On Friday, August 31, 2012 5:53:24 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: > > Hi Craig Weinberg > > You're on the right track, but everybody from Plato on > says that the Platonic world is timeless, eternal. > And nonextended or spaceless (nonlocal). > Leibniz's world of monads satisfies these requirements. > > But there is more, there is the Supreme Monad, which > experiences all. And IS the All. > >
Hegel and Spinoza have the Totality, Kabbala has Ein Sof, There's the Tao, Jung's collective unconscious, there's Om, Brahman, Logos, Urgrund, Urbild, first potency, ground of being, the Absolute, synthetic a prori, etc. I call it the Totality-Singularity or just "Everythingness". It's what there is when we aren't existing as a spatiotemporally partitioned subset. It is by definition nonlocal and a-temporal as there is nothing to constrain its access to all experiences. Craig > Roger Clough, [email protected] <javascript:> > 8/31/2012 > Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him > so that everything could function." > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > *From:* Craig Weinberg <javascript:> > *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> > *Time:* 2012-08-30, 13:53:09 > *Subject:* Re: Technological (Machine) Thinking and Lived Being (Erlebnis) > > I think that the Platonic realm is just time, and that time is nothing > but experience. > > Thought is the experience of generating hypothetical experience. > > The mistake is presuming that because we perceive exterior realism as a > topology of bodies that the ground of being must be defined in those terms. > In fact, the very experience you are having right now - with your eyes > closed or half asleep...this is a concretely and physically real part of > the universe, it just isn't experienced as objects in space because you are > the subject of the experience. If anything, the outside world is a Platonic > realm of geometric perspectives and rational expectations. Interior realism > is private time travel and eidetic fugues; metaphor, irony, anticipations, > etc. Not only Platonic, but Chthonic. Thought doesn't come from a realm, > realms come from thought. > > Craig > > > On Thursday, August 30, 2012 11:54:32 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: >> >> What is thinking ? Parmenides thought that thinking and being are >> one, which IMHO I agree with. >> >> Thoughts come to us from the Platonic realm, which I personally, perhaps >> mistakenly, >> >> associate with what would be Penrose's incomputable realm. >> Here is a brief discussion of technological or machine thinking vs lived >> experience. >> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ref/10.1080/00201740310002398#tabModule IMHO >> Because computers cannot have lived experience, they cannot think. Inquiry: >> An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy Volume >> 46<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/sinq20?open=46#vol_46>, >> Issue 3 <http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/sinq20/46/3>, 2003 >> >> Thinking and Being: Heidegger and Wittgenstein on Machination and >> Lived-Experience >> Version of record first published: 05 Nov 2010 >> >> Heidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beitr锟�e zur Philosophie >> begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally >> characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the >> critique of machination in Beitr锟�e connects its arising to the >> predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for >> the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding >> of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of >> machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced >> to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne , >> originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this >> common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and >> lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the >> deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the >> Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the >> Beitr锟�e 's analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes >> to discover a way of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant >> basic assumption of self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the >> modern picture of the autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set >> over against a pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual >> confrontation. In the final section, I investigate an important and >> illuminating parallel to Heidegger's result: the consideration of the >> relationship between experience and technological ways of thinking that >> forms the basis of the late Wittgenstein's famous rule-following >> considerations. >> everything-list >> >> >> >> Roger Clough, [email protected] >> 8/30/2012 >> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >> everything could function." >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/WEvmwMTgZdoJ. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected] <javascript:>. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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