On 01 Dec 2013, at 18:04, Jesse Mazer wrote:
Chalmers a materialist? That seems like a pretty bizarre and/or
uninformed description, given that the idea he is best-known for is
that the "hard problem" of first-person qualia can never be solved
by materialist explanations (even if the so-called "easy problem" of
explaining third-person behaviors, including everything we say and
write, probably could be), and requires either a dualist ontology or
a panpsychist idealist one (although he argues that even if we
accept panpsychism, it would still be a "dual-aspect" theory since
there would be a distinction between "information states" and the
qualia associated with each one). Have you read his book "The
Conscious Mind"?
Chalmers is still a weak-materialist, making him non computationalist
in the weak sense I propose, but that could explain why he stops at
step 3 in the UDA.
He is also dualist, and defends, in that book, the Everett
interpretation, which is, as well explained by Primas notably, the
essence of Everett theory (QM without collapse).
Dennett's problem is that it take the problem of matter basically
solved, which is not the case, and eventually flirts seriously with
the elimination of the person and consciousness.
Chalmers is not an eliminativist, but seems to ignore comp and the
FPI. Both ignores computer science and the fact that we can already
listen to the machines.
I have enjoyed Dennett's Brainstorm very much, and in "Minds" I" he
get close to the FPI, in his novel "Where am I".
But his "consciouness explained" is the billionth physicalist attempt
to put the person under the rug. Both the intuitive FPI, and the logic
of self-reference illustrates a sort of correctness of the intuition:
as it shows that IF Matter exists then the person is an illusion. With
comp the person is not an illusion (we have to ask her yes or no) so
only Matter can be an illusion.
In this list I have sometimes said "materialist" for "weak
materialist", to avoid the repetition. A weak materialist is a
believer in primitive matter. A materialist in philosophy of mind is
for someone who believes only in Matter, and is of course
automatically a weak-materialist. Comp+occam is thus inconsistent with
both weak materialism (the belief in Matter) and materialism (the
belief in only Matter).
Bruno
Jesse
On Saturday, November 30, 2013, Roger Clough wrote:
Online opinions of Dennett and Chalmers-- the clueless two
Dennett never tells us what conscilousness is, because
conciouness rwequires a perceiver, and he hasn't a clue as to what
that is,
because that concept is foreign to his materialism.
He's clueless. And famous as well maybe because with that
beard he looks like a philosopher ought to look.
Chalmers is in the same hole as Dennett is
he is also a materialist wuithout a perceiver.
With his long wild hair he may seem to some to
know what he's talking about. But he's also
clueless, which is why we have the "hard problem
of consciousnwess
Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000]
See my Leibniz site at
http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough
gh
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