To say that F = m . a or e= m c2 as truth it is necessary to accept certain beliefs. Belief that at the next moment the laws will not change for example.
Let´s go to a human level: in evolutionary terms, I would say that truth is a belief hardcoded by natural selection. Truth would say, is the constants plus the algorthm, The data that the living being processes, are the beliefs. The pivotal affirmation from Conrad Lorenz: "The kantian a priori where shaped in our mind as a result of natural selection" has a very far reaching: it means that self evident truths like the existence of persons, animals, space, time and all self evident truths that derives from them are hardcoded, and we have hardcoded algorithms for processing them. That is the reason why they appear behind us and we react to them without any doubt about their existence. We also have also algoritm for adquiring derived concepts in certain ways and not in others. Truth in a ample sense is whatever that kick-back: a stone wall for example. But that is not all. in evolutionary terms, the kick-back can happen across generations. If we doubt about certain abstract truths (like to kill is bad), we will not receive an inmediate negative feedback, but perhaps in a few years or even our gene/meme descendants. That is why the Lorenz`s mechanism has included in our mind a lot of innate common sense truths). That materialist explanation paradoxically end up in the idea that there is no space neither time neither persons outside the world of the mind, that is what really exist. Out of the mind there is nothing. Perhaps mathematics. I´m in aggreement with Craig on this. 2013/6/3 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> > > On 03 Jun 2013, at 01:41, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > How do we integrate empirical data into Bp&p? > > > > Technically, by restricting p to the "leaves of the UD*" (the true, and > thus provable, sigma_1 sentences). > Then to get the physics (the probability measure à-la-UDA), you can do the > same with Bp & Dp & p. Think about the WM-duplication, where the W or M > selection plays the role of a typical empirical data. > > More on this when you came back to this, probably on FOAR. > > Bruno > > > > > > > > On Saturday, June 1, 2013 3:41:56 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote: >> >> Russell wrote: >> >> >> *"...When it comes to Bp & p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can >> see it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, >> as opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge. But I am >> vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific knowledge, which has >> more to do with falsifiability, than with proof. And that's about where I >> left it - years ago.* >> *..."* >> Interesting difference between 'scientific' and 'mathematical' >> (see the Nobel Prize distinction) - also in falsifiability, that does not >> automatically escape the agnostic questioning about the circumstances of >> the falsifying and the original images. Same difficulty as in judging >> "proof". >> "Scientific knowledge" indeed is part of a belief system. In conventional >> sciences we THINK we know, in math we assume >> (apologies, Bruno). >> John M >> >> >> On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 6:43 PM, Russell Standish >> <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: >>> > You mean unprovable? I get confused because it seems that you >>> > sometimes use Bp to mean "proves p" and sometimes "believes p" >>> > >>> >>> To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing. I believe in >>> this theorem because I can prove it. If I can't prove it, then I don't >>> believe it - it is merely a conjecture. >>> >>> In modal logic, the operator B captures both proof and supposedly >>> belief. Obviously it captures a mathematician's notion of belief - >>> whether that extends to a scientists notion of belief, or a >>> Christian's notion is another matter entirely. >>> >>> When it comes to Bp & p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see >>> it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as >>> opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge. >>> >>> But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific >>> knowledge, which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof. >>> >>> And that's about where I left it - years ago. >>> >>> Cheers >>> >>> -- >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> ---------------- >>> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) >>> Principal, High Performance Coders >>> Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] >>> University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> ---------------- >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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