But the multiplication >> can be triggered by the observation, by some alien, even far away, of its >> own piece of matter. Such a multiplication is contaminated by the alien to >> you, at the speed of light (or below) assuming again the physics of today >> (which we seem to recover until now). >> >> It is certainly hard to imagine: a brain our a physical computer is made up >> of the histories we can share, and which are supported by the infinitely >> many computations (which are run in Arithmetic) with more details than we >> need to have our computational state. >> An image would be that a piece of matter is made of those computations, but >> that is still a misleading metaphor, as matter is not something made of >> anything, but is more like a qualia (a first person notion), which we can >> share among locally independent universal machine. >> >> I can argue, that both intuitively (with some many-world account of QM) and >> formally (using the self-reference logics and the quantum logical formalism) >> that nature confirms this (with some degree), but that will not help, QM >> itself does not admit simple interpretation, and there is no unanimity of >> how to interpret it. Mechanism makes this both more simple (the many >> computations are easy to study), and more complex, because the internal >> views are based on incompleteness which is rather counter-intuitive too. >> >> It is exactly what I am searching: what is matter when we understand that >> the physical reality is more like an infinity of computer simulation >> interfering statistically? The math, a bit like with the current physical >> theories, can only give epistemic observable and predictions rules, and that >> is how we can test mechanism experimentally. Matter conceived as something >> made of tiny particles is a concept that we need to abandon: they are >> abstract feature introduce by ourself when we look at things, but with a >> very general notion of ourself (all universal machines in arithmetic). The >> math suggest that the “bottom” of the physical reality is a highly >> symmetrical structure which is highly not symmetrical from the perspective >> of the average universal number in arithmetic. >> >> I hope this helps. I will make a glossary which should add more help, soon >> or a bit later, >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> The Kantian perspective is >> >> logic-of-X ≠ X-in-itself >> >> -- which is noumena, or matter. >> >> All our conceptions of the world are prisoners of our logic (languages). > > That is a good reason to make clear which logic we are using. The use of the > classical (usual) Church-Turing thesis means that we use classical logic in > the base Turing-universal ontology . We need that a program, when enacted (on > some input, or not) will either stop, or not stop, independently of us > knowing which is the case. > Then the phenomenologies (which emerges from incompleteness) get their own > logic (intuitionist for the first person) and quantum for the material > self-modes. > > Cf: > > p, > []p > []p & p first person mode > []p & <>t material mode > []p & <>t & p. Material and first person mode > > Bruno > > > > > > Whatever logic it is, its semantics (of a theory in that logic) is the > elephant in the room. > > - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantics_of_logic > - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_theory > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_theory> > e.g. Whereas universal algebra provides the semantics for a signature, logic > provides the syntax. > - https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/model-theory/ > > Semantics is the wild, wild west of logic.
You might try to make a point, perhaps. Semantic is obviously very important. Logic can be divided in three chapters: - theory of theories and proofs (cf Gödel) - semantics (Model theory) (cf Lowenheim, Skolem and Tarski, Mostowski, …) - the relation between, theories and models, that is the study of (all) theories and all their semantics, usually through completeness and incompleteness theorems. Semantic is the heart of “modern logic”. I do avoid using it here to much, because it is quickly rather technical. I hope people have some idea that the structure (N, 0, +, *) (which is the set N with the usual standard interpretation of + and *) is a model of both RA and PA. I might say a bit more in the glossary I am preparing. All “rich” theories have infinitely many non isomorphic models, and by incompleteness no theories at all can study its own semantics, but some theories can still say a lot about it, like its own incompleteness. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/35e27240-6b10-4658-94ce-92ee435116a6%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/35e27240-6b10-4658-94ce-92ee435116a6%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/AD2C6DD3-1305-4453-9CCB-99A76428283F%40ulb.ac.be.
