Hi Richard Ruquist I'm well aware of that, except you don't need Godel to reach an impossibly complex state of calculations. My own position is that if you can't calculate upward any more, you calculate downward. From Platonia, except that you begin to use the forms, numbers, reason, all of that stuff. Consciousness is created from Platonia, probably more form philosophy than math. After some study, it turns out that Leibniz's substances are not based on physical materials but on their forms. Just like Plato except that there are an infinite types of materials.
Roger Clough, [email protected] 10/16/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-16, 08:33:45 Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ? Roger, Philosophers such as Lucas, Hofstadter and Chalmers as well as Penrose and Godel suggest that consciousness may be due to incompleteness itself allowing for emergence... See http://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf Richard On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 7:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ? > > The short answer is that I am proposing that : > > 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position > that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. > > 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make > such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the > range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed > calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic > reason, > the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough > mathematics to be more specific. > > If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. > > > > > ======================================================= > A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: > Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an "emergent property" > of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: > > A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's > condition of non-computability ? > > http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html > > "Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of > classical > computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. > The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that > > 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, > 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex > temporally bind information, > and > 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity > among neurons." > > > > B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? > > Now my understanding of "emergent properties" is that they appear or emerge > through looking at a phenomenon > at a lower degree of magnification "from above. " Thus sociology is an > emergent property of > the behavior of many minds. > > IMHO "from above" means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser > position. > > Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: > > http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html > > One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably > that of Platonia as experienced. > All art and insight comes from such an experience. > > On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the > universe is made up of > quantum "spin networks", which presumably can model even the most complex > entities. > He does not seem to deny that the "non-computational" calculations belong to > the realm > of spin networks. > > This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of non-computability, > and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete, > to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation. > > Instead, I propose the following: > > 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position > that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. > > 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make > such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the > range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed > calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic > reason, > the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough > mathematics to be more specific. > ================================================================= > > > > Roger Clough, [email protected] > 10/16/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
