On Wednesday, April 9, 2014 4:58:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 07 Apr 2014, at 21:33, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> I'm not saying that I know it, I'm saying that it makes more sense. >> >> >> But then why are we discussing? >> > > To make more sense of everything. > > >> Then, as I said, comp makes no sense from the 1p, which in comp is the >> sense-maker, which makes your point logically in favor of comp. >> > > If 1p is the sense maker, and comp makes no sense from the 1p, then comp > makes no sense. > > > For the 1p. You will tell me that is all what count in your theory, but > that is what is debated, and you beg the question again. >
You are the one who is saying that sense making is limited to 1p. How is that begging the question to ask you to clarify your contradiction that comp makes sense beyond 1p, but that sense making is limited to 1p at the same time. > > > >> I am just saying that the non comp feeling is normal with comp, >> > > Yes, I have no problem with the idea that some analysis of machine > function would point outside of computation. > > > ... some analysis of machine function made by the machine. > Sure. In my view, machines reflect a particular range of sensible relations, so that they do indeed tap into what I would call a 'meta-theroetical' library, but that library is a generic reflection that can be used to impersonate sense, but not experience it. > > > >> Very plausibly. That part can be related to Tarski or Gödel limitation >> theorem, although very often the arguments are not valid, but sometimes it >> is. >> > > Some things may be true but not arguable, so that an invalid argument can > still point us to a valid truth - i.e. a metaphor. > > > You confuse false and non-valid. Non-valid does not entail false, but it > remains non valid, and thus is not an argument, even if you were correct in > the conclusion. You might guess this, because that type of argument can > prove everything. > What we are used to thinking of as valid or non-valid has to more deeply considered when it comes to consciousness. We cannot argue with the method that we use to move our fingers or taste coffee. > > > > > >> >> >> >> If I said that I have a theory that horses pull carts rather than the >> other way around, does its lack of argumentative value make it less true? >> >> >> Lack of justfication can make it less plausible, compared to a theory >> with more justification. That is a very contextual questions, depending on >> many things. >> >> > You're interested in what makes a good theory, but I'm interested in > understanding consciousness. > > > > I am interested in consciousness too, and ask for a good theory, not one > which makes it into a primitive falling from the sky. > If its primitive, it doesn't fall from the sky, the sky falls from it. > > >> The decision to say "yes" to the doctor. >> >> >> What would a UM say to the doctor? >> >> >> The 1-I will say no, and the 3-I might say yes. The UM will live a >> conflict, and only its education might help to decide, in one or the other >> direction. >> > > That sounds like it is the 1-I doing the deciding...which makes me wonder > what is 3-I there to do? > > > > Your body, or your Gödel number, that is a description at the right > substitution level. It is the []p, for the case of the ideally correct > machine, as opposed to the 1p Theaetetus' []p & p, which obeys a quite > different logic. > It sounds like the 3-I is just an address. > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> The machine's decision to add a self-consistency axiom and become another >> machine. >> The direct introspection of the machine, when she feels what is out of >> any possible justification. >> That is formalized by the the annuli Z* \ Z, X* \ X, etc. >> >> Yes, mathematical logic provides tools to meta-formalizes some non >> formalizable, by the machine, predicate which are still applying on the >> machine. >> >> >> Whether it is formal or meta-formal, it's still logic. >> >> >> Not really. Logic is applied, but is not the subject of the inquiry. As >> you said above, arithmetic is not entirely logical. >> > > It depends. If the method of inquiry is logical and the response is > logical, there is no reason to expect that there is anything beyond logic > in between, even if it is not the logic that we are expecting. > > > But the point is that "logical" does not mean anything per se. The 3p and > the 1p have different and opposed logics. > Logical means representation by cognitive functions rather than aesthetic contents. If you wanted, for instance, to make a cell phone that auto-rotates its screen, you have to use some hardware; an acceleration sensor or mercury switch. Such a sensor has no substitution level as no logical instructions can locate the actual phone's orientation on Earth. No virtual sensor can work to inform the user of the real phone. > > > >> >> >> It remains a view of consciousness that lacks aesthetic presence >> >> >> That is the statement I am quite skeptical about, and that you should >> justify, at least the day you pretend that comp is false (not today). >> > > I justify it with all of the examples you keep ignoring - blindsight, > synesthesia, the separation of i/o devices from CPUs, the map-territory > distinction, the conflict between generic/universal systems and proprietary > histories, the model of information as a reduction of qualia, the lack of > need for geometry in binary systems, etc. I don't see anything that > positively supports qualia arising from computation, other than the > pathetic fallacy. > > > You don't have to see that. > Why would I want to pretend I don't see it? > The counter-example shows you invalid. That's all. You confuse again > []~comp, which you defend, and ~[]comp, on which we both agree, as comp -> > ~[]comp. > I think that all support for comp us unfalsifiable. ~comp is supported by numerous empirical examples and rational arguments about the difference between maps/representations and territories/presences. > > > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> and is limited to programmatic states of figuring and configuring. >> >> >> It concerns both the 1p, and its relation with some 3p. You are the one >> conflating them, but that beg the question of why we should conflate them. >> > > Not sure what you mean or how it relates. > > > > All your argument shows that the 3p machine cannot think, and I agree with > them. A body, or a description or a number cannot think indeed, only a > (first) person can. But comp does not say that a machine can think, only > that it can manifest the thinking of a person. With comp, my body and brain > are just natural machine that we get at birth. We are not them, we own them. > I agree that we own them, but that does not mean that the cells of our body aren't also owned by sub-personal consciousness. From our personal perception, those sub-persons seem mechanical, but that may be because of our distance from them. Our quality of awareness is modulated by the characteristics within and beyond our personal range of consciousness, but the mechanical nature which we see beyond us is only another kind of body. The []p and the []p & p are both vehicles for the deeper ~p of aesthetic presence. Sense is ~p (or as I call it -א) > > > > > > >> >> >> >> He's already dead, I'm just saying that I'm not fooled, even if your >> daughter's mistakes make her happy. >> >> >> >> That's my point. Your theory amputes the sense that my sun-in-law is able >> to make, in the comp theory. >> > > Your sun-in-law can make a great deal of sense in the eyes of other > people, I only say that there is no sun-in-law that is independent of our > expectations. The mechanism that represents this meaning to us is indeed an > order of magnitude of difference from ordinary machines, just as a > sculpture that moves is greater than a still photograph, but no new > interiority need be imagined to explain why this behavioral sculpture could > seem life like. > > > In your theory. But that begs the question, when seen as a refutation of > comp. > It's not begging the question at all. It's a simple recognition that a cartoon is only animated within the experience of an appropriate audience. Putting drawings onto paper and flipping them in a certain sequence does not make them into an entity which literally exists on its own. There is nothing that it is like to be a set of drawings of Porky Pig being rotoscoped. It doesn't matter how many millions of drawings you have or how sophisticated and lifelike they look, it's still not conjuring any 1p experience. Even though this is almost undoubtedly true, there is not necessarily a valid argument to make for it, because the nature of 1p experience is already unreachable from argument. It begs the question to accuse me of begging the question, just because arguing for or against consciousness is beyond the scope of argument. > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> You don't have the monopoly on a word like sense. And you should not >> confuse a theory of sense with sense, and a simple theory of sense if given >> by machine's intensional self-references, and so your move to evacuate it >> by abandoning logic just to "kill" my sun-in-law confirms my point. >> >> >> I don't try to have a theory of sense, I try to address sense as it >> actually seems to be. >> >> >> Yes, that is what I criticize. You project your conception of sense to >> others. >> > > By comp, I only do what machines always do. > > >> >> >> >> >> I don't think that any simple theory of sense given by logic >> >> >> It is not given by logic, it is only maintained by the assumption that at >> some description level we are Turing emulable. And then the math, in that >> theory, explain why indeed that is not a logical move, and why it asks for >> a "religious" sort of act of faith. >> > > In my view, the act of faith is sleight of hand. By the time we have > assumed that we are Turing emulable, we have already put the cart in front > of the horse. While we are distracted with ideas of religion, we have made > a fundamental mistake in substituting a phenomenological territory for a > map of maps that has no territory. > > > Confusing map and territory is a mistake that *you* do when reducing my > sun in law to his mechanical body. > He does not need to be reduced to his mechanical body, but neither does he deserve to be inflated to the status of having a personal life. He can be a beautiful piece of design, he can be an oracle for us on super-human knowledge, he can even offer insight into emotions and experiences that he doesn't have, but like a thermometer, he only measures one-dimensional effects that fall out of simulating our cognitive states. > > > > > > >> >> >> >> can do anything but obstruct our understanding...unless we use it as an >> example of how sense works to obstruct itself, which it does. >> >> >> >> You need to abandon logic to be argue that some talk by some entities >> does not make sense. >> >> >> Only if you are blind to the pathetic fallacy. >> >> >> You comment yourself here. >> > > It seems pretty straightforward to me. I can talk to a voice mail machine > without imagining that there is something that it is like to be a voice > mail machine. > > > Me too, but a voice mail is not a self-introspective universal machine. > You are racist against voice mail. How do you know that their listing of menu options isn't their way of expressing their mastery of self-introspection? They are telling you exactly which options that they have available. It's begging the question of sub-comp if you insist that only those machines which you can imagine have self-introspection actually have it at a deeper level. We could make a voice mail system where two voices speak and respond to each other. Your argument against voice mail is no different than mine against sun-in-laws. If your sun-in-law caught a virus and was reduced to a voice mail system, is he no longer part of the family? > > > > > > >> >> >> For most people, it is pretty cleat that just because words can be made >> to come out of a machine in the correct order, it doesn't mean that the >> machine understands what it is saying. Most people understand that voice >> mail can't really listen to you, aren't really being polite, etc. There's >> nothing there behind the woman's voice that is a woman. It does make sense, >> but at a much lower level, so that the imitation of high level sense is a >> pseudo-aesthetic presentation. >> >> >> For most people it has been pretty clear that the sun moves in the sky. >> Then comp explains why ~comp is pretty clear. >> > > Once you understand the relation between sun and Earth, it makes more > sense out of our actual experience. Comp doesn't seem to offer any more > sense of our experience, and in fact makes our experience a 'qualia of the > gaps' within arithmetic. > > > > ... because you don't study the theory. > >From what I see, the theory doesn't address the points that I bring up. > Comp explains why all machine are perturbed by the gap between 3p and 1p, > and the gap between the x logics and the x* logics, and machine can > understand that they cannot prove the existence of their 1p to you, > although we can derive it for simple correct machine. > The same kind of gap could be anticipated between one kind of 3p and another kind of 3p. I don't see anything in comp that points to any aesthetic phenomena. > > > > > > >> >> >> I agree that argument is a bit diabolical. But comp explains why comp is >> not believable, and even why comp is false from the 1p view. >> >> >> Yet you forbid my diabolical argument that sense cannot be sliced into >> logic without losing the most important part. >> >> >> Indeed, that would be a reduction of ([]p & p) to []p. >> > > I don't think there is any &p, it's just [([([])])] all the way down. p = > [([([])])] - [] > > > "& p" does not involve any description of p. But you have to do some math > to see this, and to not confuse a statement like p and a sentence denoting > p. > > I'm not confusing p with "p", I'm pointing out that there is no reason to assume that p is possible outside of a theory. > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> My view also explains why comp is not believable, and why it would seem >> true from the 3p view. >> >> >> >> That is why I insist that saying "yes" to the doctor involves some faith, >> and courage, and that comp has theological consequences, that we can study >> on PA, which in comp is an Escherichia Coli for the study of soul and body. >> >> >> I don't see that comp allows any faith or courage...just mechanism acting >> on arithmetic function and senseless whims with no consequence to it. >> >> >> here you do reduce the machine to its []p, and abstract from its []p & p. >> You could say that you don't see a qualia inside a brain, or inside carbon, >> etc. You just adopt a double standard distinguishing silicon machine and >> carbon machines. >> > > It's not a double standard if you explicitly define the brain and carbon > as [([([])])] representations to begin with. I would not expect to find > proprietary qualia in the body's generic view of us (the brain). That is > not my objection to machine sentience though. Again, there is no > theoretical problem with machine sentience, it is an empirical problem > which arises from assuming 3p behaviors are the cause rather than effect of > experience. > > > Not at all. It is the logico-arithmetical relations and their semantics > which brought the experience, not the behavior, which is a consequences of > those relations. > Logico-arithmetic relations are still 3p concepts. Semantics can be simulated to some extent without having genuine 1p. > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> But you will have to motivate the use of that logic, >> >> >> Why would I have to motivate the use of sense if I don't have to motivate >> the use of standard logic? All I have to do is stop presuming that math can >> make color and then begin to understand why. >> >> >> But comp explains why. >> >> >> Then show me a new color. You can't do it. If I said 'show me how to >> solve Rubik's cube', you could. >> >> >> Machines can already explain why. Anyway, what you say does not >> distinguish silicon and organic bodies on the consciousness matter. >> >> >> It's not the composition of the matter that is the problem, its what the >> composition represents. Authenticity is more fundamental than matter or >> information. >> >> >> Why should my sun-in-law be no more authentic after its prosthetic >> operation? >> >> >> Because you killed him when you replaced the brain that has been >> constructed since the beginning of time as his one and only connection to >> express himself in 3p and replaced it with an imitation that is missing >> billions of years of experience as living organisms. >> >> >> If you say that his brain has been build from the beginning of time, I >> can say the same for the computer. >> > > The substances that you make the computer out of have been built from the > beginning of time, > > > I thought you were not assuming time or physical realities. > Not at the absolute level, but locally, experiences are partitioned with spatiotemporal qualities. > > > > > but when we superimpose a machine onto that substance, there is no > crossover from the experience represented by the substance and the > modalities introduced into them. > > > Why do we have a brain, then? > Brains seem to be associated with creatures who move intentionally. Brains allow for more of a locally cached depth of experience. Brains introduce more entropy and negentropy, more aesthetic quality per unit time. > How do you relate sense and the physical or the mathematical? How is that > related with refuting comp? You beg the question again. > The physical is the most direct reversal of sense - experiences through private time become bodies in public space. Math is a subjectification of physics and an objectification of cognition. I don't see why that would be begging the question, certainly no more than comp does, or any hypothesis about consciousness does. Craig > Bruno > > > > > ... > > Craig > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
