On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 3:45 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < [email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 5/5/2019 6:11 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: > > No doubt, and the cybernetic description of those animals corresponds > nicely to our intuitions about levels of consciousness. > > So one consequence of this way of looking at consciousness is that we can > ascribe consciousness to things like corporations, cities, and cultures as > a whole. Perhaps some will find that to be a reductio ad absurdum. I think > it's really interesting to consider that cultures are conscious. > > > It's interesting. But without delineating the distinctions it starts to > make "consciousness" a murky ambiguous concept. I don't think it adds much > to the understanding of my thermostat to say it is conscious of the > temperature and the temperature setting. > Finding ways to reason about consciousness has always been murky and ambiguous. On the whole, I think the cybernetic approach does make things a little less murky and ambiguous. And I agree that the consciousness of a thermostat is not interesting, beyond the fact that something as simple as a thermostat can be considered to have consciousness. > It is only at the higher levels in which self-awareness enters into > foresight, reflection, values, and learning that the nature of > consciousness and how it must be realized for intelligence becomes > interesting. > I agree, though I think it's important that a theory of consciousness have something to say about simpler forms that is consistent with whatever you can say about the advanced forms. > > It goes in the other direction, too. Cells in our body are conscious too, > but we're not aware of them in the same way we're not aware of cultural > consciousness. Consciousness, in this way of thinking, is a property of the > whole system, not some reductive summation of the consciousnesses of its > constituent parts. > > > I don't think I can buy that. Yes, my cells, and "my" bacteria, are > conscious at the level of biochemical information processing. But that's > not part of my inner narrative consciousness. > I must not have expressed myself clearly - we're saying the same thing. I'm highlighting the fact that my consciousness doesn't appear to have anything to do with the consciousness of my component parts (cells, organs, etc), nor do I seem to have access to the consciousness of the culture(s) I'm a part of. The point is that consciousness isn't a sum of its parts, but is identified with the system as a whole. And to be clear, when I say system, I'm referring to cells, humans, corporations. Systems can be composed of systems. Terren > > Brent > > > Terren > > On Sun, May 5, 2019, 2:15 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> OK, I agree with that, but it's far from human consciousness. I think >> there are quite a few distinct levels from a thermostat to a flatworm to >> spider to a dog to a human. >> >> Brent >> >> On 5/4/2019 10:53 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: >> >> Yes, exactly. There's something it is like to be a thermostat. What is it >> like? As a basic homeostatic model, with a single recursive element - the >> dynamics are enough to create an ongoing stream of awareness of the state >> of a single bit of information. >> >> On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 1:30 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> It appears to me that every system that has a function will have a >>> cybernetic description, i.e. one that only mentions functional >>> relationships but not the matter. I can imagine such a description of my >>> thermostat: There's an element that changes with temperature and makes a >>> connection below a certain temperature that energizes a source of >>> heat...and so on. Right? >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> On 5/4/2019 8:26 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: >>> >>> The cybernetic description of a system is a description of a system's >>> relationships, both internally in terms of the system's organization - how >>> its components relate to each other functionally, and externally in terms >>> of a system's functional relationship to its environment. A cybernetic >>> description explicitly leaves out the materiality of the components - it's >>> only about the relations. Therefore cybernetics is exclusively about >>> information - the way a system creates/updates information about its >>> environment, and how that information is processed as a function of the >>> system's organization as a whole. >>> >>> What I'm saying is that for any system that has a cybernetic description >>> (which can cover a very broad range of systems), there it is something it >>> is like to be that system, which is to say a system that processes >>> information in one form or another. A lot of this comes from the site >>> Principia >>> Cybernetica <http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/DEFAULT.html> which is a pretty >>> expansive treatment of cybernetics. >>> >>> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 2:55 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 5/4/2019 6:30 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>> >>>> What I'm suggesting draws on both functionalism and identity theory. >>>> It's functional in the sense that the constitutive aspect of cybernetics is >>>> entirely functional. >>>> >>>> >>>> So what is the function that makes a system "cybernetic" and is that >>>> sufficient to make it conscious? >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>>> There is nothing in a cybernetic description beyond the functional >>>> relationships between the parts of that system. It draws on identity theory >>>> in the sense that I'm claiming that consciousness *is* cybernetic >>>> dynamics. What I'm adding is the same move that panpsychism makes - that >>>> there is something it is like to be any cybernetic system, and this >>>> includes many more things than brains, and crucially, does not depend on a >>>> specific substrate. >>>> >>>> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 9:13 AM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I must assume you have already studied (hopefully over many years) in >>>>> philosophy the difference between >>>>> >>>>> *functionalism*: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/ >>>>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>> *identity theory*: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/ >>>>> >>>>> A short way of expressing identity theory over functionalism is >>>>> >>>>> *A simulation is not a synthesis.* >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *Experiential materialism* is a variant of identity theory in which >>>>> >>>>> • psychical properties, as well as physical ones, are attributed to >>>>> matter, which is the only basic substance >>>>> >>>>> so that >>>>> >>>>> • the material composition of the brain has both physical and >>>>> psychical aspects. >>>>> >>>>> @philipthrift >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 7:38:46 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Maybe you could tell me what specific criticism you have rather than >>>>>> quoting a wikipedia article. >>>>>> >>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 7:50 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don't believe in the "*functional* equivalence" principle >>>>>>> >>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> as it does not capture the nature of what is needed for >>>>>>> consciousness (as many critics - some listed there - have pointed out). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If I had to pick something vs. "cybernetic dynamics" it would be >>>>>>> "neurochemical dynamics". That seems closer to me. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 5:31:56 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Then you're missing the point of the alternative I've been >>>>>>>> offering. It's not about the *matter itself*, it's about the >>>>>>>> cybernetic dynamics implemented in the matter. So I would predict that >>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>> could replace your brain neuron by neuron with functional equivalents >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> your consciousness wouldn't change, so long as the cybernetics were >>>>>>>> unchanged. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019, 6:08 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Well we know *some* matter has a psychical aspect: *human brains*. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Unless one is a consciousness denier. >>>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>>> https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 4:58:04 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Panpsychism of any flavor that identifies matter with a psychic >>>>>>>>>> aspect is subject to the problems I described earlier. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> It never occurred to me to google something like "theoretical >>>>>>>>>> psychology" >>>>>>>>>> <https://www.google.com/search?q=theoretical+psychology> but >>>>>>>>>> there's a lot there. How much of it is interesting, I don't know. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I think as we flesh out the connectome, theoretical psychology >>>>>>>>>> will take on more legitimacy and importance. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 5:16 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> There is a whole spectrum of panpsychisms (plural) - from >>>>>>>>>>> micropsychism to cosmophychism: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/ >>>>>>>>>>> cf. https://www.iep.utm.edu/panpsych/ >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> That is not a "real science" yet is its basic problem of course. >>>>>>>>>>> But consciousness science in general really isn't yet either. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> One would think there would be a group of theoretical >>>>>>>>>>> psychologists - there is theoretical physics, chemistry, and >>>>>>>>>>> biology, but >>>>>>>>>>> theoretical psychology is in a much weirder state - who would be >>>>>>>>>>> involved. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 3:48:40 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> My question for panpsychists is similar to my question for >>>>>>>>>>>> Cosmin: what does it buy you in terms of explanations or >>>>>>>>>>>> predictions? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Just blanket-asserting that all matter is conscious doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>> tell me anything about consciousness itself. For example, what >>>>>>>>>>>> would it >>>>>>>>>>>> mean for my fingernails to be conscious? Does my fingernail >>>>>>>>>>>> consciousness >>>>>>>>>>>> factor in somehow to my own experience of consciousness? If so, >>>>>>>>>>>> how? What >>>>>>>>>>>> about all the other parts of my body, about individual cells? >>>>>>>>>>>> Does the >>>>>>>>>>>> bacteria living in my body contribute its consciousness somehow? >>>>>>>>>>>> It quickly >>>>>>>>>>>> runs aground on the same rocks that arguments about "soul" do - >>>>>>>>>>>> there's no >>>>>>>>>>>> principled way to talk about it that elucidates relationships >>>>>>>>>>>> between >>>>>>>>>>>> brains, bodies, and minds. Panpsychism does nothing to explain the >>>>>>>>>>>> effect >>>>>>>>>>>> of drugs on consciousness, or brain damage. Like Cosmin's ideas, >>>>>>>>>>>> it's all >>>>>>>>>>>> just post-hoc rationalization. Panpsychism is the philosophical >>>>>>>>>>>> equivalent >>>>>>>>>>>> of throwing your hands up and saying "I dunno, I guess it's all >>>>>>>>>>>> conscious >>>>>>>>>>>> somehow!" >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> What I'm suggesting posits that consciousness arises from the >>>>>>>>>>>> cybernetic organization of a system, that what the system >>>>>>>>>>>> experiences, as a >>>>>>>>>>>> whole, is identified with the informational-dynamics captured by >>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>> organization. This yields explanations for the character of a given >>>>>>>>>>>> system's consciousness... something panpsychism cannot do. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Terren >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 3:57 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I see the coin made (as the ones lying on my desk right now >>>>>>>>>>>>> made of metal) of matter. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> The two sides of the coin (of matter) are *physical *and >>>>>>>>>>>>> *psychical*: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/ >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> If ὕ – the first Greek letter for “hyle”, upsilon (υ) with >>>>>>>>>>>>> diacritics dasia and oxia (U+1F55) – is used for the symbol of >>>>>>>>>>>>> matter, φ >>>>>>>>>>>>> (phi) for physical, + ψ (psi) for psychical, then >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> ὕ = φ + ψ >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> (i.e., the combination of *physical* and *psychical* properties >>>>>>>>>>>>> is a more complete view of what matter is). The physical is the >>>>>>>>>>>>> (quantitative) behavioral aspect of matter – the kind that is >>>>>>>>>>>>> formulated in >>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematical language in current physics, for example – whereas >>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> psychical is the (qualitative) experiential aspect of matter, at >>>>>>>>>>>>> various >>>>>>>>>>>>> levels, from brains on down. There is no reason in principle for >>>>>>>>>>>>> only φ to >>>>>>>>>>>>> the considered by science and for ψ to be ignored by science. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 2:10:05 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I see them as two sides of the same coin - as in, you don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>> get one without the other. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 3:00 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If "consciousness doesn't supervene on physical [or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> material] computation" then does that mean there is realm for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (A) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consciousness and one for (B) physical [or material] >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computation? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is A like some spirit or ghost that invades the domain of B? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Or does B invade A? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>>> >>>> -- 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