On 17 January 2014 14:00, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:49 PM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 17 January 2014 13:43, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:42 PM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On 17 January 2014 13:34, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> I meant that if the physics of the brain is computable it follows as a >>>>> straighforward deduction that it would *at least* be possible to make >>>>> a philosophical zombie. It is then a further argument to show that it >>>>> would not be a zombie but a conscious being. >>>>> >>>>> I don't see this. Why would it at least be possible to make a >>>> p-zombie? (And if you can show by a further argument that it's a conscious >>>> being, then clearly it *wasn't *a zombie...) >>>> >>> >>> I think he means that strong AI would be possible, and then strong AI + >>> comp -> conscious programs. >>> >> >> I think I see. Strong AI implies intelligent programmes, but not >> necessarily conscious ones. However I'm still not sure about philosophical >> zombies, which I believe mimic human beings completely without being >> conscious. >> > > Right, so if you think there can be intelligent programs and you believe > zombies are impossible, then it implies computationalism. > > I guess so. It's just the "argument from incredulity" really, which I admit doesn't stand up. I just can't imagine how a programme could imitate a person convincingly for a long time without being conscious.
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