Dear Bruno, How do you deal with the fact that there are more than one self-consistent theory where those theories contradict each other? The example is where one theory takes the continuum hypothesis as true and another takes it as false.
On Sun, Jan 19, 2014 at 11:44 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 19 Jan 2014, at 00:33, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 10:11:50AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> Comp does not need actual infinities, but it still needs the >>> potential infinity of all finite things (integers, or something). >>> >>> But finitist physicalism >>> >> > Oops! I meant "ultrafinistism". The idea that the big thing is a finite > thing, like in step seven, or apparently in Edgar's ontology. > > > > > is indeed a way out of comp. But then your >>> theory is non-computationalist. Do you say "no" to the doctor. You >>> have already answer "no", and later "yes", so I am not sure. Which >>> is it? >>> >>> >> I would agree that finitism contradicts comp, because it contradicts >> arithmetic realism >> > > Ultrafinitism, yes. > > > > > > (some numbers are not as real as others), but why >> do you suggest that finitism contradicts "Yes doctor"? >> > > > Ultrafinitist physicalism is handled by step 8 (MGA). > > It can be handled by a stronger use of Occam razor already in step seven, > instead. > > (To be sure I don't like the idea that the infinitely many creatures which > provably exist and have "life" in arithmetic would be zombie. (but that's > between us)). > > In a sense, those creatures are sort of zombies, because from their own > first personal views, they exist on the limit measure on infinitely many > computations, and that's something nobody can see. Yet, it has a complex > mathematics of its own, whose propositional part is given by the variants > of G and G* (assuming classical standard definitions of belief and > knowledge). (for the ideally correct machine). > > Bruno > > > > > >> >> -- >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ---------------- >> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) >> Principal, High Performance Coders >> Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] >> University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ---------------- >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/ > topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 [email protected] http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
